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Abstract 
 
This thesis identifies theoretical gaps regarding the adequacy of property rights in 
achieving sustainable management in the world’s largest Sundarbans Mangrove 
Forest (SMF) in Bangladesh. This will be achieved through an examination of 
existing and alternative property rights regimes. Gaps are also pinpointed regarding 
non-compliance with existing policy in conservation practices and the absence of 
clear quantitative and qualitative methodical approaches for identifying sustained 
conservation determinants of the forest.  
 
This research aims to fill these gaps by addressing the questions of the adequacy of 
the existing property rights regime to achieve sustainability. It examines the 
interaction between property rights and conservation and the necessity for an 
alternative property rights regime of co-management. It focuses on state property 
rights regimes within mangrove conservation practices. The subject of this thesis is 
regarded as one of the oldest mangrove management systems in history, originating 
in 1875. 
 
The thesis adopts a mixed methods research approach involving household survey, 
content analysis and focus group discussions. Multiple actors, scales and 
techniques—with a focus on Forest Dependent Communities (FDCs) and 
conservation practices by the Bangladesh Forest Department (BFD)—are involved in 
the study. This study considers FDC households as a unit of analysis. Field work was 
conducted in six villages of the Koyra sub-district and various government offices 
over a period of four months between November 2010 and February 2011. The field 
research moves from the household level to the national, division, district, sub-
district and international levels. It undertakes a combination of process analysis to 
establish how mangrove forest conservation is enhanced, the role of FDCs in 
conservation and why policy fails to advance sustained conservation. 
 
Following a review of descriptive statistics, logit model and content analysis, the 
study finds the state property regime to be inadequate due to the specific and 
changing socio-cultural, economic, political and ecological contexts of the SMF and 
its FDCs. Currently, there is a high prevalence of institutionalised corruption and 
elite dominance. Existing regime embeddedness obstructs FDCs in their attempt to 
play a role in management and policy-making processes.  
 
Without understanding the emergence of the common property regime, FDCs’ 
positive motivation and collective action cannot be incorporated into sustained 
conservation policy directives. Along with supply-side property rights interventions 
in line with Schlager and Ostrom’s (1992) theory, this study justifies some key 
demand-side interventions to achieve sustainable management. This is expected to 
overcome state property-related hurdles in achieving sustainability of the SMF. 
Thereby, it highlights property rights embeddedness to improve FDCs’ socio-
economic context through a ‘co-management-alternative livelihood mix’. 
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Mawalis Local FDCs who harvest honey and beeswax from the SMF 
(also called Mawals). 
Pashur-Goran- 
Gewa 
-Keora-Kankra 
 
Dominant tree species of the SMF. 
Sal Main species of Tangail-Mymensingh-Dhaka protected forest 
(scientific name is shorea robusta). 
Sundari The main tree species from which the name ‘Sundarbans’ 
originated. 
Union Parishad Lowest level tier of Government. 
Upazila Lowest bureaucratic/administrative and second lowest 
Government tier (formerly known as Thana). 
Zamindary Previous ruling system of a particular area in lieu of offering 
revenue to the British Government. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Forests provide direct and indirect use and non-use benefits. Access to forest 
resources is an important source of livelihood and income generation for rural people 
(Babulo et al. 2008; Fisher 2004; Mamo et al. 2007; Vedeld et al. 2007). According 
to the World Bank (WB 2004), more than 1.6 billion people globally depend on 
forests to varying degrees for their livelihood. Around 60 million indigenous people 
rely almost fully on forests; and some 350 million people living in and around forests 
are highly forest-dependent for their income. The world’s coastal zones are home to 
over 60 per cent of the global population. Coastal communities and indigenous 
people heavily depend on a range of products and services of mangrove forests in 
coastal ecosystems (Adhikari et al. 2010). This high anthropogenic dependence has 
resulted in at least 35 per cent global mangrove forest loss in the last two decades 
and this has exceeded losses for two other threatened environments: tropical rain 
forests and coral reefs (Valiela et al. 2001). Recently, Duke et al. (2007) and Giri et 
al. (2007) confirmed the rapid and alarming decrease in mangrove areas globally.    
Conversion of forest land to non-forest use, along with forest degradation, is a price 
of human settlement (Maraseni 2007). According to the Food and Agriculture 
Organisation (FAO) (2010) of the United Nations, total global forest land is 
equivalent to 30 per cent of the earth and is being reduced by a factor of 200 square 
kilometres (sq. km) per day. Such conversion takes the form of deforestation and 
degradation, and has two adverse effects. First, it increasingly threatens the 
livelihoods of 1.6 billion forest-dependent people of the world (Plieninger 2009). 
Second, the reduction of forests is causing atmospheric concentration of carbon 
dioxide (Eckersley 1995; Kirschbaum 2003; MOEF 2005a; Prasad 1997; Quazi et al. 
2008; Randall 1993; UNFCCC 1997). Thus, many developing countries are adopting 
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national forest conservation policies to secure the livelihoods of forest people and to 
try to achieve sustainable forest management. Hence, conservation policies are 
adopted through conservation practices defined as specific, science-based guidelines 
for conservation of rare species during forest resource harvesting (MDFW 2009). 
By transmitting Brundtland’s (1987) definition of sustainable development into 
sustainable forest management, although the ultimate objective of sustainable forest 
management is to meet the needs of forest-dependent communities (FDCs) without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs, continuous 
tropical forest destruction poses a challenge in achieving such sustainability 
(Laurance 2007). Deforestation rates are severe in tropical parts of Asia and the 
Pacific with a reduction of 1.1 per cent/year in comparison with south and central 
America; and in Africa where the rate is estimated as 0.7 per cent/year (Dupuy et al. 
1999). Although only 7 per cent of the world’s total land is covered by tropical 
forests, they contain 50 per cent of all living species (Dupuy et al. 1999). Tropical 
forests are valued as the main source of FDCs’ livelihoods through the generation of 
direct economic benefits and as the provider of many intangible benefits to society 
(Mahapatra & Kant 2005).  
Historically, Asian forests are extremely rich in terms of tropical rain forests and 
biodiversity. Asian tropical forests, including biodiversity hotspots, are being 
destroyed at an alarming rate (Laurance 1999, 2007). The World Bank identified 
overharvesting of forest products by local FDCs as one of the major reasons for the 
loss of forest cover (WB 1993). Conventional forest management is based mainly on 
wood production with an application of numerous silviculture techniques and 
approaches (Biswas & Choudhury 2007). However, to achieve sustainability, forest 
management must include economic and human dimensions and go beyond just 
focusing on mere wood production.   
Against this conventional forest management history, sustainable management has 
become a process of managing forest land to achieve selected objectives without 
undue reduction of its inherent values and future productivity with undesirable 
consequences on economics, society and the environment (ITTO 1992). To achieve 
these goals, forest policies have shifted from traditional harvesting of certain specific 
products, mainly wood, to the promotion of forest management for a continuous flow 
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of multiple benefits (Malla 2000). In the last decades, sustainable forest management 
has gained strong policy support from policy-makers and received unprecedented 
focus from scientists and researchers (Diaz-Balteiro & Romero 2004; Dupuy et al. 
1999; Pearce et al. 2003). Hence, sustainable development of forests is defined as a 
“process that consists of maintaining indefinitely, and without unacceptable 
deterioration, the capacity for production and renewal, as well as the ecological 
variety of forest ecosystems” (Dulbecco & Yelkouni 2007, p. 1044). The ecological 
focus of this definition contrasts with the wider definition of Islam and Siwar (2010) 
which implies the sustainable utilisation of forest resources for the benefit of 
communities and states. This latter concept aims to maintain the value of forest 
resources by creating benefits through employment and income for the populations 
and states concerned.  
However, the main objective of sustainable forest management is to enhance the 
natural forest by increasing the adoption of sustainable forest management practices 
on the part of forest managers and policy makers for the welfare of its dependent 
communities (Islam & Siwar 2010). This objective has not been realised in many 
tropical forests because of the lack of partnership between multiple actors (Ros-
Tonen et al. 2008). This failure cannot be overcome without creating an institutional 
context for good forest governance, including mandating local community 
involvement (Andersson & Agrawal 2011). Following Ros-Tonen et al. (2008), 
national conservation policy becomes problematic when it avoids the concept of 
sustainable forest management in overlooking partnerships with indigenous and 
traditional forest users.       
Because of these policy and management problems, the problem of forest clearing 
has become increasingly severe in developing countries (Panta et al. 2008). This is 
especially true for Bangladesh. According to the Ministry of Environment and 
Forests (MOEF) (MOEF 2005b), forests cover 17 per cent of the total land area of 
Bangladesh. However, Manna and Hasan (2009) question this figure and estimate the 
area to be only 7.7 per cent. They also predict the possible reduction of forest cover 
to 5 per cent of total land area within a few years due to massive deforestation, 
especially through illegal felling. The forest sector contributes 5 per cent to Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) and generates 2 per cent of total employment of 
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Bangladesh (MOEF 2005c). Transparency International recorded the Bangladeshi 
forest sector’s contribution to GDP as 1.52 per cent in 2006-07 (Manzoor-E-Khoda 
2008). However, the FAO estimates this sector’s contribution to GDP at only 1.7 per 
cent and as contributing insignificantly (0 per cent) to the total labour force (FAO 
2011).  
Bangladesh has 3 per cent of the global mangrove share—mainly via the world’s 
largest mangrove forest, the Sundarbans Mangrove Forest (SMF). This forest is now 
facing high anthropogenic pressure to provide livelihoods for 3.5 million local forest-
dependent people living in its surrounding villages. Except for three buffer zone 
areas with strict protection, a large number of areas are protected via conservation 
policy. Therefore, this mangrove forest is in need of special attention for sustainable 
conservation under protected area management of the BFD.  
This chapter includes eight sections. Section 1.2 provides a short brief of the 
country’s protected forest area management systems. Section 1.3 outlines the 
research problem that frames the central research objectives and questions in Section 
1.4. A short synopsis of the research design and methodology is outlined in Section 
1.5. Sections 1.6 and 1.7 present the scope and organisation of the research 
respectively. The chapter concludes with Section 1.8.    
1.2 Protected Area Management in Bangladesh 
Due to continuous deforestation and degradation, Bangladeshi policy-makers have 
sought to manage and protect forests through forest departments (FDs). The history 
of protected area management in Bangladesh dates back to 1875. In its early days, 
the aim of protected area management was to ensure secured resource extraction. 
Colonial British rulers transformed the indigenous decentralised forest management 
systems into a centralised system by consolidating forest administration through the 
creation of a forest bureaucracy, the Forestry Department, in 1865 (Kumar & Kant 
2005). After independence in 1971, the newly-named Bangladesh Forest Department 
(BFD) inherited the same hierarchical colonial top-down organisational structure 
with past working practices unchanged. In 1979, the first national forest policy 
(NFP) was adopted. This made some small deviations from the colonial forest policy 
inherited from the British period and from 1962 forest policy in the Pakistan period. 
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The BFD maintains its primary role of ‘revenue collector’ for the Government 
exchequer through focusing on wielding power and authority over the forests and 
forest communities. Furthermore, it continues to be the national ‘protector of forests’ 
from local people who are ‘notional thieves’ in the eyes of government and BFD 
officials (Fernandes & Kulkarni 1983). Accordingly, the rules and regulations of the 
BFD were prepared and directed towards precluding local people from playing any 
role in the management of forests. The BFD continues to remain non-responsive to 
societal needs to this day. It is not surprising that this top-down exclusionary 
management system has resulted in hostility and conflict between the BFD and FDCs 
(Hossain et al. 2001; Iftekhar & Islam 2004a).  
In the Sundarban Impact Zone (SIZ), the centralised and exclusionary management 
systems have worsened this hostility. Because of their heavy dependence on the 
forests for their livelihoods, in recent times the marginalised and disadvantaged 
communities started defying strict restrictive conservation policies (Kumar & Kant 
2005). In addition, the failure of the state-centred policy of 1979 has seen a 
continued reduction of forest resources throughout the 1980s, with an annual 
estimated deforestation rate of 3.3 per cent (Alam 2009). Given this high 
deforestation rate, there has been a growing consensus among key forest policy-
makers in Bangladesh in favour of moving to a more sustainable approach by 
involving local people in management (Salam et al. 2005). In this regard, the 
Government has given the highest priority to the adoption of a participatory forest 
resource management programme. This approach has been launched and has become 
the dominant focus of the country’s forestry sector (Khan & Begum 1997).  
The participatory forestry programme commenced in 1980 with the aim of extending 
forestry activities and initiatives under the auspices of the BFD. Salam et al. (2005) 
identified the specific objectives of the programme as: (i) involving local 
communities for the protection, management and development of forests in a 
sustainable way; (ii) increasing forest resources with a view to improving local 
environment; (iii) contributing to eradicating rural poverty by involving the local 
poor and vulnerable sections of society in the management of forests through 
income-generation activities; and (iv) enhancing institutional capacity of the BFD.  
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Although participatory forestry was targeted to achieve a paradigm shift in forest 
management, it did not occur in the case of the SMF. The local people were, and still 
are, excluded from mangrove management and policy formulation. There is still no 
consideration of the use of the forest for sustainable production and livelihood 
security for FDCs (Kabir & Hossain 2008). Rather, through conservation policy, the 
BFD has emphasised protection by proclamation as a reserved forest. It has 
consolidated state control by prohibiting the granting of new rights to FDCs other 
than strict access; and withdrawing rights granted through permit licenses. The BFD 
also restricts any sort of human activities inside the forest without their formal 
permission.  
The second forest policy was adopted in 1994 after identification of the forest 
degradation and encroachment on forest land (Iftekhar & Hoque 2005). To address 
these problems, the policy recognised the role of local FDCs for the first time by 
committing to an equitable distribution of forest resources amongst them. However, 
the BFD violated its commitment to partnering in the case of the SMF by 
maintaining a strict conservation policy that excludes local people; and the BFD 
continues to implement previous long-held historical exclusionary policies. Thus, 
there is an urgent need to bring change to its organisational structure and culture.    
1.3 Statement of the Research Problem 
More than 50 per cent of Bangladesh’s forests have disappeared in the last 30 years 
(MOEF 2008). This rate of deforestation is very severe.  In one study, it was cited 
that 50 per cent of the SMF’s total tree cover has been reduced over the past 20 years 
(Kabir & Hossain 2008). Such deforestation is due to the diverse nature of its 
resources and the huge demand for them. This overall reduction trend is threatening 
the livelihood security of the FDCs (Kabir & Hossain 2008).  
Regarding forest reduction, a considerable amount of research has been undertaken 
in the area of forest conservation through community participation in a co-
management system or structure. In the literature, co-management structures imply a 
division of authority and management tasks among various stakeholders, including 
public and private (Carlsson & Berkes 2005; Njaya 2007; Olsson et al. 2004; 
Plummer & Armitage 2007; Plummer & Fitzgibbon 2004a). This study applies 
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FDCs’ involvement with defined property rights in a co-management structure for 
sustainable management of the SMF. In this regard, Ellis and Porter-Bolland (2008) 
identified that community involvement in forest management played a significant 
role in forest conservation. Theoretically, co-management promotes the access to, 
and exchange of, both material and immaterial resources such as money, technology, 
scientific knowledge, local experiences, and provides legitimacy (Sandstrom & Rova 
2010). According to Sandstrom and Rova (2010), this concept of co-management is 
broad and limits its performance. Hence, this research scales down this concept of 
co-management into co-management structure to ensure authority and management 
tasks are allocated to the FDCs of the SMF.  
However, others like Fraser et al. (2006) and Plummer and Fitzgibbon (2004b) 
criticised co-management for not being successful when its indicators were not 
reconciled with property rights. The term ‘indicator’ is used as the measurable 
criterion in the form of both qualitative and quantitative variables which can be 
monitored periodically to assess the change in sustainable forest management and to 
formulate related policy (Hickey 2008; Wijewardana 2008). Hickey (2008) identified 
the magnitude of the forest sustainability indicators as being very important for 
monitoring and policy formulation. Following foreshadowed definition, conservation 
practices of the SMF may be defined as a set of de jure rules and regulations for 
resource harvesting and management. For instance, conservation practices in the 
SMF include issuance of permit licences to FDCs for access and withdrawal rights; 
banning timber and timber-related resource harvesting since cyclone Aila in 2009; 
restricting fish and crab harvesting in the breeding season for a specific time and in 
specific forest land; etc. Thus, it is necessary to identify the indicators in terms of 
conservation practices and co-management structure to achieve sustainability. In 
spite of its importance, no study in Bangladesh has focused on the identification of 
such indicators for sustained conservation of the SMF (Salam & Noguchi 2005). 
Hence, FDCs’ role in management and policy formulation for conservation has 
remained unexplored.  
In Bangladesh, much of the literature on protected area management emphasises the 
poor condition of forests and existing management problems (Biswas & Choudhury 
2007; Chowdhury & Koike 2010; Chowdhury et al. 2009; Muhammed et al. 2008). 
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The Forestry Master Plan of 1993 primarily guides current forest management. This 
plan has the primary objective of improving management practices sustainably by 
enhancing environmental preservation and conservation through increasing public 
participation whilst ensuring benefit streams from the forests (BFD 2005). Although 
sustainable forest management is the prime goal of forest conservation and FDCs’ 
participation is the central component of the policy, no study has yet been conducted 
to identify the factors influencing FDCs’ participation in sustained conservation 
practices in the SMF.  
Present management system has failed to realise true sustainable indicators from 
overall stakeholders’ viewpoints (Roy & Alam 2012). This includes avoidance of 
local people’s customary rights and knowledge in resource conservation. The 
existing emphasis on exclusion has made forest management more complicated with 
numerous new objectives (Warner 1997). Sustainable forest conservation is hindered 
as a result of dense population pressure and weak law enforcement (Struhsaker et al. 
2005). Sustainable forest conservation needs to go beyond mere forest ecosystem 
management to focussing on a broader approach of including local people and 
policy-makers in a partnership (Salam et al. 2005). Forest conservation needs to 
reflect the attitudes of communities by creating a dynamic interaction between them 
and policy makers; and explore the necessity of alternative livelihood options for 
FDCs to lessen pressure on forests. The impact of factors influencing conservation 
policies, property rights, economic activities and existing conflicts between local 
people and the BFD to achieve sustainability in the SMF has remained unexplored.  
The provision of property rights to local people plays a vital role in environmental 
conservation and mangrove management (Amri 2005). However, despite a large 
body of literature, in-depth analysis of institutional and property rights issues of 
community-based conservation in Bangladesh is relatively rare. The FDCs in the 
SMF do not have recognised property rights. Moreover, the lack of alternative 
livelihood options for them is increasing pressure on the forest. Economic incentives, 
property rights and participation in co-management processes significantly influence 
the sustainable management of mangrove ecosystems (Walters et al. 2008). 
Investigation of strategies for achieving sustainable conservation practices in the 
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SMF through an inclusion approach with appropriate property rights allocated to 
FDCs remained unexplored.  
1.4 Research Objectives and Questions 
Firstly, the study aims to identify which factors influence the BFD’s conservation 
practices in managing the SMF. This research, with the application of survey, focus 
group discussions (FGDs) and content analysis methods, will fill gaps in policy, 
theory and methods for participation, exclusion and an alternative property rights 
regime. Hence, it will identify and quantify conservation factors by obtaining a 
thorough understanding of the reserved forest management structure, community-
forest relationships and deforestation threats. This study fills the gaps in the literature 
by examining community perceptions towards property rights and forest 
conservation. It is thus hoped that this study will enhance co-management policy 
perspectives for sustainable management of the SMF. 
This research explores potential corrective policy and management approaches to 
reduce deforestation. It also aims to address the policy linkages between community 
and conservation to achieve sustainable forest management. In this regard, this study 
extends the analysis by involving communities in a system of inalienable common 
property rights. 
Consequently, the main objective of this study is to investigate whether an alternative 
property rights regime can enhance sustainability in the SMF. To achieve this 
principal objective, research questions are designed based on three thematic issues: 
state property rights, co-management and demand-side interventions. The main 
research questions are as follows:  
1. Is the existing property rights regime adequate to achieve sustainability? 
2. How do communities perceive the interaction between the existing property 
rights regime and the conservation of forest resources?  
3. Is an alternative property rights regime of co-management able to achieve 
forest sustainability? 
4. What are the barriers to implementation of co-management?  
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5. How can these barriers be overcome to achieve sustainability?  
1.5 Research Design and Methodology 
The research adopts a mixed method approach that involves the collection of both 
primary and secondary data and information. This research uses different 
methodological approaches. In this regard, a detailed content analysis has been 
conducted on historical policy regimes using Schlager and Ostrom’s (S&O) (1992) 
property rights framework. The framework has been used to investigate the 
interaction and conflict between the state property rights regime and mangrove 
resource conservation practices. Various methods were used to generate data and 
information to answer the research questions. These include: (i) use of secondary 
sources for content analysis to address research question 1, (ii) household survey for 
research question 2, and (iii) focus group discussions (FGDs) for research questions 
3, 4 and 5. For analysis of relevant stakeholder responses and to finalise the 
interview questionnaire, a pilot study was also conducted. Except for content 
analysis, the research design for the household survey and FGDs are outlined in 
Figure 1.1.  
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Figure 1.1: Research design 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This study adopts an integrated approach examining multiple actors, scales and 
methods with a focus on state and common property rights regimes. The study has 
reviewed forest policies with respect to the SMF for the last five hundred years. In 
this regard, the content analysis method was used to identify the role of property 
rights in the outcomes observed in the literature.  
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This study considered the FDCs as a key focus for analysis purposes. Four highly-
marginalised and disadvantaged FDC groups were selected. As well, BFD staff 
working at various levels, including the Sundarban Forest Office (SFO) and its lower 
offices, were included. Non-Government Organisations (NGOs), research 
organisations, other government offices from Upazila (sub-district) to ministry levels 
and university academics were also included. The mixed method approach helped 
comprehend how management of the SMF was being driven, who was driving it and, 
in spite of conservation interventions, why this forest was experiencing deforestation 
and degradation, and the role of FDCs in existing conservation practices. 
The study thus examined the perceptions of various actors including FDCs and the 
BFD with regard to access to, and withdrawal and management of, forest resources. 
Current and alternative property rights regimes were examined against resource 
harvesting patterns, interests, and characteristics of FDCs and the BFD in the context 
of mangrove conservation. This approach was able to capture and understand the 
actions and activities of these two actors.   
The integration of quantitative and qualitative methods is useful in an examination of 
property rights. Quantitative household survey methods were used to collect data and 
information on FDC perceptions regarding conservation practices, top-down 
management, resource extraction patterns, property rights and other socio-economic 
and demographic variables. Nonetheless, these data were not adequate to provide 
direct statements on what FDCs, the BFD and other actors are thinking. They are 
thus insufficient to allow an understanding of overall perceptions of mangrove 
conservation. Consequently, to complement the quantitative method, qualitative 
semi-structured interviews with these actors were also conducted.   
This study investigated community perceptions by employing a binary logit model 
using dichotomous, continuous and other variables. For dichotomous variables, five-
point Likert scale responses were converted into binary formats. This model is 
considered to be best adapted to capture the non-linear relationship between factors 
and forest outcomes that vary with the changes in the value of other factors. Logistic 
regression is widely used to capture and probe potential causal mechanisms. Because 
of the dearth of baseline information on forest conditions in the SMF, assessment of 
sustained conservation (forest growth) was complicated. An approximate subjective 
14 
 
assessment of sustained conservation from the FDCs was assumed to be the only way 
to overcome the problem.  
The respondents were not experienced in survey participation. To make the questions 
accessible and understandable to the respondents, variable-related objective 
questions were mainly avoided.   
1.6 Scope of the Study 
Bangladesh has many different types of forests such as hill forests, mangrove forests, 
mangrove plantations and plain land Sal (shorea robusta) forests. This study focuses 
on the mangrove forest known as the SMF. This is a reserved forest, managed solely 
by the BFD. Under present management, FDCs are not involved in the policy 
formulation and management of the SMF, despite the country’s forest policy 
supporting their involvement (GOB 1994). Under the present institutional 
framework, the FDCs enjoy only two types of property rights—‘access’ and 
‘withdrawal’—for a limited period, subject to renewal of permit licences. Thus, this 
study applies theories of conservation, property rights, co-management and social 
capital to investigate which types of property rights can ensure benefit streams for 
the FDCs. Primarily, adopting an alternative property rights regime under co-
management may enhance such benefits and provide sustainability of the SMF. The 
study mainly uses S&O’s (Schlager & Ostrom 1992) property rights typology.  
This research introduces the concepts of market, corruption and the role of policy 
instruments in conservation. The existence of corruption, restriction of FDC 
specialisation and capital accumulation due to the current state property rights regime 
is explained in the literature review. However, these concepts are not assessed or 
measured by framing specific research questions. Other issues such as social justice 
and poverty are outside the scope of this study.    
This study was limited to a policy evaluation comparing two policy regimes. An 
assumption of this study is that state forest management has failed and a co-
management approach could lead to sustainable management of the SMF.  
Although it is supposed that several factors or conditions make local peoples’ forest 
management sustainable, this study assumed defined property rights as the most 
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significant factor to achieve sustainable forest management. Co-management is 
assumed to better regulate, monitor, and distribute resources among local 
communities with different interests and to achieve sustainability. 
This study employs ecological reasoning and implications for useful and effective 
answering of the questions as to how property rights and co-management practice 
may contribute to FDCs’ perceptions and their willingness to enhance mangrove 
conservation. It suggests property rights, co-management and social capital as factors 
driving the communities’ perceptions to change. It presents and predicts a 
relationship between property rights and population pressure (i.e. growing human 
influence on forests). More people results in more demand for the forests and their 
products, hence, the study explores whether FDCs would refrain from excessive 
resource harvesting if greater access is granted. Along with customary knowledge, 
social capital, effective legal settings and enforcement, alternative income generation 
schemes are needed to achieve sustainability.     
Most importantly, the security of property rights to forest communities links their 
livelihood security to improvement in socio-economic conditions. This study 
addresses these issues by examining demand-side interventions. These demand-side 
interventions can uplift the socio-economic conditions of FDCs, while 
co-management can achieve sustainability. This ‘reciprocal relationship’ between 
co-management forest policies and demand-side interventions aims to achieve 
sustainability of the SMF.      
1.7 Organisation of the Thesis 
This thesis comprises eight chapters (Figure 1.2). Following this introductory 
chapter, (i.e. Chapter One), Chapter Two backgrounds the study area. It presents 
local level contextual information with a brief description of the geographical area, 
resources, significance of, and threats to, this mangrove forest. Present and past 
management mechanisms with dependent communities are also presented.  
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Figure 1.2: Structure of the thesis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Chapter Three reviews the existing literature on achieving forest sustainability in 
developing countries through the implementation of a co-management structure. 
Importantly, it presents the theoretical underpinnings of co-management. In this 
regard, the application of the basic theory of property rights is critically reviewed to 
establish the theoretical foundation of the thesis by situating this research firmly 
within natural resource economics. By applying these theories, it examines the 
current property rights regime and its existing impact on the SMF.  By reviewing the 
existing rights regime, this chapter justifies the concept of the embeddedness of 
common property rights as an alternative property rights regime. This is how the 
concept of embeddedness is valued, particularly from a common property rights 
regime perspective within the S&O’s (1992) framework. Most importantly, it argues 
that property rights should be recognised as a priority for FDCs, which this study has 
identified as being among the most disadvantaged and marginalised sections of 
society.  
Chapter Four provides the historical and policy context of the SMF and the role of 
FDCs in its management. It discusses the history of forest policy and development 
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since 1526 through content analysis. In particular, it elaborates this content analysis 
method and its application to policy. It highlights the management and conservation 
of this forest with the emergence and evolution of the role of property rights. It 
evaluates and discusses forest policies during four historical time periods: Mughal, 
British, Pakistan and Bangladesh. The history of forest policy is analysed with the 
application of S&O’s (1992) property rights theory. This chapter pinpoints the issues 
of co-management processes through procedural and distributional power equity in 
common property rights regimes. In this regard, a policy model is prescribed.     
Chapter Five discusses the research methodology used in quantitative research for 
this study. The process of face-to-face household survey is described within the 
analytical framework of validity and reliability assurance.    
Chapter Six analyses the findings of the survey data. It presents community 
perceptions of state forest ownership and management towards the SMF. It presents 
statistical models and identifies the determinants of FDC participation in mangrove 
conservation practices. Regression analysis results are presented using theoretically 
referenced model variables regarding property rights, co-management and social 
capital.  
Chapter Seven presents descriptive statistics and analyses the findings of the FGDs. 
It discusses the justification of the implementation of an alternative property rights 
regime of co-management. It investigates the barriers to co-management with 
measures to overcome them. It presents three main domains: state, common property 
regimes and demand-side interventions. It explores policy directives to enhance 
forest sustainability through improving the forest’s condition and demonstrating the 
need for alternative livelihood options. Hence, it addresses the missing link between 
livelihood security and forest conservation. In this regard, results of barriers to, and 
remedies for, co-management are discussed.  
Chapter Eight summarises the key findings of the study into three domains: state 
property rights, co-management and demand-side interventions. This chapter 
synthesises the findings by linking implications with theory, methods, policy and 
practice. The chapter also suggests areas for future inquiry to improve understanding 
of FDCs involvement in a co-management system for mangrove conservation.      
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1.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the background to and proposed design of this research. It 
has described the qualitative and quantitative methodology used to answer the 
research questions. Furthermore, this chapter has explained the limitations of scope 
of this research by outlining the overall framework and parameters under which the 
research has been conducted.  
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Chapter 2 
Study Area: The Sundarbans Mangrove Forest 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter outlined the context of forest management in Bangladesh. This 
chapter provides an introduction to the geography of the SMF and an historical 
perspective of its management, which was once closely linked to the colonial system. 
It explores the circumstances that helped implement the reserved forest policy in the 
SMF. It describes the importance of the forest to FDCs’ economic and livelihood 
needs. It explains how the forest has been used for economic, social, political, 
cultural and religious activities and how it has become a prosperous and dynamic 
part of Bangladesh’s economy today.  
This chapter establishes that the most widely debated issues in the forest’s history are 
agrarian stagnation, anthropogenic pressure, overharvesting, institutionalised 
corruption of the BFD and growing forest piracy. These issues are covered to 
understand the dominant discourse of state coercion, community livelihood 
dependency, contested cultures, practices and conceptions of forest use from a 
historical perspective.   
The chapter is organised into nine sections. Section 2.2 gives an overview of global 
mangrove forests and their importance. Section 2.3 provides a geographical location 
of the SMF. Section 2.4 pinpoints the significance of the forest from cultural, 
international, environmental and economic perspectives. The biodiversity and 
ecosystems of the forest are revealed in detail in Section 2.5. Management and 
conservation, including early history and the present conservation system, are set out 
in Section 2.6. Section 2.7 explains the nature of FDCs and their dependence on the 
forest. Various threats to the SMF are reviewed in section 2.8. Section 2.9 
summarises the chapter’s findings.         
21 
 
2.2 Global Mangrove Forests Reduction and the Sundarbans Mangrove Forest 
Mangroves are intertidal forested wetlands. They are confined to tropical and 
subtropical regions (Tomlinson 1986). The total global mangrove area is 18.1 million 
hectares, equivalent to 152,000 sq. km (Spalding et al. 2010). Mangroves are found 
in 123 countries and territories of the world. Mangrove coverage has been declining 
rapidly from original levels as a result of increasing human use and conversion. 
Jayagoda (2012) noted that mangroves now represent less than 1 per cent of global 
tropical forests and less than 0.4 per cent of the total forest estate worldwide of 
39,520,000 sq. km. Mangroves reach their largest abundance and diversity along 
wetter coastlines and in estuarine and deltaic regions. The largest single expanses of 
mangrove forests are the SMF, the Niger Delta, and the complex deltaic coastlines of 
northern Brazil and southern Papua. These four areas comprise 16.5 per cent of the 
world’s mangroves (Spalding et al. 2010). Mangroves possess an intense diversity of 
species. Among the Indo-West-Pacific, the largest diversity of mangrove species is in 
South-East Asia.   
New research has shown that mangroves have higher levels of primary productivity 
than other temperate or tropical forests. Their levels of standing biomass are very 
high, even in low-stature forests. Mangrove forests preserve high levels of organic 
carbon in soils. Preliminary estimates suggest per year aboveground biomass of 
global mangroves contain over 3,700 Teragram (Tg) of carbon (1 Tg = 1 million 
metric tons). Further, sequestration of organic matter related to mangrove 
sedimentation is likely to be 14-17Tg of carbon (Spalding et al. 2010).   
Other observations about mangroves include their extensive use by humans. The 
widespread human use of these forests is mainly for their high valued timber and 
non-timber forest products such as fuelwood, leaves, honey and fishing (Das 2006). 
Coastal people are now increasingly aware of the importance of mangroves as 
natural protection from storms, surges and erosion. Hence, there is an increasing 
need for planting and restoration of mangroves to protect coastal communities (Ren 
et al. 2008).  
Continuing mangrove losses are very severe throughout the world. There is a general 
consensus that the original estimates of mangrove cover were over 200,000 sq. km 
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(Smith-Asante 2010). It is estimated that more than 50,000 sq. km, or a quarter of the 
original mangrove cover, has been lost due to human activities (Smith-Asante 2010). 
However, there is a consensus that between 1980 and 2005, some 35,600 sq. km of 
mangrove forest areas have been lost (Spalding et al. 2010). Rates of mangrove 
losses have been reduced from 1.04 per cent per year in the 1980s to 0.66 per cent 
per year in the five years to 2005 (FAO 2007). In spite of this reduction, these rates 
are still three to five times higher than overall forest losses worldwide (Spalding et 
al. 2010).  
Across the globe, there are 1,200 mangrove protected areas which are equivalent to 
one-third of global mangrove areas (Smith-Asante 2010). Usually mangroves are 
surrounded by densely populated coastal areas. This imposes intense economic 
pressure on mangroves. Hence, remaining mangroves are facing huge anthropogenic 
pressure. The greatest drivers of mangrove losses are the conversion of mangrove 
land to aquaculture, agriculture and urban land uses.  
Of more recent concern to mangrove loss is sea level rise (SLR) due to climate 
change (Rahman et al. 2011). There are two notable arguments regarding 
possibilities of addressing SLR challenges to mangroves. One is the accumulation of 
sediments and various organic matter in the soil to help mangrove forests keep up 
with the slight losses from SLR. Another is the possibility of transplanting 
mangroves inland to cope with SLR. Nonetheless, throughout the world it has been 
shown that neither of these options has prevented the loss of mangrove areas due to 
SLR.  
The rate of mangrove degradation is mainly the result of local responses to decisions 
driven by market forces due to industrial demand, population expansion and poverty. 
However, in many countries, mangrove degradation is also due to high-level policy 
failures. For instance, state level aquaculture policy resulted in massive mangrove 
losses during the 1950s in The Philippines (Spalding et al. 2010). Like many other 
countries, Bangladesh has established general legal protection for mangrove 
resources. Existing conservation policy is implemented to maintain conservation 
values in mangrove-protected areas. Although it is suggested that the trends of 
mangrove gains or losses can dramatically be reversed, this has not occurred in the 
case of the SMF.  
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Use of licensing is a common conservation practice. Like many other countries, the 
BFD has established licensing systems to protect mangroves and to strictly control 
destructive activities. Application of a licensing system by the BFD is synonymous 
with economic instrument applied for conservation and protection. In spite of that, 
conservation policy for the SMF fails to establish appropriate legal frameworks and 
adopt development interventions when necessary. For instance, existing conservation 
policy does not have any standard for timber, aquaculture, or water quality protection 
from oil spillage from ships, engine-driven boats, etc. (UNEP 2011). In SMF, there is 
a dearth of activities to replace mangroves. The most notable example is the loss of 
Chakaria Sundarbans in Bangladesh (Hossain et al. 2001). This forest in Cox’s Bazar 
was one of the oldest mangrove forests in the Indian subcontinent. Because of heavy 
human interference, the entire forest of 18,200 hectares has been cleared for shrimp 
farming and human settlement (Akhtaruzzaman 2000). Deforestation has affected the 
socio-economic conditions of more than 90 per cent of the local community (Hossain 
et al. 2001).  
The rate of mangrove degradation in the SMF is greater due to conflicting pressures 
and points to a failure of existing conservation policy. According to Spalding et al. 
(2010), this conservation failure suggests the need to establish a clear management 
regime for mangrove management worldwide.  
2.3 Geographical Location 
Up to 1816, the SMF was situated in the southern portion of the Ganges delta. It 
extended from the Meghna River on the east to the Hugli River on the west through 
the then districts of Khulna, Bakarganj and 24-Parganas (Pargiter 1885). Figures 2.1, 
2.2 and 2.3 show the extent of the SMF in these three regions in the period between 
1870 and 1920. Permanently settled lands of those districts limited the forest on the 
northern side. The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) (2011) recorded 
that this area is now approximately three-fifths of the total 16,700 sq. km that existed 
200 years ago. Two-fifths of the forest has been cleared due to agricultural 
conversion, mostly in India. The SMF lies between Bangladesh and India, covering 
60 and 40 per cent respectively.   
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Figure 2.1: The Khulna Sundarbans 
 
Source: Ascoli (1921) 
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Figure 2.2: The Bakarganj Sundarbans 
 
Source: Ascoli (1921) 
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Figure 2.3: The 24 Parganas Sundarbans 
 
Source: Ascoli (1921) 
The SMF in the coastal area of Bangladesh was formed within the vast Bengal delta 
basin over 11,000 years ago (Mikhailov & Dotsenko 2007). The forest is located in 
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the old Ganges delta on the northern limits of the Bay of Bengal. Clay mineral and 
radiocarbon indicates that the lower Bengal delta plains of the SMF were originally 
formed with sediments deposited by the Ganges River (Heroy et al. 2003). It is the 
single largest area of productive mangrove forest in the world (Hussain & Karim 
1994). The SMF is located in the southwest geographical corner, between 21º30´ and 
22º30´ north and 89º00´ and 89º55´ east, in the area of Khulna, Satkhira, Bagerhat 
districts (Figures 2.4 and 2.5). The location of this forest is south of the Tropic of 
Cancer and at the northern limit of the Bay of Bengal. The forest lies 300 km south-
southwest of the country’s capital city, Dhaka. It is unique due to its size, 
productivity and significance and in terms of balancing the local ecosystem (Hoq et 
al. 2006). The whole area is treated as the SIZ, which consists of 2,268 villages and 
17 Upazilas of five immediately-adjacent districts (Kabir & Hossain 2008). Not 
more than 200 years ago, the SMF extended further inland, including much of the 
Khulna region. The present area of the SMF is 6,017 sq. km which is 40 per cent of 
the total forest land under the control of the BFD. This area covers 4.07 per cent of 
the total land area in Bangladesh (MOEF 2005b). 
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Figure 2.4: Sundarbans mangrove forest, Bangladesh 
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Figure 2.5: Protected areas of Bangladesh 
 
The SMF consists of numerous small-forested islands and mudflats intersected by an 
intricate network of coastal waterways. These islands were formed by natural 
sedimentations between the Raimangal, the Harinbhanga and the Baleswar rivers. 
The forest is bounded by three famous deltaic rivers—the Ganges, Brahmaputra and 
Meghna. The forest lies across the outer deltas of these three rivers. A dense network 
of small rivers, canals, channels and creeks also contribute to sediment formation. 
The maximum elevation inside the forest is 10 metres above mean sea level. The 
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western and eastern limits of the SMF are defined by the course of a tributary of the 
Ganges named the Hooghly and Baleshwar rivers respectively. The river Ichamati or 
Raimongal (known as Harinbhanga in India) demarcate the border of the forest 
between Bangladesh and India. Out of three sanctuaries, its west and adjoining south 
sanctuaries adjoin the Indian section of the forest (UNEP 2011).   
The current area within Bangladesh is 599,330 hectares and the Indian area is 
426,300 hectares, lying in the 24-Paragnas district of West-Bengal. The above 
estimates of the mangrove forests sometimes differ in the two countries considerably 
(Gopal & Chauhan 2006). However, this study confines itself to the Bangladeshi part 
of the SMF.  
The forest lies at the end of the basin facing towards the Bay of Bengal. It extends 
over 200 islands separated by 15 major distributary rivers flowing north-south across 
the country. Around 400 interconnected creeks and canals flow through the forest. 
Furthermore, an impenetrable saltwater swamp extends 100-120 km inland to 
support this tidal mangrove forest (UNEP 2011). 
2.4 Significance of the SMF  
Following sections describe the cultural, international, environment and economic 
significance of the SMF.  
2.4.1 Cultural Significance 
The SMF area has significant national importance for its cultural heritage and 
religious values. A Hindu religious festival named ‘Rash Mela’ is celebrated once a 
year in Dublar Char (island). The island is deep inside the forest. This attracts Hindu 
devotees from local and distant places. People visit the ruined Hindu temple of 
Sheikh at Shekher Tek to celebrate an annual festival (Ramsar 2003). Local and 
foreign visitors, irrespective of caste and creed, attend the festival.   
The forest has very significant cultural heritage value. The country’s archaeological 
evidence demonstrates early human occupation on the deltaic islands. This denotes 
the previous supply of abundant fresh water from the Ganges and other non-saline 
ground water (UNEP 2011). The forest has been featured by many famous writers in 
both Bengali and English literature. Notable novels such as Bankim Chandra 
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Chatterjee’s Kapal Kundla, Amitav Ghosh’s The Hungry Tide, and part of Salman 
Rushdie’s Midnight’s Children, are set in the forest.    
2.4.2 International Significance 
South Asia has some 7 per cent of global mangrove share (Das 2006) (Figure 2.6), 
placing it eighth globally. In terms of mangrove share, Bangladesh is eighth in the 
world and the SMF alone occupies more than 3 per cent of Bangladesh (Khan 2009) 
(Figure 2.7). Categorised as reserved forest, the SMF is unlike mangroves in other 
parts of Asia, Africa and Latin America in terms of forestry products and substantial 
fisheries (Hoq et al. 2006). It is the world’s largest halophytic mangrove forest and, 
in terms of biological production, it is one of the most significant natural ecosystems. 
Furthermore, it has the longest history of scientific management in the world (UNEP 
2011).  
Figure 2.6: Regions of the world by mangrove share 
 
Source: Adapted from Spalding et al. (2010) 
10,171
215
7,917
624
22,402
5,717
23,882
10,344
51,049
20,040
6.7
0.1
5.2
0.4
14.7
3.8
15.7
6.8
33.5
13.2
0 10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000 50,000 60,000
Australasia
East Asia
East & South Africa
Middle East
North & Central America
Pacific Ocean
South America
South Asia
South-East Asia
West & Central Africa
Global share (%)
Area (in sq. km)
Region
32 
 
Figure 2.7: Countries by largest mangrove share 
 
Source: Adapted from Spalding et al. (2010) 
This forest contains a rich biota, including endangered reptiles. It lies within a World 
Wildlife Fund Global 200 eco-region which has been declared as a Biosphere 
Reserve by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation 
(UNESCO) (UNEP 2011). Apart from three wildlife sanctuaries, this reserve 
contains a tiger reserve and national park. UNESCO included it in the World 
Heritage list in 1997. Accordingly, the government declared this forest a World 
Heritage Site in 1999. It was included as a Ramsar site in the Convention on 
Wetlands of International Importance held in 1971. Recently, the government 
declared the whole forest, equivalent to 601,700 hectares, as a Ramsar site (Ramsar 
2003).  
Globally, the total mangrove area is 152,361 sq. km. (Figure 2.6). The 12 countries 
in Figure 2.7 cover 68 per cent of global mangrove share.  
2.4.3 Environmental Significance 
Traditional lifestyles were comparatively well adapted to the unique characteristic of 
the forest. The forest provides protection from coastal surges generated through 
cyclones and storms in the Bay of Bengal. The SMF is an important buffer for 
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coastal inland zones from the ravages of cyclones. The swamp of the forest is 
extensively strengthened and embanked to buffer inland areas from devastating 
cyclones and storms. The waters are very rich in nutrients that provide a critical 
nursery for shrimps and other fish. These enhance the spawning grounds of 
crustaceans and fish along the whole coastline. Mangrove swamp covers over 50 per 
cent of the forest. The rest is largely covered by salty and brackish water.     
The forest’s wide range of flora and fauna is unique. It supports an exceptional 
biodiversity and concurrently ensures the viability of ecological processes such as 
monsoon rain flooding, tidal influence, delta formation, flooding and plant 
colonization (Amin 2002). The most extensive mangroves of the SMF are found in 
river deltas near to the sea. This creates new expanses of land through the active 
deposition of new sediments.  
2.4.4 Economic Significance 
The forest offers subsistence livelihoods for a huge number of residents (Agrawala et 
al. 2003; Kabir & Hossain 2008). This forest contributes 3 per cent of the total 
Bangladeshi GDP from the overall forestry sector contribution of 5 per cent (Khan 
2009; MOEF 2005c).  
In their recent study, Spalding et al. (2010) estimated the economic value of 
mangroves at between US$2,000 and $9,000 per hectare per year. Particularly over 
longer time horizons, these values are obviously higher than any other alternative 
uses such as aquaculture or agriculture. These ecosystems play an important role in 
meeting the needs and demands of local FDCs by providing food, timber, and 
employment in both cash and non-cash economies. Initially, the main demand was 
scientific timber harvesting (UNEP 2011). However, during the last few decades, 
non-wood products such as fish, crab, honey, beeswax, Gol leaves, thatching palm, 
grasses and crustacean shells have gained importance and play a vital role in rural 
coastal economies. Consequently, harvesting of these resources has been brought 
under BFD management control (Hussain 1997). In addition, the SMF has a huge 
non-use value and greater protective role from climate change. Being a storm 
protector and shore stabiliser, it has a great deal of economic importance to the 
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coastal zone. It also contributes to the economy by providing a source of timber and 
natural resources.    
2.5 Biodiversity and Ecosystems 
The SMF has a wide range of rare fauna including the Bengal tiger, estuarine 
crocodile, and various reptiles and birds. The forest is diverse, with 269 species of 
wildlife (Roy 2004). The intertidal zone is replete with trees, fisheries, and shrubs, 
including ferns and palms. In these deltaic lands, fresh water and sea together 
provide a home for a wide range of distinct species.  
2.5.1 Abiotic Characteristics 
The area experiences a sub-tropical monsoon climate and severe cyclonic tropical 
storms. Its annual rainfall ranges between 1,600 and 1,800 mm (Karim 1994a). The 
climate is humid sub-tropical, with an average of 70 to 80 per cent humidity. It has 
four main seasons: pre-monsoon (March-May), monsoon (June-September), post-
monsoon (October-November) and the dry winter season (December-February) 
(Karim 1994b). The minimum temperature is 2-4º Celsius in winter to 32º during in 
the monsoon season and a maximum of 43º Celsius in March (Gopal & Chauhan 
2006). Rainfall also increases from west to east with the mean annual variation from 
about 2,000 mm in the east to 1,600 mm in the west. Eighty per cent of the rains fall 
during the monsoon season. The forest is situated in the flat deltaic swamp on the 
greater Ganges-Brahmaputra estuarine complex. Thus, it ranges from 0.9 to 2.1 
metres above mean sea level (Iftekhar & Islam 2004b). Its soil is of recent origin 
consisting of alluvium washed down from the Himalayas. The type of the entire soil 
geology is a mixture of quaternary sediments, sand and silt, interlaced with marine 
silt and clay.    
Over two kilometres wide, straight rivers and their intricate network of waterways 
run north to south through the forest. The ecosystem is largely maintained by two 
diurnal flow and ebb tides, with a tidal range of up to 8 metres (Mandal & Ghosh 
1989). Tides bear erosion-resistant clay and silt for the banks. Flood currents in the 
monsoon season deflect waves largely to the eastern part, and ebb currents to the 
western part. Significantly, these trends of currents redistribute river-borne sediments 
along the coast (Mandal & Ghosh 1989; Michels et al. 1998). The area comprises 
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three main hydrological zones—brackish, moderately saline and saline—to influence 
particular type of vegetation with dominance.    
In addition to its protective aspects for coastal communities, the SMF’s ecological 
processes of monsoon rain flooding, delta formation, tidal influence and plant 
colonisation are unique. 
2.5.2 Biotic Characteristics 
The forest is a rich source of flora. Its flora consists of a total of 69 species. 
However, a total of 425 species of wildlife have been recorded (Agrawala et al. 
2003). Karim (1994c) reported a total of 334 species of trees, shrubs and plants. They 
belonged to 245 genera of Spermatophytes and Pteridophytes from this forest and its 
adjoining areas. Of these species, only 123 may be found at present (Karim 1994c) 
because of considerable changes in the status of different species and the taxonomic 
revision of mangrove flora (Khatun & Alam 1987). However, very few steps have 
yet been taken to investigate changes in the botanical environment within the forest 
(Karim 1994c). 
Trees of the SMF are represented by 22 families within 30 genera. It is estimated that 
the total growing stock of the forest is 10.6 million cubic metres (Canonizado & 
Hossain 1998). Among all the species, Heritiera fomes is the single most vital 
species of the forest. As a pure crop and mixed with Excoecaria agallocha, this 
Heritiera fomes covers 18.2 per cent and 62.4 per cent of the forest area respectively 
(USAID 2001). Heritiera fomes dominates where the soil water is moderately fresh. 
Their dominance is in the north-east and on the higher ground. They currently form 
60 per cent of commercially useful timber. However, recently the dominance of 
Heritiera forest type is decreasing (Iftekhar & Islam 2004a). This species is also 
affected by the ‘top-dying’ disease. Iftekhar and Islam (2004a) found that around 
20.18 million Heritiera species occupying 198.5 sq. km were severely affected by 
this disease. They again added that these species also suffered from the effects of 
root rot and die-back diseases. These are unique in comparison with the non-deltaic 
coastal mangrove forests.    
Besides tree species, the SMF is home to many animal species. The total listed 
official number of animal species is 453. Iftekhar and Islam (2004a) reported that 
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there are 120 species of fish, 290 species of birds, 42 species of mammals, 35 species 
of reptiles and 8 species of amphibian commonly found in the forest. These species 
currently represent 36 to 37 per cent of birds, 28 to 30 per cent of reptiles, and 33 to 
34 per cent of the mammals of the country (Iftekhar & Islam 2004a). The SMF is 
famous as the world’s largest remaining habitat of the Royal Bengal Tiger, Panthera 
tigris tigris. Other notable valuable animal species living in this forest include otters 
(Lutra spec.), squirrels (Callosciurus pygerythus and Funambalus pennati), rhesus 
macaque (Macaca mulatta Zimmermann), spotted deer (Axis axis), barking deer 
(Muntiacus muntiak) and wild boar (Sus scrofa); and in rivers and the sea, a number 
of dolphin species (Iftekhar & Islam 2004a).  
In terms of vegetation, the SMF is classified into five categories: (i) moist tropical 
seral forest, (ii) low mangrove forest, (iii) tree mangrove forest, (iv) salt-water 
Heritiera forest, and (v) fresh water Heritiera swamp forest (UNEP 2011).  Of these, 
the moist tropical seral forest comprises a mosaic succession of four types of tidal 
forest communities. However, much of the fresh water Heritiera swamp forest has 
been cleared for settlement (UNEP 2011). Further, the newly-accreted sites are 
vegetated with mainly Sonneratia apetala, followed by Avicennia officinalis. On the 
levee banks, Golpata or Nypa palm Nypa fruticans grow abundantly, provided they 
are well established (Miah et al. 2003). The dominance of Exoecaria agallocha 
increases with rising ground soils caused by sediment deposition.   
The SMF is the home of diverse fauna. Forty-nine mammal species have been 
recorded in the forest (UNEP 2011). It supports one of the subcontinent’s largest 
populations of the Bengal tiger Panthera tigris. UNEP (2011) estimates there is a 
total of 350 tigers in the forest. However, several other larger species of mammals 
such as the Javan rhinoceros Rhinoceros sondaicus, Indian rhinoceros Rhinoceros 
unicornis and Indian water buffalo Bubalus arnee are now locally extinct. 
Extinctions were due mainly to the increase of agricultural conversion and soil 
salinity in the late 20th century. Above all, human interference in the form of resource 
harvesting and top down forest management have had a significant effect on wildlife 
habitats and population degradation (Rashid et al. 1994). 
The forest comprises a total of 315 species of varied and colourful birds. This 
number is recorded as 36-37 per cent of the national total (Rashid et al. 1994). 
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Around 53 reptile species, covering 53 per cent of the national total, and 8 
amphibians are recorded as inhabiting the forest. The forest is known for its estuarine 
crocodile Crocodylus porosus of which some 100 still survive. Over 120 species of 
fish are commonly caught by fishermen (Seidensticker & Hai 1983). Moreover, in 
total, 400 species of fish and 48 species of crabs exist (UNEP 2011). From these, 20 
shrimp, 8 lobster and 7 crab species are regularly caught. Brackish water and marine 
species are found to be dominant. Fresh water species are found only along the 
eastern edge of the Baleswar River. A rare species of Ganges river shark Glyphis 
gangeticus is found in the estuaries. UNEP (2011) also found that the forest supports 
300 species of spiders and a large number of honey bees.  
Because of these valuable plants and species, about one-third of the whole forest is 
designated as protected area for the conservation of biological diversity (Ramsar 
2003). In addition, the forest is abundant in various wood, biomass and non-wood 
resources. These are mainly timber, fuelwood, pulpwood, leaves, shells, crabs, honey 
and fish. A significant portion of coastal local people make their livelihood from the 
harvest of these resources.      
2.6 Management and Conservation 
The colonial management history and current conservation systems are set out in the 
following sections. 
2.6.1 Early Management History 
The following sections describe human settlement of forestlands and revenue history. 
2.6.1.1 Settlements of Forest Lands 
Forestry provides a good example of the early management style of the British 
colonial period in India (Gadgil & Guha 1992; Phillips 1886). In 1853, the then 
British colonial government declared its paramount policy objective in the SMF as 
the speedy reclamation of the forest using absolute proprietary rights (Iqbal 2006). 
The British colonial government designated the forest as protected and reserved 
under the Indian Forest Act of 1865 (UNEP 2011). In 1883-84, the total area of 
reserved and protected forests under the FD was 12,012 and 5,957 sq. km 
respectively. Of that, the reserved forests in the SMF alone covered an area of 4,095 
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sq. km (Phillips 1886). However, much of the forest was later leased out by the 
British Government to local landlords for cultivation.  
The government then sought to protect the forest from reclamation. For the first time 
in 1862, the necessity of conserving the forest was considered following a 
memorandum prepared by Dr. Dietrich Brandis, the Conservator of Forests in Burma 
(Ascoli 1921). Subsequently, in 1864 the whole area of SMF forest—equivalent to 
3,403 sq. miles—was brought under the absolute jurisdiction of the government. In 
practice, the government leased out the entire area to the Port Canning Company 
who made a huge profit from forest produce (Pargiter 1885). Subsequently, in 1864, 
the government condemned the oppressive harvesting by the company and cancelled 
the lease order. The government then moved to a policy of reclamation to prevent a 
recurrence of oppressive harvesting methods (Ascoli 1921).   
After the failure of the above policy, the government again realised that woodcutters 
involved in illegal harvesting had caused rapid and huge destruction to the most 
valuable Soonder (Sundari) tree tracts (Ascoli 1921). In that situation, the 
government agreed to protect the forest. In 1875, the government declared 500 sq. 
miles in Bagerhat and 385 sq. miles in Khulna sub-divisions as reserved Sundri 
forests (Ascoli 1921).  
The government again released a portion of reserved forests for reclamation in 1891. 
Subsequently, FD adopted a working plan in 1891-92 to apply a strict conservation 
management policy within Bagerhat and Khulna blocks to all valuable timber such as 
Sundari, Passur, Amur and Keora. The area of reserved forest in Khulna was 
increased by 1,339 sq. km in 1900-1901 entirely through the inclusion of the water 
area. This policy enhanced revenue earnings which amounted to Rs. 6,30,808 against 
an expenditure of Rs. 1,01,555 (Ascoli 1921). However, it should be noted that no 
steps had been taken to reserve or protect any forest in the district of Bakarganj by 
the end of that decade.       
It is debatable whether the forest was reserved with a view to supplying timber and 
obtaining a reasonable revenue. Huge wooden sleepers or railway ties were needed to 
develop 25,000 miles of railway system by the end of the eighteenth century (Hill 
2008). Gadgil and Guha (1992) argue that many of the revenue departments 
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considered deforestation as a necessary function of government in the period to 1860. 
Thus, the government derived revenue of Rs. 2,68,778 between 1910 and 1920. This 
rate was equivalent to Rs. 415 per sq. mile per annum (Ascoli 1921). However, the 
government was ultimately unwilling to preserve and protect Bakarganj forest, which 
was wholly cleared in 5 or 6 years (Ascoli 1921). In 1874, for the first time the 
government decided to preserve the tract of the SMF as a source for the supply of 
wood, timber and fuelwood for Southern Bengal (Ascoli 1921). A separate office 
called the Commission of the Sundarbans was created to manage its revenue (Iqbal 
2010). Nonetheless, these offices had no connection with the affairs of the SMF other 
than forest revenues being paid to its treasury (Beveridge 1876).        
2.6.1.2 Application of Jalkars for Fisheries 
Before 1859, no leases were granted for fisheries in the SMF. Afterwards, the 
government circulated orders to apply Jalkars or to tax the fisheries of the navigable 
rivers in 1859 (Pargiter 1885). However, overestimated Jama rates caused excessive 
bid values. Hence, farmers frequently defaulted and the government hastily 
mandated fresh settlements. In that period, there was conflict between forest and civil 
officers (Phillips 1886). Forest officers were inclined to preserve the forests; and, 
alternatively, civil officers were in favour of protecting the rights of the people. 
Thereafter, the government decided to stop further leasing of fisheries. Overall, that 
particular system of Jalkars did not work (Pargiter 1885).  
2.6.1.3 Lease of Bankar for Forest Produce  
For the first time, the government applied the Bankar or tax for the farming of forest 
produce by public auction. From 1864, the Bankar and Maukar (tax on honey and 
beeswax) were applied by the government on Khas Mahalls in some parts of the 
forest for five years. Unfortunately, the Port Canning Company bought most of the 
available farms at the auction at the first stage (Pargiter 1885). In one year, they 
again acquired the remainder and, thus, obtained a monopoly on forest produce 
(Pargiter 1885). Also, in one year (1867-1868), the Company gained a net profit of 
Rs. 42,849 (Pargiter 1885) through its oppressive harvesting methods (Ascoli 1921). 
Consequently, the government decided to cancel the Bankar system. It is evident that 
during the last 135 years, government initiatives focused mainly on leasing out the 
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forestlands. No initiative was recorded to protect local communities engaged in 
reclamation.  
2.6.2 Present Management 
The forest is currently under the sole management of the BFD. Because it is the 
largest mangrove forest in the world under commercial timber production 
management, forest protection advocates have increased the pressure on politicians, 
policy-makers and forest managers for scientific management of its resources (UNEP 
2011). After independence in 1971, the forest increased in importance through the 
establishment of sanctuaries. Three wildlife sanctuaries were established under the 
Bangladesh Wildlife (Preservation) (Amendment) Act of 1974. The sanctuaries are 
Sundarbans South, with an area of 17,878 hectares; Sundarbans West, with an area of 
9,069 hectares; and Sundarbans East, with an area of 5,439 hectares. Subsequently, 
in 1996, each of these sanctuaries was extended. The extended areas are 36,790 
hectares for Sundarbans South Wildlife Sanctuary, 71,502 hectares for Sundarbans 
West Wildlife Sanctuary and 31,227 hectares for Sundarbans East Wildlife 
Sanctuary. The total area of World Heritage sites now covers 139,519 hectares 
(UNEP 2011).   
Conservation practice in Bangladesh is based on the top-down management approach 
where upper level BFD managers make managerial and technical decisions as per the 
approval of the MOEF. Then the BFD forwards these decisions to their field offices 
for execution. This existing management mechanism does not allow for the 
participation of the FDCs at any stage. At the field level, there are two main offices 
of the BFD, namely, Divisional Forest Office (East) and Divisional Forest Office 
(West) under which there are 4 Range Offices and 72 Patrol Posts/Camps inside the 
SMF where a total of 1,167 staffs are working in different categories (BFD 2010). 
Under the present management structure, these field officials have no opportunity to 
incorporate local indigenous and customary knowledge of FDCs in designing 
conservation strategies. This exclusion approach violates NFP guidelines (GOB 
1994). 
The BFD has two divisional forest offices: Sundarban West Forest Division with 
their headquarters in the Khulna district, and the Sundarban East Forest Division 
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with their headquarters in the Bagerhat district. These divisional offices are divided 
into four administrative ranges: Chandpai, Sarankhola, Khulna, and Burigoalini. The 
forest is guarded by 16 forest stations and 55 compartments. On a 20-year cycle, the 
BFD harvests these compartments—lying in 9 blocks—in turn, along with the three 
peripheral wildlife sanctuaries on the coast. Early management emphasised revenue 
collection through simple felling, and encouraged overharvesting. Subsequently, 
conservation systems reduced the amount of overharvesting by enforcing a cutting 
rule for the four major timber species.  
The present conservation system wisely uses its wetland resources through the 
establishment of protected areas along the southern periphery. The aim was to 
manage the forest sustainably for both timber and the needs of the local people 
(Seidensticker & Hai 1983). Nonetheless, forest management failed to achieve these 
planned objectives and the forest has showed continuous signs of degradation (UNEP 
2011).   
Past management approaches attempted to integrate conservation of wildlife with 
profitable exploitation of timber, forest products and fisheries (Blower 1985). 
Following this, a plan was drawn up in the 1990s with a target to manage the forest 
as a single unit. This supported the establishment of buffer zones at the peripheral 
level to restrict illegal access. To achieve this, an integrated Sundarbans management 
plan was initiated under the Sundarbans Biodiversity Conservation Project. The 
project was undertaken with funding support from the Asian Development Bank, 
Global Environment Facility and other funding agencies (Hossain & Roy 2007; 
MOEF 2000; Ramsar 2003). The overall objective of the project was to attain 
sustainable conservation of biodiversity and management of all reserved forest 
resources. In this regard, the key aim of the project was to ensure rational plans and 
participation of all key stakeholders (Reza 2004).  
To achieve the above aim, three field stations were established to limit disturbances. 
The BFD controls the entry and collection of forest produce. It also issues licences 
for hunting under the Bangladesh Wildlife (Preservation) (Amendment) Act, 1974. 
However, in practice, such hunting licences are not issued, with a view to protecting 
biodiversity. Besides hunting, it also prohibits many activities within wildlife 
sanctuaries including residence, damage to vegetation, cultivation of land, 
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introduction of domestic animals and setting of fires (UNEP 2011). Nonetheless, the 
BFD can relax any such restrictions for scientific purposes, improvement of scenery 
or aesthetic enjoyment (Blower 1985).    
To address deforestation and degradation of the forest, research is conducted under 
the management of the Bangladesh Forest Research Institute (BFRI). Although BFRI 
was established in 1955, mangrove research was initially overlooked. BFRI initiated 
a separate office in Khulna to enhance mangrove research only in 1985. There are 
eight field stations in the SMF to provide data for a number of its ongoing studies to 
BFRI researchers (UNESCO 2007). Nevertheless, it was unfortunate that this 
initiative was confined to supporting the scientific management of the forest and 
scientific aspects of the mangroves. Current research processes overlook socio-
economic research aspects for mangrove conservation strategies and livelihood 
security of the FDCs. This missing link leaves a serious gap in achieving socio-
political benefits from conservation policies.  
2.7 Local Forest-Dependent Communities 
For many centuries, local communities have been harvesting resources and 
producing rice from farming through forest land conversion (Eaton 1990). Over the 
centuries, the local communities suffered from incursions by pirates, colonialists, 
cyclones and storm-surge devastation—all of which depopulated these local 
communities (Rainey 1891).  
According to the FAO (1998) and UNEP (2011), the human population living in the 
area of the SMF is about 3.5 million and is estimated to have doubled in 34 years at a 
yearly population growth rate of 2.04. Iftekhar and Islam (2004a) identified 18 per 
cent of the households in the SIZ as having a direct dependence on the SMF. On the 
other hand, the FAO (1998) estimated the portion of this population to be 25 per cent 
on the basis of their full or part-time engagement in forest produce harvesting. This 
figure could be much higher if all members of the family were included. This 
population earns 46 per cent of their direct income from forest produce harvesting 
(FAO 1998). A recent study found 50 per cent of FDC households earn 70-100 per 
cent of their total income through harvesting resources from the SMF (Shah & Datta 
2010). Figure 2.8 presents the principal harvested resources.   
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Figure 2.8: Principal harvested resources  
(a) Fishing trawlers (b) Illegally harvested Golpata 
carrying as Malam in the sides of the 
boats 
  
  
(c) Golpata harvested as thatch materials 
for roofing village houses 
(d) Fish are being dried by the 
fishermen caught in winter fishery at 
Dublar char 
  
Source (a-d): Ramsar, (2003)  
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(e) A wood-cutter with loaded boat (f) A young fisherman with his 
equipment 
  
(g) Gol leaves harvesting (h) Crab harvesting 
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(i) Honey collectors racing into the forest (j) Honey collectors most vulnerable 
to tiger-attacks 
  
(k) Fisherwomen collecting shrimp fry (l) A young girl at fishing  
  
Source (e-l): Ahmad et al. (2009)  
This forest has long been used for local community livelihoods. Originally, 
communities mainly cut wood (Ascoli 1921). Kabir and Hossain (2008) found five 
local communities directly dependent on the SMF, namely: Bawalis (wood cutters), 
Mawalis (honey collectors), Golpata sangrahakari (Gol leaves collectors), Jele 
(fishermen) and Chunery (snail and oyster collectors). Apart from these local 
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communities, there is only one indigenous Munda community, which moved to the 
Sundarbans region about 250-300 years ago from the Bihar province of India.  
Zamindars (landlords) brought them to clear this forest during British colonial rule. 
These communities are socially recognised and commonly cited by researchers to 
analyse the sustainability of this forest (Kabir & Hossain 2008). They are also 
identified based on resource harvesting patterns and allocation of property rights by 
the BFD.  
Along with woodcutters, fish, crab, shell, honey and beeswax collectors, the forest 
provides livelihoods for timber traders and other workers. The number of harvesters 
has increased enormously. In one study, it was found that around 35,330 people work 
in the forest (Chakrabarti 1986). Of these, 4,580 collect timber and firewood, 1,350 
collect honey and beeswax, and 4,500 harvest natural resources and hunt animals 
(mainly deer). The remaining 24,900 are engaged as fishermen, crab harvesters and 
shrimp farmers. Hussain (1997) assumes that the number of fishermen involved in 
year-round fishing is even larger. The number of honey collectors is less because of 
the short harvesting season which is limited to 3 months or 10 weeks starting from 
around the 1st of April each year. The BFD issues permits to the several thousands of 
FDCs to enter the forest for honey collection (Chakrabarti 1987).  
Islam and Gnauck (2009) cited that the SMF employs 500,000-600,000 people for 
around six months of each year. They also cited the number of daily working 
fishermen and other stakeholders to be about 50,000. FDCs harvest wood and fish 
equivalent to US$100 million and US$304 million respectively, annually (Islam & 
Gnauck 2008). The harvested value of fish is three times higher than the annual value 
of forest products. The value of standing timber has been calculated at US$2.09 
billion.     
According to BFD estimates, around 45,000 people work in the forest in each day 
during the peak harvesting season (Hussain 1997). In addition, more than 10,000 
fishermen set up fishing camps for three to four months in the winter (Hussain 1997). 
These fishermen mainly come from the distant Chittagong district and return home 
before the monsoon season starts. FDCs catch fish and crabs year-round (UNEP 
2011). This is the most profitable and easiest source of income. In 1986, the average 
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annual fish catch was 2,500 tonnes (Chakrabarti 1986). This figure has continued to 
increase.  
FDCs use extracted resources for their daily lives, to build houses and other 
necessities such as boats and furniture. They use timber for boats and furniture; 
charcoal and fuelwood for cooking; fish, crabs and fruit for food; poles for house-
posts and rafters; Nypa palm thatch for roofing; reeds for fencing; grass for matting; 
and medicinal trees for local herbal treatment (UNEP 2011).  
Because of tigers’ significant dependence on the forest year-round, tiger-attacks are 
highest in the world (Barlow 2009). Each year some 300 people are killed by tigers 
and crocodiles in the forest (UNEP 2011). Locally-made non-mechanised boats are 
the only transport used by communities to harvest resources. However, mechanised 
boats are used by Mahajans and other local elite who employ FDCs for harvesting 
resources in larger quantity, such as for harvesting Gol leaves. Overall, these FDCs 
are very poor and live in a subsistence economy dependent on the forest.  
Environmental problems affect multiple actors and agencies because of their 
uncertain nature and, typically, their multi-scale complexity (Reed 2008). 
Nevertheless, it is an imperative to understand that local stakeholder interests are 
directly affected by policy decisions (Hossain & Roy 2007). Decision-makers 
therefore need to understand how these local stakeholders are affected by the 
environmental policy decisions and actions they take and how their powers influence 
outcomes (Reed et al. 2009). In spite of a strict conservation policy, the forest is 
being degraded rapidly, posing a threat to the environment and the livelihood 
security of the FDCs.  These threats are discussed below. 
2.8 Threats to the SMF 
The SMF is under severe threat of deforestation and degradation, in spite of 
long-term BFD management and a strict conservation policy (Akhtaruzzaman 2000; 
Primavera 1995). This, in turn, poses a threat to the livelihood security of FDCs. 
2.8.1 Anthropogenic Pressure 
The population pressure is significant in Khulna district with a household size of 
5.2—higher than the national average of 4.9 and Khulna divisional average of 4.7 
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(BBS 2009). This district is the seventh largest district among the country’s 64 
districts in terms of household size (BBS 2009). On the other hand, this household 
size is the largest in comparison with 10 other districts of the Khulna division. This 
anthropogenic pressure increased the forest dependency of the population of the SIZ, 
as people mostly live below the poverty line (GOB 2005). For instance, in the 2001 
population census, it was recorded that in Koyra Upazila, 67.89 per cent of 
household incomes were derived from agriculture (BBS 2007a). Out of these, 
cropping, livestock, forestry and fishery generated 44.96 per cent and the remaining 
22.93 per cent came from agricultural labour.  
Cyclone Aila caused the loss of income generation from agriculture and other 
sources, leaving them dependent on the forest. Tree density has decreased due to 
continuous logging (legal and illegal) and encroachment as a result of anthropogenic 
pressure (Iftekhar & Saenger 2008) (Figure 2.9). Shrimp farming and anthropogenic 
influences have destroyed 45 per cent of mangrove wetlands in Bangladesh (Islam & 
Gnauck 2008). This finding is in line with Barbier and Cox (2004). They found that 
increased shrimp farming accounts for 30 to 70 per cent of mangrove loss 
worldwide. The observed declining health of the SMF is particularly related to the 
high livelihood pressure exerted by high numbers of local people (Iftekhar & Islam 
2004b).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
49 
 
Figure 2.9: Illegal harvesting  
(a) Illegal fishing with the help of otter  (b) Crab harvesting despite ban on 
catching and sale of crustaceans during 
breeding season 
  
Source: Ramsar (2003) Source: The Daily Star, accessed on 
24/2/2012, 
http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/
index.php 
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(c) Illegal harvesters collecting Keora 
fruits by breaking branches of Keora trees 
(d) Illegal tiger hunting 
  
Source: The Daily Prothom Alo, accessed 
on 08/08/2011, http://www.prothom-
alo.com/ 
Source: The Daily Star, accessed on 
9/12/2012, 
http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/
index.php 
  
(e) Village elites illegally harvest Goran 
saplings to fence shrimp farms  
(f) Illegal fishing in the Baleswar river 
with prohibited behundi and mosquito 
nets  
  
Source (e-f): The Daily Prothom Alo, 
accessed on 09/2/2012, 
http://www.prothom-alo.com/ 
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(g) Illegal woods seized by the BFD 
awaiting sale through tender  
(h) Tree density degradation  
  
 
According to the UNEP (2011), major anthropogenic effects include over-
exploitation of wood and non-wood forest products and excessive poaching of 
animals. High coastal population demand enhances illegal activities. These activities 
include trawling for prawn seeds, creating irrigation and drainage canals, and 
building embankments for fishery and shrimp ponds. Over-exploitation is thus 
identified as the most pressing ongoing threat to both flora and fauna (UNEP 2011). 
Recently, it has been confirmed that anthropogenic pressure has already encouraged 
encroachment on the boundaries of eastern and western parts of the forest.  
After two devastating cyclones (Sidr and Aila in 2007 and 2009, respectively), 
dwelling places of FDCs have been severely disrupted. Most people have now been 
resettled on embankments adjacent to the forest border. It is also assumed that further 
encroachment may occur unless this increasing and newly-settled population is 
stabilised along the borderline areas. Besides, like Chokoria Sundarbans, fishing 
camps are another major source of disturbance in the SMF.  
Fishermen harvest excessive fish and crabs by breaking the prescribed rules. 
Similarly, woodcutters are also involved in extensive illegal and over extraction of 
resources, hunting and trapping (Blower 1985). Between 1981-81 and 1986-87, a 
total of 118 offences was recorded and over 3,300 metres of deer nets were removed 
(Habib 1989). Illegal activities are rampant due to the increased pressure after these 
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two devastating cyclones. It is thought that the SMF ecosystem normally takes 10-15 
years to regenerate after damage caused by cyclone, provided there is no poaching or 
other human disturbances (UNEP 2011).  
Anthropogenic pressure causes serious harm to the forest. For instance, green turtle 
Chelonia mydas is rarely seen because of excessive fishing. Excessive fishing is also 
destroying Hawksbills Eretmochelys imbricate. Several decades ago, smooth-coated 
otters Lutrogale perspicillata were estimated to be 20,000 in number (Hendrichs 
1975). These are now domesticated by fishermen to drive fish into their nets 
(Seidensticker & Hai 1983). The number of estuarine crocodiles is being greatly 
depleted because of hunting and trapping for skins.  
Salinity and inundation have also disrupted traditional livelihood practices and 
enhanced increased dependence on the forest. This, in turn, encouraged FDCs to 
move towards shrimp farming for the new export-oriented cash industry in the mid-
1980s. However, artificial land inundation with brackish water during periods of low 
salinity by shrimp farmers has caused severe destruction to the forest cover 
(Agrawala et al. 2003). Depletion of forest was even faster because of increased 
pressures from waterlogged shrimp farming areas in other parts of the SMF.                        
2.8.2 Reduction of Fresh Water Flow 
Geographically, Bangladesh is situated in the lower reaches of the Ganges delta. 
Freshwater flows come through the Ganges distributaries. However, India built the 
Farraka barrage just inside its border. Alteration of water flows of the Himalayan 
headwaters is one of the most notable disturbances threatening this mangrove forest 
(Rahman et al. 2011). The barrage is causing eastward migration of the Ganges. This 
has tremendously reduced and changed the fresh water flow of these rivers into 
Bangladesh and the SMF. The Passur, the Sibsa and the Koyra are fresh water rivers, 
whereas the Kholpatua and Madar rivers are semi-saline and saline water 
respectively. The reduced flow of fresh water is increasing the salinity in the forest 
and causing vegetation losses.  
The vegetation of the forest is mainly comprised of six dominant species alongside 
these five river systems of the forest. These are Sundari (Heritiera fomes, 
Sterculiaceae) in the Passur river area; Sundari, Passur (Xylocarpus mekungensis, 
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Meliaceae) and Kankra (Bruguiera gymnorhiza, Rhizophoraceae) with scattered 
Baen (Avicennia Officinalis) in the Sibsa and Koyra river areas; and Gewa 
(Excoecaria agallocha, Euphorbiaceae) and Goran (Ceriops decandra, 
Rhizophoraceae) with few Sundari in the both the Kholpatua and Madar river areas 
(Hoq et al. 2006). Some of these species are not saline tolerant. For instance, the ‘top 
dying’ disease is common in the dominant plant species Heritiera fomes, practically 
unknown in any other mangrove forests across the globe.    
The SMF waterways are dissected by seven north-south flowing rivers. These are the 
Raimangal, a mouth of the Meghna and a branch of the Hariabhanga to the Baleswar 
(Figure 2.10). The Ganges barrage has cut off most of the fresh water and shifted the 
outflow eastwards from the Bhagirathi-Hooghly channels (Seidensticker & Hai 
1983). Thus, the whole waterways carry little fresh water, except for the Baleswar 
river on the eastern edge of the East Sanctuary (UNEP 2011). Salts are increasing in 
the south-eastern corner of Bangladesh that covers the whole of the forest area. Fresh 
water reduction has adverse effects on salt-tolerant fish harvesting during the dry 
season. In this period, fishing of salt-tolerant varieties becomes the main means of 
livelihood because of high salinity levels. Consequently, livelihoods are seriously 
hampered.  
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Figure 2.10: Map of the rivers and estuaries of the SMF 
 
Source: IUCN (2011) 
It is also reported that salinity ingress causes an increase in soil salinity in the forest 
areas. Increased salinity hampers complex forest processes of natural regeneration of 
vegetation and forest succession. This can significantly change the forest with 
discernible adverse impacts on forest regeneration and succession (Ahmed et al. 
1999). For instance, the freshwater loving Sundari is anticipated to decline in number 
or disappear entirely due to such effects. This situation would make vegetation 
canopy sparse and plant height would be reduced. Consequently, productivity of the 
forest would seriously be hampered. According to Chaffey et al. (1985), increasing 
soil and river salinity reduces total merchantable wood volume. This view is 
supported by Ahmed et al. (1999) who suggested that disappearance of oligohaline 
areas combined with decreasing mesohaline would cause a 50 per cent reduction in 
merchantable wood.     
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The effects of climate change would be even more severe over the longer dry season 
from November to April. According to climate model predictions, there will be a 
reduction in precipitation in the period, which would reduce fresh water flows into 
the SMF (Agrawala et al. 2003).  
2.8.3 Sea Level Rise 
SLR has direct adverse impacts on the forest due to enhanced inundation and saline 
intrusion into river systems. Previous records present a higher SLR of 3.14cm against 
a world average of 2cm from 1983 to 2003 (UNEP 2011). Loucks et al. (2010) 
predict that the SMF will experience a 28cm sea level increase by 2070, which will 
cause severe habitat loss. This will leave outer islands of the forest to erode away. 
UNESCO cited an estimate that a 25cm SLR would destroy 40 per cent and a 45cm 
SLR would destroy 75 per cent of the total forest by the end of the 21st century 
(Colette 2007). According to Agrawala et al.’s (2003) Bangladeshi study, there is a 
likely SLR range between 30cm to 100cm by 2100. On the other hand, the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) projected a range of 26cm to 
59cm of global SLR under scenario A1F1 (Meehl et al. 2007). Previously, potential 
SLR in Bangladesh was projected to be 30-150cm by 2050 (DOE 1993). However, 
following an IPCC report, as well as available SLR studies, Bangladesh National 
Adaptation Programme of Action suggested SLRs of 14, 32 and 88cm for the years 
2030, 2050 and 2100 respectively (MOEF 1995).   
A study was carried out by the meteorological research council of the South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) on relative SLR in the Bay of 
Bengal for 22 years (1977-1998). SAARC’s sea level data were measured and 
observed at Hiron Point. The result reveals a rise in sea level by 4.0 and 6.0mm per 
year respectively (SMRC 2003). It shows a much higher rate of SLR along the SMF 
in comparison with the yearly global rate of 1.0 to 2.0mm in the previous century 
(Karim & Mimura 2008). Figure 2.11 shows SLR-related vulnerabilities in the SMF.  
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Figure 2.11: SLR vulnerability   
(a) Upazila headquarter and degree college under water during flood 
  
  
(b) Damaged embankment (c) SMF at high tide (Ahmad et al. 
2009) 
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(d) Top-dying disease (e) Main mode of transport to Khulna 
from Koyra 
  
  
(f) Local protection of embankment with illegally harvested timbers 
 
  
 
It is clear that a rise in the sea level will occur in the future. This would cause an 
increased backwater effect in the creeks and rivers and tend to push the saline front 
further inland. Although it is hard to precisely predict, the final location of the saline 
front will depend on two effects: enhanced fresh water flows from major Ganges 
distributaries; and enhanced backwater flows in the monsoon period (Agrawala et al. 
2003). Thus, the backwater effect would reduce discharge of freshwater flows of the 
northern tributaries from the Ganges to the Bay. This would result in relatively 
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prolonged inundation of the SMF. Consequently, SLR, coupled with reduced fresh 
water flows, would increase dry season salinity levels in the SMF (Agrawala et al. 
2003).      
2.8.4 Environmental Degradation 
Illegal felling of timber and poaching of wildlife are the two main environmental 
threats to the SMF (Agrawala et al. 2003). Over-extraction not only damages the 
SMF by reducing the resource stock, but also causes pollution from aquaculture. 
Other threats include uncontrolled oil spills and dumping of wastes, as well as 
natural disasters such as storms and cyclones.  
After two recent cyclones, the construction of coastal embankments has changed 
previous synchronous hydrological ecosystems to a marginalised and scattered 
ecosystem (Hoq et al. 2006). Salinity increases various plant diseases. The land 
surface of the forest is flat. There are very few micro-topographical variations. 
Reduced flow increases sedimentation. Usually, the highest land is adjacent to 
watercourses. This is due to the sediment deposition caused when tides overflow 
their banks. Reduced water flows hasten sediment deposition. Besides, the 
construction of dykes has greatly affected fish and plant populations. 
Abovementioned environmental effects, coupled with pollution from industrial 
wastes from nearby Khulna and Mongla ports, have further deteriorated the health of 
the forest (Ramsar 2003).    
Bordering rivers have been used to transport goods and materials from different 
countries, including India, to the Mongla port adjacent to the forest. This growing 
barge traffic is leading to oil spillage and adversely affecting the forest ecosystem 
(Agrawala et al. 2003; Blower 1985). Engine and speedboats used in tourism and 
patrolling have also caused damage through oil spillage. Harvesters also increase 
spillage at the time of harvesting. An example of oil spillage is the capsizing of a 
Panamanian cargo ship in August 1994 which caused the deaths of fish, shrimps, and 
other aquatic animals, along with Heritiera Excoecaria and grasses (Karim 1994b).   
The construction of a series of embankments by the Government of Pakistan as an 
adaptation measure for coastal flooding in the late 1960s has caused environmental 
degradation. The authority did not recognise any adverse consequences during 
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construction design. Embankment water flow regulators were either not built 
properly as per design, or not maintained properly afterwards and, subsequently, 
caused water congestion. The area later experienced water logging starting from the 
early 1980s. 
2.8.5 Inappropriate Property Rights 
Despite strict conservation policies (to be discussed in Chapter Four) being in place 
with regulated restriction to entrance, rapid degradation poses a serious threat to the 
livelihood security of local FDCs. This is due to inappropriate allocation of property 
rights to FDCs which allows the BFD to allocate harvesting rights inappropriately to 
the vested groups. For instance, forest officials frequently have close links with 
contractors. In the recent past, the BFD employed around 4,500 contractors (UNEP 
2011) to facilitate commercial logging of endangered timbers. In addition, the forest 
produces up to 45 per cent of total resources produced in the country’s all state-
owned forests, and the forest was the source of raw materials for the only newsprint 
paper mill in the country (Hussain 1997). Further, the forest regularly supplies raw 
materials to a number of hardboard mills, match and other industries. The BFD takes 
full ownership of this decision.  
As the SMF is a reserved forest, the BFD is the sole manager, whereas MOEF is 
responsible for policy-making. The BFD allocates operational level rights through its 
local forest offices. Permits are mainly given to the Jele, Bawalis and Mawalis. 
These legal harvesters use de jure rights established through permits for entrance and 
use de facto rights for illegal harvesting. While FDCs use illegal de facto rights, the 
BFD exercises exclusive rights to monitor and manage resource harvesting. 
However, they fail to ensure sustainable harvesting of mangrove resources. The BFD 
has, to date, failed to make any attempt to attain sustainable harvesting through 
merging these de facto and de jure rights to manage the forest. Such attempts are 
needed to redefine the role of state property rights applied by the BFD.         
2.8.6 Ineffective Laws and Management 
Throughout 135 years of state management (Hussain 1997), the forest has been 
facing increasing threats. These problems have been accompanied by limited and 
poor implementation of enacted laws and management plans (UNEP 2011). 
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Unfortunately, poor management and the prevalence of corruption allow FDCs to 
practice illegal exploitation of resources.  
Currently, military, police, navy, customs, fisheries and other departments are 
involved in the management of the SMF, along with the BFD. Involvement of 
multiple organisations influences degradation. These organisations render their duties 
independently, without any co-ordination. The BFD has no supervisory control over 
them. This creates a problem and has resulted in a failure to achieve the objectives of 
conservation. For instance, Hiron Point in the South Wildlife Sanctuary is a prime 
tourist spot inside the deepest forest. It is linked with the wider and open sea. Besides 
the BFD offices, naval and military camps are based there to ensure the security of 
the area. Their presence is intended to guard against smugglers moving to and from 
neighbouring India with contraband goods. Although they are meant to protect the 
forest, they are also involved in illegal poaching. Extensive illegal hunting and 
trapping by naval and military personnel in that area has been reported (Blower 
1985).  
Conflicts between the multiple organisations create serious obstacles for sustainable 
conservation. During the 1970s, a 31 km long shipping channel from Mongla to 
Ghasiakhali was introduced under the Indian water-protocol. The shipping route is 
used by the Bangladesh Inland Water Transport Authority (BIWTA) through the 
forest. This route causes harm to the water quality and disturbs the wildlife (Figure 
2.12). Recently, this problem has become severe; and navigation problems have 
caused BIWTA to withdraw the channel. Since then, the BIWTA has been using an 
alternative, longer water route through the forest from Mongla to Sannashi (Suman 
2011). The route includes huge ecologically-important areas of the SMF such as: 
Sannashi – Rayenda – Bogi – Shorankhola – Dudhmukhi – Harintana – Andarmanik 
– Mrigamari – Chandpai/Jaimanirgol. Surprisingly, the BIWTA did not seek 
permission for this activity from the MOEF or the BFD, although they regularly 
advocate against the use of the route (Suman 2011).  
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Figure 2.12: Unauthorised water route through the SMF 
(a) Shipping channel along the SMF (b) Unauthorised route inside the SMF 
  
Source: The Daily Janakantha, accessed 
on 23/11/2011, 
http://www.dailyjanakantha.com/ 
Source: The Daily Ittefaq, accessed on 
11/3/2012, http://new.ittefaq.com.bd/ 
 
 
Management systems are deteriorating since the occurrence of natural disasters 
because of disruption to government offices. After two recent cyclones, it was 
observed that the field stations, boats, jetties, and equipment of the BFD were 
washed away. For example, in 1997, there were 3 field stations in the West Wildlife 
Sanctuary. Each station had 9 staff, of whom 2 were officers and 7 were forest 
guards. Likewise, there were 2 and 3 stations in the South and East Wildlife 
Sanctuaries respectively. But cyclone Sidr had damaged and destroyed all stations 
and much of their infrastructure (UNEP 2011).  Consequently, this drastically limited 
the BFD’s authority and capacity to manage the forest and to prevent illegal 
harvesting and poaching of both marine and terrestrial fauna and flora.  
In this situation, the international community has offered to become involved in the 
management of the area. For instance, UNESCO (2007) proposed re-establishing the 
management capacity of the BFD after Sidr. The proposal was made to avoid any 
irreversible damage from the risk of uncontrolled resource exploitation. However, 
their financial help in the form of a grant of US$100,000 was insufficient to restore 
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destroyed infrastructure (UNEP 2011). Consequently, even after two years, most of 
the damaged field stations remained unusable, specifically in the eastern part of the 
forest. Most importantly, radio communication towers remained completely out of 
service. The international community has instead ensured its involvement in 
managing the area by developing a five-year development project. This is how, in the 
name of re-establishment of the destroyed infrastructure, they consolidate their 
interference in the conservation management of the BFD.  
2.9 Conclusion 
Continuous deterioration of the SMF has become a serious threat to both its 
ecological systems and economic production. Most of the problems are attributed 
directly or indirectly to its rapidly dwindling condition that is firmly associated with 
historically unsustainable forest use. Anthropogenic pressure and natural calamities 
have enhanced FDCs’ dependence on the forest.  
Because of its importance, there cannot be any justification in allowing further losses 
from this forest. There needs to be sound implementation of conservation policy and 
planned interventions for the restoration of the forest. This necessitates adoption of a 
holistic approach to forestry, fisheries and the environment by ensuring active 
participation of FDC stakeholders. Redirection of the existing management regime 
and conservation interventions is needed, with a target to halt the rate of loss and to 
attain sustainable management.   
In the long term, conservation policies have changed and been revised frequently. 
However, conservation issues in terms of habitats and wildlife protection have 
continued to be ignored. Policy-makers and BFD biologists frequently fail to explain 
effective conservation priorities. These, to some extent, ultimately become a political 
process. The success of this process lies in the wider participation of local FDCs in 
launching conservation activities. This aspect has long been missing. Consequently, 
one of the keys to successful conservation is a national political consensus on wider 
participation. Unfortunately, neither the colonial nor the present government has 
addressed this issue.  
The forest is again facing threats posed by both human beings and nature. For 
sustainable conservation, FDCs’ involvement and ownership in management and 
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decision-making is a prerequisite to ameliorating most of the threats. This needs a 
consensus to be reflected in the political process as well. In the absence of such a 
consensus, overcoming key challenges to achieve environmentally friendly and 
socially equitable benefit streams will remain a distant dream.      
The forthcoming chapter presents the existing literature review of property rights and 
co-management in relation to forest sustainability. 
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Chapter 3 
Property Rights and Co-Management for Forest 
Sustainability 
 
3.1 Introduction  
The previous chapter explained the study area and its vulnerability due to a range of 
natural and artificial challenges. It described existing management of the SMF under 
the control of the BFD to substantiate the aims and objectives of the study. This 
chapter presents a conceptual and theoretical framework to understand a mangrove 
forest management regime as applied to the SMF. This framework is developed to 
inform policy decisions regarding an alternative property rights regime and demand-
side interventions. The concepts and theoretical debates relating to FDC participation 
and the benefit-sharing mechanisms in a co-management structure are discussed. The 
discussion involves reviewing existing literature regarding forest conservation, 
property rights and co-management structures. The chapter also provides an outline 
of the existing state property rights regime. To develop the conceptual framework, 
some linkages between conservation and FDC livelihood security are considered in 
the context of the management of the SMF.   
This chapter includes nine sections. Section 3.2 narrates the basic theory of property 
rights. Section 3.3 describes types of property rights. Section 3.4 provides a snapshot 
of natural resource management problems. Section 3.5 presents an overview of state 
property regime and its problems with the SMF. Section 3.6 pinpoints the rationale 
for an alternative property rights regime in the management of the SMF. Section 3.7 
outlines the conceptual framework of the research. Section 3.8 identifies policy, 
theoretical and methodological gaps in the literature. Section 3.9 concludes the 
chapter.    
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3.2 The Basic Theory of Property Rights  
From the writings of Adam Smith (1776) to the recent theory of economic growth of 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), it has been well established that an individual’s 
increased production of economic outputs is the basic source of economic growth. It 
has two components. One is specialisation and the other is accumulation of capital. 
These are described below.  
3.2.1 Specialisation and Accumulation of Capital 
Specialisation 
Within the context of forest conservation, specialisation needs elaboration. First, it 
describes the division of labour between individuals. Specialisation between firms 
means that the most efficient firms produce each commodity. The same can be 
applied to countries, with each producing goods with which it has comparative 
advantage. 
Specialisation obviously needs trade. In the absence of trade, people will be forced to 
produce their own requirements themselves, without developing any specialisation. 
This was a common practice in primitive societies. Of course for trade, property 
rights are a prerequisite as trade is, in simple terms, a transfer of property rights. 
Without property rights there can be no trade and there can be little or no economic 
specialisation.   
Accumulation 
Capital refers to assets including physical, human, social and natural capital. 
Accumulation of capital needs property rights. Obviously, one cannot save valuables 
in the form of physical capital, natural resources or even human capital unless one 
has adequate property rights over one’s accumulation. Accumulation of capital 
means sacrificing current consumption. It means individuals necessarily expect to be 
sure of gaining from the accumulation in the future. Without property rights this is 
not possible. Second, some individuals decide to consume assets lest others seize 
their accumulated assets. In that case, they consume over a short time period to 
overcome such an outcome. Therefore, in the absence of property rights, there will 
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be no accumulation and “what capital there might exist will be quickly seized and 
squandered” (Arnason, 2005, p. 245).  
3.2.2 Property Rights and Market Creation 
From this reasoning, it is recognised that property rights are a basic prerequisite for 
specialisation and accumulation of capital to occur. These arguments underpin one of 
the fundamental theorems of economics. This theorem is about the necessity of 
property rights for a high supply of goods and, indeed, economic progress in general 
(Arnason 2005).  
Any trade presupposes property rights over the commodities to be traded. 
Theoretically, if property rights are in place, there remains the opportunity for FDCs 
to reap benefits from production specialisation of resource-specific harvesting. In this 
situation, trading will occur. According to Arnason (2005), the reverse situation is 
not true when the existence of markets leads to the creation of property rights. 
Hence, a causal relationship can be derived from property rights to markets and then 
trade. It does not operate in reverse.  
Thus, it is clear that property rights systems are pragmatically based upon the 
existence of markets. Markets automatically exist if there are property rights. That 
means markets cannot arise without property rights, but property rights do not 
depend on markets. Hence, property rights are fundamental to market creation.  
3.2.3 Property Rights and Externalities 
Without defined property rights, a common problem in market production is the 
existence of externalities. For instance, externalities are pervasive in mangrove 
fisheries and mangrove forest resources. It is widely accepted that the market system 
is efficient when there is no externalities (Arrow & Hahn 1971; Debreu 1959). In this 
regard, what is less familiar is the close causal relationship between externalities and 
lack of property rights.  
When property rights are missing, resource harvesters simply take as much as they 
want. Otherwise, they take to the extent allowed by the existing social custom. This 
creates a different situation in case of scarce mangrove resources when the act of 
‘taking’ diminishes resources available to others in the society. Alternatively, 
68 
 
dependent FDCs are adversely affected by this ‘taking’. Hence, a negative externality 
is created.  
However, having property rights in place restricts such ‘taking’. Nonetheless, it 
cannot be mentioned that full and complete property rights can be applied or such 
property rights are necessarily desirable in a particular economic situation of 
mangrove forest conservation. Consequently, in any regime, ‘taking’ as an output of 
negative externalities or ‘giving’ as an output of positive externalities occurs 
provided there is an exchange of property rights. This method of property rights 
exchange is obtained through purchase. Purchase price will be positive in an 
economic situation where resources are scarce. That means that the owner of 
previous property rights will be compensated for handing the property rights over to 
another party.   
3.3 Types of Property Rights 
Marshall (1890) identified that political economy examines the role of social and 
individual action more closely in connection with the attainment and material 
prerequisite to wellbeing. However, while Gordon’s (1954) work on the economic 
theory of a common property resource was stimulating, original and an important 
study, it escaped the theoretical discussion of Marshallian contributions. From earlier 
times, the economics of the forest has continually been under revision because of the 
efficiency of production being dependent on scarce resources and their appropriation 
(Scott 1955). Hence, allocation of appropriate property rights is necessary to 
emphasise the Marshallian concept that price and output of scarce mangrove forest 
resources reach a trading equilibrium.  
Property rights regimes specify user rights for specific actors with comparable duties 
and obligations to others. These rights and duties have various dimensions. 
Economists distinguished four types of resource management regimes, namely: state, 
private, common, and open-access regimes (Bromley 1991). The following sections 
review these regime types.   
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3.3.1 State Property Regime 
State property is property owned by all and its access and use is controlled by the 
state (Guerin 2003). Anything registered with the state becomes state property and 
the state may reserve the use of the property. Government is responsible for 
undertaking all maintenance and investment to guard against unauthorised use. 
Governments claim ownership of many natural resources because of their vital 
importance to society and the nation. The state exerts control over the use of a 
resource where local communities or groups of users find it difficult or impossible to 
control usage in the absence of recognised rights to the resource.  
This underlying debate demonstrates the imperative of state ownership and raises 
legitimate questions about why a specific group of resource users should have 
property rights transferred to them. However, in reality, the state often lacks the 
capacity to enforce state property rights and regulations for extensive resources such 
as forests, marine fisheries, rangelands and irrigation. In this management vacuum, 
state property, in effect, becomes openly accessible where there remains no 
management and anyone can exploit resources—leading to resource depletion and 
overuse (Agrawal & Ostrom 1999). Under state regimes, sanctioned users and 
owners have rights against encroachers. Users without property rights are unlikely to 
be able to exclude logging companies or commercial fishing trawlers to prevent 
overharvesting. When rights are held by the state, local communities and indigenous 
user groups cannot apply de facto customary rights in resource management.                
Under this regime, the state acts as a provider of property rights and incurs costs such 
as deliberations, rule-making, negotiations, dispute resolution, monitoring, detection, 
judicial proceedings and punishment (Eggertsson 2003). Taxation or other economic 
instruments cover these costs. It is sometimes argued that property rights 
arrangements incur two types of cost: exclusion and internal governance costs 
(Eggertsson 2003). The state property rights regime arguably mitigates exclusion 
costs with its own set-up or organisation to protect rights and to defend them from 
outsiders. Alternatively, internal governance costs are avoided through governing the 
behaviour of independent insiders who share the property.    
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The allocation of full authority is advocated to regulate the resource with the external 
agency in state property regimes and reduce overexploitation of an asset (Hardin 
1968). However, it is observed that state property rights play a dominant role over 
the asset. Consequently, the inefficiency of state control as the dominant form of 
property ownership sometimes leads to the adoption of alternative forms of control 
(Chopra & Gulati 1997).  
3.3.2 Private Property Regime 
In private property rights regimes, access, use, exclusion and management are 
controlled by a private owner or by a legally defined group (Sheehan & Small 2002). 
The efficiency of property rights arrangements depends on each particular situation. 
It is sometimes observed that private property rights may emerge internally as a 
result of an individual agent’s desire to avoid cost externalities (Birdyshaw & Ellis 
2007). It is argued that private property rights are a set of workable rules to solve 
society’s increasingly complex economic problems (Epstein 1995). Private property 
rights promote faster and fuller investment in maintenance and improvement of 
resources through investment in institutional and technological development. They 
change the structural response to each circumstance. They require higher outputs and 
incomes in comparison with other alternative arrangements. Non-secured property 
rights inhibit conservation by reducing capital investment because of uncertainty of 
gains. Private property rights overcome this problem of negative predictable 
consequences through rights enforcement.      
It has been argued that the problem of over-exploitation and degradation of 
environmental resources can be resolved only by creating and enforcing private 
property rights (Demsetz 1967; Johnson 1972). However, it is important to note that 
no right in property can ever be absolute. State imposition or legal dictates may 
restrict even the use of private property in cases of emerging environmental 
significance or where there are amenity values adjacent to the property (Chopra & 
Gulati 1997). In private property, responsibilities in relation to the ownership, use 
and management of environmental resources usually fail to meet the collective or 
public need for environmental protection (Lawrence 2000), because actors’ interests 
are not automatically compatible with environmental protection in spite of the 
existence of property rights. Leopold (1968) raised the question of whether an 
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environmental ethic is consistent with the notion of private property rights. Exclusive 
rights of individual owners cannot ethically and aesthetically promote positive good 
with an economic expedient. The use of private property rights to regulate natural 
resources is controversial because of two critical issues: the allocation of wealth in 
society; and the conservation and management of limited resources (Barnes 2009). 
Thus, this rights regime lacks complex forms of holding such as stewardship to meet 
physical, legal and moral imperatives associated with natural resources. This has 
made private property rights an unsuitable and ineffective means of regulating 
natural resources. 
3.3.3 Common Property Regime 
According to Chopra and Gulati (1997), common property comprises the setting up 
of a regime structure of rights and obligations with reference to the members of a 
specific group who are eligible to obtain access to the resource in question. This 
access carries with it certain obligations on the part of each member.  
Under common property regimes, members enjoy not only access and withdrawal 
rights but also full rights of management and the exclusion of non-members 
(Eggertsson 2003). Pure common property regimes do give full rights of alienation or 
transferable asset titles to its members. This limitation differentiates common 
regimes from other types of exclusive rights (Eggertsson 1992). Common property 
regimes link user rights to a resource to membership of the resource management 
group. This management mechanism is expected to resolve disputes. Moreover, 
common property regimes maximise wealth through investment from social groups. 
This investment is expected to return a positive yield. Hence, it removes the costlier 
initiation of property rights. 
Common property regimes lie between private and open-access rights (Eggertsson 
2003). Common property regimes are complex structures that need rules and 
regulations with enforcement mechanisms to regulate exclusions and governance. 
When an asset is defined as common property, a specific group or insiders can easily 
use, control and manage the resource with exclusive use rights. Outsiders are not 
allowed to enjoy the resource. However, there may be an exception where rights of 
isolated groups may be based on customary law and social norms in some traditional 
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societies. In both cases, insiders with exclusive rights to a specific resource act as 
rational actors to avoid adverse effects on the supply-side. This provides incentives 
to invest in resource improvement and maintenance.  
3.3.4 Open-Access Regime 
Open access occurs when there are no property rights. This asserts that everybody’s 
property is nobody’s property (Bromley 1991). Actors enjoy both privileges and no 
rights for use and maintenance of an asset. In this system of privilege without rights, 
no actor has the right to preclude use by others. This fails to control resource use 
(Bromley 1991). In reality, it increases demand for the resource, which ultimately 
exceeds its rate of regeneration. The absence or breakdown of management and 
authority systems in open access regimes fails to introduce and enforce actors’ 
specific resource use norms. Open-access regimes hamper actors’ investment in the 
form of capital assets such as improvement of tree species. The institutional vacuum 
of open access expedites use rates and, therefore, the eventual depletion of the asset 
(Bromley 1991). 
Unlike under common property systems, outsiders have access in open-access 
regimes. Actors are authorised to enter or withdraw resources under an ideal or pure 
open-access regime. However, no one or group has exclusive rights to manage or sell 
the asset (Eggertsson 2003). Additionally, no individual bears the full cost of 
resource degradation. This situation results in 'free riding' and over-exploitation 
which was termed the ‘Tragedy of the Commons' by Hardin (1968). 
Open access lies at one end and individual property lies at the opposite end on a 
individualisation of ownership measurement scale (Eggertsson 2003). Open access 
creates problems when independent actors enjoy both incentives and the ability 
simultaneously to withdraw on a large scale from an asset they access. In that 
situation, negative externalities and adverse consequences arise, such as inadequate 
provision, maintenance and investment in improvement leading to economic and 
biological degradation of the resource. Hence, open-access regimes cause the supply-
side reduction in resources (Barzel 1997). 
These regimes also incur undesirable consequences on the demand-side through 
accelerated and excessive withdrawal (Eggertsson 2003). Actors have an incentive to 
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be first to remove a resource as long as it remains abundant. Actors’ motives drive 
them to unsustainable withdrawal of renewable natural resources such as fish and 
forest products. In fact, open access users have an incentive to deplete the resource to 
zero (Gordon 1954; Scott 1955). This regime does not contribute to accumulation.  
3.4 Overview of Natural Resource Management Problems 
In one way or another, all environmental and natural resource problems relate to 
over-exploitation and the provision of public goods in state property rights regimes. 
This arises from ill-defined and enforced property rights, formal or informal, to an 
individual or a group (Libecap 2009). In this situation, FDCs with high 
anthropogenic pressure behave as private owners and cause degradation. They are 
less motivated to consider internalising social benefits and costs in their production 
or investment actions—a view supported by Coase (1960).  
Gaps between private and social net returns result in externalities. This includes 
overharvesting resources from a forest. This situation is a typical example of the 
‘Tragedy of the Commons’. The tragedy occurs through reducing aggregate short-
term production or enhancing high use levels. Long-term investment to offset the 
stock is too low. These spillovers generate a damaging rush to exploit common-pool 
resources. Involved parties cannot bargain with one another in a manner described by 
Coase (1960). Dissipation or re-allocation of the resource to high-valued uses at 
present or in future does not occur. This situation does not provide price signals to 
reveal the opportunity cost and to correct wasteful use decisions. Hence, free riding 
is rampant and reduces resource stocks. This causes state property rights regimes to 
divert valuable and designated labour and capital from productive investment to 
predation and defence (Libecap 2009).  
Regarding the above consequence of property rights and anthropogenic pressure, the 
wasteful situation is associated with common pool resource management such as 
mangrove forest management. According to Libecap (2008), this problem needs to 
be addressed to overcome wastage and to enhance social savings. He suggests that 
social savings are needed to avoid property rights problems by adopting several 
options: (i) providing incentives for collective action to develop informal property 
rights for the individual or group; (ii) if these are not feasible, de jure government 
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official regulations are needed to secure access and withdrawal of resources and their 
use; and (iii) allocating common property rights for private restrictions on resource 
extraction and use behaviour.  
Achieving each of these options is not easy. First, there is a need to consider whether 
the beneficiary groups of the common property are small and homogeneous in costs, 
discount rates and production objectives (Baland & Platteau 1996; Ostrom 1990). By 
meeting these criteria, cooperative rules can be agreed upon to manage the resource 
and to provide group goods (Libecap 2009). In reality, it does not happen as there 
may be more than one group. Resource harvesting interests may differ from one 
group to another. This is very common for mangrove forests where there is interplay 
between fish and timber.  
Exogenous factors raise the incentives for defection among existing group members. 
These attract more heterogeneous new entrants outside of the original group; and 
leave less incentive to overcome common property constraints. Unless the state 
recognises and enforces localised arrangements, new entrants will deplete existing 
resource stocks. In reality, this may happen due to the fact that group members are 
not as politically influential as the new entrants (Fog 1956; Hay & Kelley 1974).  
Regarding the second option, government regulations such as tax schemes may bring 
private and social use costs into closer alignment (Pigou 1920). These tax schemes 
may remove effects of externalities through the implementation of central command 
and control regulations. Effective regulation and tax schemes need policy-makers 
and regulators to comprehend information on both the social costs and optimal levels 
of production. This includes private production and compliance costs of individual 
users. For mangrove forest conservation with state property rights regimes, these 
may not be applicable. FDCs cannot bear the compliance costs without alternative 
livelihood options. Hence, very few regulators can meet these requirements. As a 
result, in the case of mangrove forest conservation, state property rights regimes 
completely rely on the uniform standardised government regulations to address 
negative externalities. These include standardised controls on access as a regulatory 
instrument and the imposition of fixed tax levels as an economic instrument.  
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Although uniform regulations appear to be equitable and politically attractive, they 
fail to reflect differences in both production and compliance costs. Centralised rules 
for mangrove conservation are unlikely to provide incentives to the actual users of 
the resources due to the high vulnerability of poor FDCs. Rather, central regulations 
and tax policies are evaded—and are expensive to enforce. FDCs are not ‘owners’ 
under regulation and tax policy schemes of the FDs. Hence, FDs typically do not 
capture the increased social returns from the protection or investment in mangrove 
stock through conservation. Rather, they illegally allow FDCs to maximise private 
returns through cheating and malpractice (Johnson 1995). Hence, it often appears to 
be against the state’s interests and fails to mitigate anthropogenic pressure by 
enhancing resource stock depletion.        
3.5 Current Property Rights Regime in the SMF 
The following sections describe existing state property rights and challenges in the 
SMF.  
3.5.1 State Property Regime in the SMF 
The creation of protected forests under the sole management of a forest bureaucracy 
has become synonymous with forest conservation since its commencement in the 
early 19th century (Colchester 2004; Nyhus & Tilson 2004). Likewise, the BFD is 
solely responsible for undertaking conservation and development initiatives in the 
SMF. However, the top-down conservation mechanism does not share its power and 
control of forests and forest resources other than with relevant government bodies. 
The BFD and MOEF make necessary investment through the Annual Development 
Programme (ADP). Development projects are implemented and monitored by the 
BFD.  
The BFD uses licensing as an economic instrument as a corrective tax on harvesters 
to reduce the amount of harvesting effort. Harvesting effort is usually denoted as a 
function of the capital and labour inputs used to harvest resources. The objective of 
corrective taxation is to reduce the amount of effort and allow the forest time to 
regenerate. Economic instruments allow rights-based management in conservation 
practices. This form of rights allocation is intended to alleviate common-pool losses. 
Permit involves the granting of a right to specified time and catch allowed in a 
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nominated area. However, the BFD does not grant a right to the stock. For instance, 
individual permit rights give a weekly allowable catch in fishery and crabs. Permits 
are also issued to harvest various wood and non-wood forest products for up to thirty 
days. Present conservation policy applies permits as an economic instrument for this 
shorter term. The BFD initiates the guarantee of secured access and withdrawal 
rights to FDCs.  
Through these regulatory instruments the BFD adopts legal regulations and statutes. 
Legal regulations can be prescriptions or proscriptions and laws, ordinances, decrees, 
and other forest conservation-related directives and regulations can also be legally 
binding. They are based on state authority directed from the BFD and MOEF. These 
legal regulations and statutes are used as a threat of coercion in a case of non-
compliance. Regulatory instruments are enforced to conserve protected areas under 
the NFP, as are various laws such as conservation and hunting laws.    
3.5.2 Problems with the State Property Regime 
According to Libecap (2009), property rights arrangements provide multiple 
advantages to the conservation of natural resources through information generation, 
cost-savings, flexibility, transfer to high valued uses, and alignment of incentives for 
conservation initiatives. However, using case study and survey, Kumar and Kant 
(2005) identified that forest bureaucracy lacked accountability, responsibility and 
responsiveness to community interests. In other research, Spinesi (2009) found that 
the FDs often unnecessarily exacerbated income inequality by diverting resources 
from innovative activities and failing to ensure the livelihood security of forest 
communities. They argued that the bureaucracy was mainly responsible for dealing 
with its dysfunction in forest management, particularly by sharing power with the 
forest communities. Korten and Uphoff (1981) conducted additional research and 
identified the bureaucracy as comprising individual members with a mentality in 
which they behaved and expressed attitudes differently from those set out in forest 
conservation policy. Colchester (2004) and Sekher (2001) identified a link between 
forest sustainability and the secured tenure of forest land with access to resources. 
However, the existing regime fails to produce any approach to guarantee such a 
relationship under the traditional top-down conservation policy in the SMF. In line 
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with the findings of these studies, the existing state regime fails to capture negative 
externalities in this forest.    
The central point of this debate is how the rights regime can capture externalities 
efficiently. In any case, the regime cannot leave an economic trading system that 
allows resource users to accumulate capital through specialisation. Thus, the state 
regime fails to address the missing link between conservation and the livelihood 
situation of the FDCs.  Pavri and Deshmukh (2003) identified this rights regime as 
unlikely to develop any best-fit model to ensure sustainable forest management and 
establish desired forest-people relationships. In examining such forest-people 
relationships and their interaction within the state-managed property rights regime of 
the BFD in the SMF, it is clear that the present regime’s efficacy hinges on satisfying 
user demands by allowing appropriate property rights. The top-down institutional 
structure has largely failed to cement regime legitimacy and historical relationships 
between property rights and FDCs. Motivation theorists identified this aspect and 
noted that non-satisfaction of higher level needs by the bureaucratic structure caused 
the lack of such willingness (Maslow 1943). In line with Robbins (1998), this 
ultimately impacts the quality and quantity of resource harvesting of the SMF. 
The state property rights regime underlies mangrove forest management and 
provides full state ownership (Sudtongkong & Webb 2008). This model is applied in 
the management of the SMF where communities have no right to manage the 
resources or be involved in policy-making. This top-down management structure, 
thus, does not address the livelihood security of FDCs. In this regard, other 
management models such as open-access, full or partial privatisation and co-
management models can be applied to the SMF.  
Because the SMF has national and international significance, as well as huge 
anthropogenic pressure, the open-access management model is not suitable. In 
addition, it is not realistic for this forest to be fully or even partially privatised 
because of national and global importance. Thus, the best possible management 
model is considered to be the co-management option which has gained prominence 
as a means to obtain the sustained interest of communities in a participatory form 
with defined property rights (Plummer & Fennell 2007).  
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3.6 An Alternative Property Rights Regime for the SMF 
3.6.1 Common Property Regimes 
S&O (1992) differentiate property rights and categorise them into four 
classifications: (i) authorised users, who have access and withdrawal rights; (ii) 
claimants, who have rights to manage resources; (iii) proprietors, having rights to 
exclude others from use of the resource; and (iv) owners, having rights of alienation 
to divest the resource. These classifications may be held in common by FDCs who 
harvest from, use, and/or maintain one or more forests and who share the same rights 
and duties to harvest products from the forest(s). These classifications are used to 
allocate property rights in a co-management system for common-pool resources.   
In regard to common pool resources, S&O (1992) identified operational-level 
property rights as access and withdrawal rights and collective choice property rights 
as management, exclusion, and alienation rights. They categorised these rights as 
authorised entrant (having access right), authorised user (having access and 
withdrawal rights), claimant (having access, withdrawal and management rights), 
proprietor (having access, withdrawal, management and exclusion rights), and owner 
(having all rights) (see Figure 3.1). The absence of these types causes ill-defined 
property rights and enhances degradation through the creation of negative 
externalities (Tietenberg 1992). Prasad (1997) also supported this view, which he 
perceived as de-motivating individuals and organisations to use forest resources 
efficiently and thereby resulted in a negative interest in forest conservation and 
management initiatives. From various empirical studies, Ostrom (2003) inferred that 
at least the rights of proprietorship (up to an exclusion right) made the communities 
govern and manage the common pool resources more effectively. 
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Figure 3.1: Typology of property rights 
         Property rights 
 
 
 
Source: Schlager and Ostrom (1992) 
Many studies identified that ensuring property rights was a prerequisite for 
successful co-management where allocation of private tenure rights were not 
possible (De-Lopez 2005; Irimie & Essmann 2009). Their findings showed that those 
rights allowed access to jurisdictions and, therefore, incentives to the community to 
protect forests. Those studies were mainly conducted in European and North 
American contexts (Bouriaud 2007; Irimie & Essmann 2009), and very few were in a 
developing country contexts (Namaalwa 2008). However, Ostrom (1990, 2003) 
elaborated the property rights arguments by criticising the assumption that self-
interested rational individuals did not cooperate. According to her, the tragedy of the 
commons (Hardin 1968), the logic of collective action (Olson 1965), and the 
prisoners’ dilemma (Tucker 1950) are all inadequate because of the free-rider 
problem (Figure 3.2). Consequently, S&O (1992) argued for developing institutions 
as the basis of collective action; and identified five types of rights for governing 
common-pool resources from the experiences of the United States of America, 
Europe and other countries (Figure 3.1).  
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Figure 3.2: Genesis of S&O’s property rights theory 
Schools of property rights       Problems            Schlager & Ostrom’s prescription 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Common property rights are regularly found in many parts of the world and often 
become an effective arrangement for institutional management (Chhatre & Agrawal 
2009). The most common property right in forest management is access to a defined 
physical property and the harvesting of forest products. FDCs holding these two 
rights are defined as authorised users; and are hypothesised to have very weak 
incentives to limit their harvesting effort (Coleman 2011). Limited ownership 
restricts efforts by FDCs to develop specialisation. They have no right to make rules 
to limit forest use or harvesting effort in their attempts to obtain sustainable forest 
management. Consequently, authorised users who limit their harvesting efforts are 
disadvantaged by other (illegal) users who do not follow the same behaviour.  
In a cooperative mechanism, FDCs will enjoy the rights of management as claimants 
to regulate internal forest use and prevent overuse. Although this right provides 
comparatively more extended ownership over the resources, right holders cannot 
exclude other entrants. Hence, rights holders are unable to reap benefits from trading 
their harvested resources. Moreover, previous research has found that this 
arrangement provides somewhat weak incentives to reduce overharvesting (Coleman 
2011). Therefore, without rights of exclusion, FDCs are unlikely to extract expected 
benefits from the rules they establish in a co-management arrangement. Under this 
arrangement, FDCs are defined as proprietors who allocate access and withdrawal 
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rights to members within their group. Proprietors are hypothesised to have somewhat 
stronger incentives to sustainably harvest as they receive benefits from doing so and 
they can exclude others from the forest.  
Many authors argue that the right to alienate, that is, the right to sell or lease any of 
the above rights, is a very crucial characteristic of effective property rights (Schlager 
& Ostrom 1992). These rights encourage resource owners to reap maximum benefits 
from long-term actions that ensure sustainable forest management. With these 
alienation rights, FDCs can lease or sell the benefits to those who value the benefits 
most. Owners are distinguished from proprietors as the latter only have rights to 
realise benefits from sustainable forestry, but the former can sell those benefits to 
those who value them the most (Coleman 2011). Thus, full ownership is 
hypothesised to provide the greatest incentive to sustainably manage resource stocks. 
However, by definition, these rights are absent in common pool resources (e.g. the 
SMF) where government regulatory bodies act as the owner and manager. Table 3.1 
describes the theoretical typology of property rights.    
Table 3.1: Typology of property rights bundles and right holder designation 
Property right holder  Property rights Expected incentives to 
manage resource stock 
Authorised user Access + withdrawal Weak 
Claimant All the above rights + Management Better 
Proprietor All the above rights + Exclusion Strong 
Owner All the above rights + Alienation Very strong 
Source: Adapted from Schlager and Ostrom (1992)  
The above table demonstrates that proprietors have strong incentives to manage 
resources sustainably. This authority allows right holders to accumulate capital 
through specialisation. Through the operation of the market system, the rights 
holders gain from benefit sharing.  
The theoretical framework of this research is based on this classification of property 
rights bundles. In this study, a common property setting is applied to the co-
management model. It analyses how FDCs may gain specialisation and accumulation 
of capital through the application of common property rights. Hence, it is necessary 
to understand how S&O’s framework applies common property rights for managing 
resource sustainably. 
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3.6.2 Schlager and Ostrom’s Framework 
Operational level rights are translated into operational-level rules used to conduct 
daily activities. According to S&O (1992), “by the term ‘rules’ we refer to generally 
agreed-upon and enforced prescriptions that require, forbid or permit specific actions 
for more than a single individual” (p. 250). An example of an operational rule is the 
specification of the types of authorised or forbidden fishing or timber harvesting 
technologies.  
Collective level rights frame operational rules for individuals’ participation in 
activities. A collective-choice action can necessarily change operational rules. The 
typical operational rule is devised or changed with the right to participate in 
decisions. For example, allowing the types of authorised or forbidden fishing in a 
particular location is a collective-choice right (Schlager & Ostrom 1992). 
Although users of natural resources frequently apply the terms ‘rights’ and ‘rules’ 
interchangeably, S&O’s (1992) classification distinguishes them as ‘rights’ which 
are the product of ‘rules’. The terms clarified as ‘rights’ refer to particular authorised 
actions; and ‘rules’ refer to prescriptions leading to authorisations. Although S&O 
(1992) rest their approach completely on property rights, they specify that all rights 
have complementary duties. 
S&O (1992) classify access and withdrawal rights. Access is the right to enter a 
defined area; and withdrawal allows extraction of a resource. For example, if a group 
of wood cutters hold an access right, they may have authority to enter a defined area 
subject to following the rules specified for them to exercise this right.  
According to S&O (1992), collective choice rights are so powerful that they provide 
authority to devise future operational-level rights. Management rights allow property 
rights holders to regulate internal use patterns and to make improvements to a 
resource for transformation. For example, fishers have the authority to determine the 
zoning plan for limiting various types of harvesting activities with the demarcation of 
catch areas in fishing grounds. An exclusion right authorises property rights holders 
to determine who will have access rights to a resource and how this right may be 
transferred to other individuals. For example, fishers who confine access to their 
fishing grounds to males of a certain age group belonging to a particular community 
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and who use particular types of gear are characterised to exercise a right of exclusion 
(Schlager & Ostrom 1992).  
Although these five property rights are independent from one another, they are 
frequently used in the cumulative management of fisheries or forests. Significantly, 
this concept can be applied for mangrove forest management. For example, it is 
possible to have entry rights without withdrawal rights; to have withdrawal rights 
without management rights; to have management rights without exclusion rights; and 
to have exclusion rights without rights of alienation. 
S&O (1992) warn that these property rights bundles may cause harm within a single 
common property resource. A conglomeration of de jure and de facto property rights 
may overlap or complement to create conflict between property rights. For instance, 
a government may allow fishers de jure rights of access and withdrawal; and retain 
the formal rights of management, exclusion and alienation for itself. In this situation, 
fishers may not be able to exercise management and exclusion rights to define among 
themselves how harvesting may take place and who will harvest from the defined 
fishing grounds.  
Demsetz (1967) argued that private property rights have the predominant influence 
over investment. S&O (1992) argued that private ownership was not the only 
structure of property rights that encourages investment. For example, the right of 
exclusion provides strong incentives for owners and proprietors to encourage 
investment because, with this right, proprietors and owners can make decisions as to 
who can or cannot access a resource. S&O’s (1992) model allows researchers to 
explore the variations of property rights in common property settings and 
investigates their effects on natural resource conservation. This study uses the S&O 
model to categorise adults from the FDCs into ownership categories.  
3.6.2.1 Criticisms of Schlager & Ostrom’s Theory 
S&O’s (1992) theory is becoming increasingly popular in interpreting forest resource 
management (Coleman 2011; Dorji et al. 2006; Roy et al. 2012). In spite of that, this 
theory is criticised, first, as a normative framework and a blueprint and because it 
largely focuses on internal dynamics of resource management (Steins & Edwards 
1999). Second, Agrawal and Chhatre (2006) identified gaps in this theory as it failed 
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to address forest-people relationships in investigating the range of causal variables. 
They also explained that this theory in diverse institutional settings failed to shape 
forest conditions. Third, full ownership may cause a reduction of forest resources 
because of the existing poverty of the forest communities.   
Thus, this study will enrich S&O’s (1992) model by focusing on the adequacy of 
proprietorship or any bundled property rights for co-management and their 
influences on the sustainability of the SMF. 
3.6.2.2 Adaptation and Adoption of the Framework 
In spite of the above criticisms, S&O’s (1992) framework is used extensively in the 
literature. Existing literature commonly cites the S&O ownership framework in areas 
such as fisheries (Iglesias-Malvido et al. 2002; Rudd 2004; Sekhar 2004), forests 
(Barsimantov et al. 2011; Behera & Engel 2006; Coleman 2011; Coulibaly-Lingani 
et al. 2011; Hayes 2007; Hayes & Persha 2010; Thanh & Sikor 2006), wetlands 
(Ahmed et al. 2008; Ambastha et al. 2007) and irrigation (Kolavalli & Brewer 1999; 
Meinzen-Dick & Bakker 2001). Nonetheless, it is found that most of the studies cite 
S&O without framing key discussions or hypotheses within the property rights 
typology. In many studies, the use of the full typology of property rights such as 
access, withdrawal, management, exclusion and alienation is absent (Dorji et al. 
2003). According to Ahmed et al. (2008), typically, authors use one set of S&O’s 
typology (i.e. authorised user to assess or analyse a common property regime) and 
only a few researchers have used S&O as a general theoretical framework.  
Mangrove forest conservation is different from general forest conservation due to 
joint production with mangrove fisheries and aquaculture. For example, mangroves 
present a special case where multiple resources such as forests, fisheries, and other 
vegetation are extracted by community members. Living along the interface between 
land and sea, the mangoves support diverse and rich habitats of aquatic and terrestrial 
organisms. Because of this greater diversity of habitats, mangrove biodiversity is 
subject to various pressures with respect to developmental needs and over-
exploitation. Overall, this causes a steeper reduction trend in productivity for 
mangrove forests than for other forests (Kathiresan & Qasim 2005). Therefore, 
mangrove management is different from other forest management because of four 
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management domains: mangroves, fishery, wildlife and eco-tourism. In this regard, 
Kathiresan and Qasim (2005) suggest conservation of mangrove habitats and their 
biodiversity should form a top priority for preservation purposes and the sustainable 
utilisation and restoration of ecology.   
The S&O framework offers a great deal of flexibility in analysing property rights in 
such a multi-pronged but composite resource system for mangrove resource 
management. This implies that mangrove conservation requires policy to also jointly 
examine aquaculture development (Armitage 2002; Farley et al. 2010). It is 
important to note that no published research has yet applied S&O’s (1992) model to 
assessing such differences in mangrove conservation (Adger & Luttrell 2000; Farley 
et al. 2010; Primavera 2000; Saunders et al. 2010). Furthermore, no research has 
investigated the role of property rights in developing specialisation and enhancing 
accumulation of capital by the FDCs of the SMF.  
3.6.3 Co-Management 
To understand the existing negative outcomes of the state property rights regime, the 
following sections discuss the application of S&O in co-management of the SMF.  
3.6.3.1 Basic Concepts of Co-management 
The increasing interest in the co-management of forests has become pivotal in the 
last two decades. Plummer and Fitzgibbon (2004a) defined co-management as “the 
distribution of rights and responsibilities pertaining to a particular resource” (p. 878). 
Matose (2006) defined co-management as the management of reserved and protected 
forests by the government where surrounding communities can actively be involved 
in designing, planning and execution. These are blended with theory and practice and 
shared with government and local users. This study is primarily concerned with the 
body of knowledge of co-management and how such knowledge can be applied to 
the SMF. It will enrich the theoretical model by explaining the inadequacy of 
distributing property rights to ensure the continuous benefit stream and looks into the 
need for alternative income-generating activities within them to shape the co-
management definition for the SMF.  
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Following on from the above definitions set out in the literature, it is argued that co-
management is a key to sustainable forest management (Jumbe & Angelsen 2007; 
Matose 2006; Plummer & Fitzgibbon 2004a). The aspiration to involve communities 
and invite them to share responsibility for forest management, benefits and decision-
making powers at all levels has become a big concern to the policy-makers, 
researchers and development practitioners (Kant 2004). In the last few decades, the 
debate over community-managed conservation for forest resources against the failure 
of fortress-style conservation under the FDs has become of interest to all concerned. 
And this is related to the measures concerned with the production and preservation of 
forest lands and resources for forest conservation. Hence, cooperation from the local 
community is pivotal (Quazi et al. 2008).  
However, local people’s cooperation in co-management framework is not easy. In a 
recent study, Behera (2009) identified that access by local people in forest resource 
management had been recognised as an important policy gap in many developing 
countries. In practice, however, social capital was not enhanced. Social capital can be 
described as features of social organisation such as networks, norms and trust which 
facilitate collective action through coordination and cooperation for mutual benefits 
(Putman 1993). By building relations, trust, altruism and civic responsibility among 
the members of the forest commons, social capital has immense positive externalities 
and effects on sustainability (De-Lopez 2005). Hence, it is fundamental to allocate 
property rights to the FDCs to ensure the development of their social capital. This 
gap occurs in Bangladesh where the NFP allows the involvement of local people on 
paper, but in practice the BFD excludes them from overall management of the forests 
(GOB 1994).  
Furthermore, Kolavalli (1995) identified that the main features of co-management—
the mutual acceptance of responsibilities, rights, and accountability by the FD and 
local people together—very often remained absent. For example, by using survey 
and FGD methods, Behera and Engel (2006) identified that FDs did not bear 
adequate accountability to ensure property rights in co-management. Rather, local 
people became vulnerable to the exploitation of local and national elites. In Nepal, 
Adhikari and Lovett (2006) used field survey and participatory rural appraisal (PRA) 
methods in their research and found that the highest transaction costs appeared to be 
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the 26 per cent of resource appropriation costs borne by the poorer households in 
comparison with 14 per cent borne by rich households. This indicates that co-
management has been unsuccessful in addressing the equity issue under the FDs and 
policy-makers still have a long way to go to ensure it.  
3.6.3.2 Failures of Co-management 
Although co-management has emerged from the backdrop of centuries-old forest 
management systems by the FDs, it could not overcome the major gaps in theory and 
practice. Charnley and Poe (2007) identified those gaps as the failure of equitable 
power distribution from states to communities with emphasis on local control over 
forest resources. These failures were due to the lack of power within communities for 
decision-making, management and protection of forests from undue interventions of 
the FD (Bhattacharya et al. 2010) which, concurrently, were caused by the absence 
of appropriate property rights.  
To avoid the above problem, theorists typically identified decentralisation reforms 
for forest bureaucracies by allocating property rights to enhance efficiency, 
accountability, equity and responsiveness to the demands of the local people 
(Webster 1992). Ribot et al. (2006) conducted comparative analysis in Senegal, 
Uganda, Nepal, Indonesia, Bolivia and Nicaragua by applying case study methods 
for forest management. They found that fundamental bases of decentralisation 
“including discretionary powers and downwardly accountable representative 
authorities are missing in practice” (p. 1865). However, these studies failed to 
prescribe any effective decentralisation mechanism for accountable institutions at 
government level to establish and secure property rights as the basis for autonomous 
decision-making opportunity for communities. In addition, these studies failed to 
identify the appropriateness of property rights and any alternative for co-
management. To enhance forest sustainability, improvement of community 
livelihoods is necessary to lessen the dependence of FDCs. Without addressing the 
missing link between livelihood security and forest conservation, even conservation 
policy with co-management may not cap deforestation and degradation.   
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3.6.3.3 Role of Property Rights in Co-management  
It is sometimes argued that regulation and tax policy have roles in response to the 
‘Tragedy of the Commons’. This is mainly because of the lack of feasible 
alternatives to correct market forces. This approach also restricts the number of 
entrants. Hence, the high resource costs of defining and enforcing rights-based 
arrangements emerge. Another reason is the lack of any possibility of privatising 
common-pool resources due to high political costs with high social value. The lack 
of a rights-based approach in forest conservation and centralised standard 
prescriptions not only ignore real costs but also fail to address anthropogenic 
pressure. Therefore, centralised regulations are costlier and have proved to limit 
effectiveness.  
From this backdrop, property rights might not be a solution to address the externality 
directly. They are not able to provide individual incentives to participate in 
conservation for environmental and natural resource use. Theoretically, property 
rights allow markets. Markets provide price signals for alternative use of costs and 
benefits for all forms of common-pool extraction and provide environmental 
amenities (Demsetz 1967). The application of property rights in common-pool 
resource management needs to define and enforce resource use in allocating and 
demarcating entitlements. This helps in arbitrating disputes and enhances policy 
compliance.  
The allocation of property rights under conservation policy has high political costs 
due to the impact of rights assignments on wealth distribution and political influence 
(Libecap 2008). In the case of forest resources, FDs need the right of exclusion to 
make rights effective. Exclusion ultimately creates winners or losers. Theoretically, 
property rights allow resource ownership to obtain the stream of net benefits from 
production specialisation, investment and trade. Resource ownership is expected to 
allow stock rebound from open-access depletion and is associated with huge wealth 
distributional impacts.  
However, in reality, this may not occur due to high community dependency on 
resources. Forest resources cannot cope with the high demand of the poor dependent 
communities, who, as a result, over-harvest. This situation is worsened with the 
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shorter period of property rights allocated by permits. This economic instrument 
neither develops ownership in the FDCs nor enhances specialisation or accumulation 
of capital. This situation may cause deterioration of social cohesion and the possible 
losses of other collective values, supporting ‘the Comedy of the Commons’ (Rose 
1986).  
To overcome such dissatisfaction, it is necessary to mitigate distributional reaction 
and to secure socially and politically desirable outcomes. For this reason, many 
economists support not only common property rights, but also grandfathering or first 
possession of property rights (Libecap 2007). However, the grandfathering or first 
possession concept is criticised as it restricts new entrants. In this situation, market 
forces do not work to allow trade to gain from specialization, and capital 
accumulation by resource users. Thus, theoretically, the benefits of property rights 
depend on the level of rights granted and its ability to address the ‘Tragedy of the 
Commons’ (Guyader & Thébaud 2001).  
However, in reality, the ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ can be addressed if high 
anthropogenic pressure of the resource users is addressed. The trend towards 
degrading of mangrove forest is due to not meeting the demands of large FDCs, even 
after the allocation of common property rights. The adoption of alternative 
livelihoods is needed to lessen the pressure. The common property regime is efficient 
when there is expected benefit-sharing to offset the costs involved through the 
creation of alternative livelihood opportunities. Then, this regime provides gains to 
the society in addressing the externalities via reduced overharvesting, more 
investment and trade. It also allows the losers, due to allocation of rights, to be 
compensated politically through side payments or supply-side interventions for 
alternative livelihoods from the wealth saved from open-access losses (Libecap 2009, 
p. 129). These supply-side policy interventions might include short-term subsidies or 
the creation of alternative livelihood options for the longer term.  
3.7 Conceptual Framework 
On the basis of the above literature review and research questions, the conceptual 
framework for the proposed research has been developed in Figure 3.3.  
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Figure 3.3: Conceptual framework of forest sustainability with co-management  
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currently absent. Thus, this research investigates whether these communities are 
satisfied with the present institutional structure by understanding their perceptions 
towards existing property rights and the conservation of the SMF. If they are 
dissatisfied, such perceptions will help explain the justification of co-management as 
the alternative with defined property rights for the communities.  
Following the above justifications, this research proposes a co-management approach 
for the sustainability of the SMF. For the SMF, a mangrove co-management 
approach will be an arrangement in which both de jure and de facto responsibilities 
and obligations for sustainable management of the SMF are negotiated, shared and 
delegated between the BFDs and the FDCs. However, this research critically 
evaluates whether this co-management approach is able to achieve sustainability of 
this forest or whether any alternative livelihoods options are necessary.   
In this regard, this research will also explain perceptions of those rights and 
conservation determinants for the SMF. Simultaneously, this research will identify 
the barriers to and remedies for the distribution of property rights for co-
management. Thus, this research will assess whether S&O’s embedding of common 
property rights is adequate for forest sustainability, or whether any demand-side 
intervention is also needed to ensure impact on resources for sustained conservation. 
It is thus expected to suggest the need for corrective policy directions focusing on 
embedding property rights in a co-management structure and the sustainable 
management of the SMF.     
3.8 Gaps in the Literature 
The review of the literature reveals the following gaps in theory, method and policy: 
i. There is no known study that investigates the adequacy of the existing property 
rights regime for the SMF by applying S&O’s (1992) theory. Earlier research is 
not based on theories that investigate whether the existing property rights regime 
is conducive to its sustainability. Thus, the intensity of community dependency 
and policy failures leading to ill-defined property rights causing rapid reduction 
remained unexplored.  
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ii. The above studies regarding the theoretical aspects of property rights were 
conducted in countries where there was an established co-management structure. 
Ill-defined property rights are identified as the root cause of rapid degradation of 
the forest area despite the existence of conservation policies. In the context of 
Bangladesh, past studies did not highlight these issues and were conducted 
outside the reserved forest. Neither were they within the purview of the 
conservation policy. Muhammed et al. (2008), Salam and Noguchi (2006), 
Salam et al. (2005) and Salam and Noguchi (1998) conducted studies to 
investigate farmers’ participation in the central Sal (Shorea robusta) forest of 
Bangladesh. Those studies totally excluded the range of causal influences 
perceived by the communities regarding property rights in shaping forest 
conditions under prevailing top-down institutional settings. Furthermore, they 
did not consider community perceptions of the interaction between the existing 
property rights regime and the conservation of forest resources. 
iii. No studies have yet examined the rationality of existing state property regimes. 
Alternative property rights regimes for co-management as policy options have 
not been explored.   
iv. Only one study was conducted to identify the status of the SMF by using the 
PRA method (Kabir & Hossain 2008) without considering any theoretical 
framework. No studies have investigated its sustainability by using community 
household surveys based on a model derived from S&O’s (1992) theory, along 
with content analysis and FGD methods.  
v. Earlier studies did not challenge S&O’s (1992) model by investigating the 
necessity of demand-side interventions along with property rights bundles for 
sustained conservation of the SMF.  
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3.9 Conclusion 
This chapter addresses the broader issues of property rights as incentives to 
sustainable forest conservation. Forest management in the SMF is top-down. This 
institutional structure has neglected community-based conservation and failed to 
contribute to the development of forest resource management organisations at the 
local level. Forest conservation policies rely primarily on existing economic and 
regulatory instruments, as well as BFD’s technical precepts. Because of significant 
anthropogenic pressure and ill-defined or limited property rights, FDCs cannot gain 
from trading. Even so, the BFD has not yet made any attempt to use the range of 
benefit-sharing mechanisms that would involve the local FDCs.  
Although there is much literature on community involvement in forest management 
throughout the world, there is a lack of consensus on which management 
mechanisms will achieve sustainable conservation. Because of diversified resources 
and easier harvesting processes, mangrove forests are being degraded at a fast rate. 
Hence, only co-management with defined property rights may overcome this 
problem and achieve sustainable conservation. Demand-side interventions are also 
needed. In this regard, this study will contribute to the literature in terms of theory, 
method, policy and practice by addressing the identified gaps.  
The next chapter reviews the role of property rights and forest policies in the 
management history of the SMF by applying S&O’s (1992) property rights typology.  
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Chapter 4 
Property Rights in Forest Policies for Sustainability 
of the Sundarbans Mangrove Forest 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Following earlier discussions on property rights, this chapter critically analyses the 
adequacy of the existing property rights regime to achieve sustainability of the SMF. 
Bangladesh, as a signatory to many international forums and protocols including the 
Kyoto Protocol and International Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), 
commits to implementing international guidelines by incorporating sustainability into 
national forestry directives to ensure FDC livelihood security. In this regard, this 
chapter articulates a historical analysis of property rights in forest policies. The 
analysis critically reviews management options and policy amendments through 
different historical time periods that address the possibility of benefits to FDCs 
through rights embeddedness.  
Forest policies of the SMF in Bangladesh have a long history of state management. 
The analysis synthesises forest policies from four distinct historical time periods. The 
embedding of property rights during those periods reflects S&O’s (1992) theory. 
Thus, the analysis provides reflections of property rights in policy interventions and 
then their contribution to resource extraction. It also identifies an immediate 
alternative regime intervention for sustained conservation of the forest.  
The rest of the chapter comprises seven sections. Section 4.2 presents the historical 
approach as a framework for forest policy analysis. Details of the use of the 
analytical method for content analysis are highlighted in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 is 
concerned with the critical evaluation of four historical forest policy periods for 
managing the SMF. This is continued through a discussion of the reflection of 
property rights in the policy interventions in different time periods by developing a 
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content analysis matrix in Section 4.5. Section 4.6 designs an overall policy model 
for the sustainable management practices of this forest. Section 4.7 concludes the 
chapter.  
4.2 Framework for Forest Policy Analysis 
Because of analytical complexities of policy change, the process of forest policy 
explanation becomes difficult for researchers, practitioners and policy-makers 
(Villamor 2006). Policy analysts thus adopt different approaches. According to 
Cubbage et al. (1993), there are several approaches for forest policy analysis: (i) the 
historical approach; (ii) the institutional approach; and (iii) the analytical/procedural 
approach. The historical approach reviews past events and laws for describing forest 
resources policy evolution. The institutional approach looks into the institutions and 
organisations responsible for forest policy formulation. In a different way, a model of 
political decision-making is used in the analytical or procedural approach. Cubbage 
et al. (1993) identified shortcomings in all three approaches. According to them, the 
first approach is comparatively simple for forest policy process analysis, whereas the 
second approach is confined to specific institutions for forest policy process analysis. 
For the last approach, there is an absence of clear criteria to judge the 
implementation of a particular policy initiative.  
The abovementioned limitations of all three approaches make policy analysts and 
researchers struggle to choose the most effective approach to analyse the policy 
processes that, in reality, are detailed and complex (Cubbage et al. 2007; Villamor 
2006).  
Considering the above limitations and availability of data and information, the 
historical approach is applied in analysing forest policy in the SMF. However, the 
use of an historical approach to explain the process of policy change has its own 
complexities. This is due to the absence of a functioning and dedicated institution in 
early colonial periods. It is also not possible to develop any particular political 
decision-making model over the long term due to the lack of a structured political 
base. Consequently, the long historical policy context is considered to be an 
appropriate framework for analysing policy processes for this forest. In this regard, 
the analysis of forest policies is divided into four time periods, namely, Mughal, 
97 
 
British, Pakistani and Bangladeshi. These periods are reviewed for past events and 
laws to explain the evolution of resource management policies for the SMF.  
4.3 Objectives and Research Methodology 
The objective of this research is to analyse the implicit hypothesis that existing state 
property rights lead to a greater sustainability of the SMF by answering the following 
research question: 
 
“Is the existing property rights regime adequate to achieve sustainability of the 
SMF?” 
 
Content analysis method was used to critically evaluate the reflection of property 
rights for the FDCs in various forest policies. Two broad concepts—‘factors’ and 
‘actors’—of forest policies are identified in terms of property rights (Irimie & 
Essmann 2009). Thus, this chapter considers property rights as only one explanatory 
variable as its role has not yet been investigated thoroughly in environmental 
economics (Glück 2002; Irimie & Essmann 2009). The analysis also extends 
investigation into how the SMF became a distinct area of interest in policy 
interventions in the last few centuries. In this regard, the study covers policy 
documents from the period 1526 to 2000 during which extreme changes of policy 
formulation were common. Additionally, it covers other current textual documents.  
With regard to integration, a qualitative content analysis is used to conceptualise raw 
data (Irimie & Essmann 2009). Thus, this research carried out conceptual analysis of 
content analysis “to capture the beliefs of the policy actors” (Villamor 2006, p. 165). 
Concepts were chosen to examine the number of occurrences within the text 
recorded as per the research question.  
To ensure replicable and valid research findings (Krippendorf 2004) in addressing 
the research question, this method blends property rights with forest policies to 
comprehend the qualitative and quantitative reduction of the SMF. S&O’s (1992) 
theory was used to investigate how forest policies shaped property rights in four 
historic periods and how they currently conserve this forest from the state’s 
perspective. Although a detailed review of relevant policies and property rights 
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issues is conducted using the content analysis method, personal discussions were 
held with FDCs and key personnel working at the policy and community level to 
manage this forest.  
4.3.1 Content Analysis 
According to Berelson (1952), content analysis is a research tool for a particular 
objective to manifest content of communications with systematic and quantitative 
descriptions. Content analysis is roundly known as the application of different 
specific methods and techniques (Krippendorf 2004). As a research method, content 
analysis focuses on the actual content and internal features of a research issue. This 
method is commonly used to identify the presence of particular words, concepts, 
themes, phrases, characters, or sentences in particular texts or sets of texts (Tharenou 
et al. 2007). This method is used to quantify the presence of these issues in an 
objective manner. In this regard, this method uses texts such as books, reports, 
essays, interviews, discussions, newspaper headlines and articles, historical 
documents, speeches, conversations, advertising, informal conversations, or other 
occurrences of communicative language. After that, texts are coded and broken down 
into manageable categories on different levels such as word, word sense, phrase, 
sentence, or theme and then analysis is completed by following a particular coding 
and thematic method.  
Following Tharenou et al. (2007), content analysis for this research was conducted 
manually. This method was used to review the two abovementioned broad concepts 
in policy documents and in various consultations with relevant stakeholders. Detailed 
conceptual analysis was conducted by tallying these concepts. In describing the 
findings, a coding method was applied using theme cards. The following sections 
describe the use and procedure of content analysis.  
4.3.1.1 Use of texts 
Based on the above methodological concept of content analysis, this research 
focused on the actual content and internal features of forest policy documents. To 
conduct this analysis, texts were defined first as follows:  
i. Various forest policy documents of four distinguished time periods; 
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ii. Published reports from the MOEF and BFD; 
iii. Journal and newspaper articles; and 
iv. Formal and informal interviews and conversations with those concerned. 
Property rights issues in forest policy documents as texts are unclear prior to the 
Mughal period which began in 1526 (Kabir & Hossain 2008). Thus, the period 
before 1526 is not considered in the textual analysis. All other texts from (ii-iv) are 
considered, depending on their relation to the SMF and the allocation of rights to its 
dependent communities. 
4.3.1.2 Conceptual Analysis 
Although content analysis is traditionally most often thought to be conceptual 
analysis, it consists of two general categories. These are conceptual and relational 
analysis, of which conceptual analysis is assumed to establish the existence and 
frequency of concepts in a text (Villamor 2006). Consequently, this research uses 
conceptual analysis to address the research question.  
After defining concepts within texts, conceptual analysis frames actual contents or 
themes of the property rights regime in forest policy documents and discussions. In 
this regard, two concepts were determined for the analysis, namely, (i) ‘actors’ to 
draw internal features as policy actors’ interests and (ii) ‘factors’ in terms of 
‘allocation of property rights’ to the FDCs for livelihood security and ‘capping 
degradation’ of the forest through different policy interventions. These concepts were 
chosen for examination and the frequency of their occurrence within the above texts. 
Once identified, concepts were broken down into manageable categories on the level 
of sentence and theme. After breaking down the content of policy materials into 
meaningful and pertinent units of information, the analysis was conducted as per 
selected concepts with characteristics of property rights and degradation.  
The analysis examined the texts for the existence of certain words with relation to the 
research question (Tharenou et al. 2007). While examining the texts, attention was 
given to identifying the positive words for the development of an argument as 
opposed to negative words for building current status. This conceptual analysis was 
undertaken only to determine the presence of selected concepts so as to investigate 
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whether there is a stronger presence of positive or negative words with respect to a 
specific argument. 
4.3.1.3 Quantifying and Tallying Concepts 
As the conceptual analysis was carried out to capture the beliefs of the policy actors, 
the word ‘concept’ itself was chosen for investigation; whereas ‘analysis’ indicates 
the involvement of quantifying and tallying its presence (Villamor 2006). In this 
regard, the main focus of this conceptual analysis was to “look at the occurrence of 
selected terms within texts, either implicit or explicit terms. The choice of concepts 
was based on the research questions” (Villamor 2006, p. 165). In line with Villamor 
(2006), who used 22 documents and 4 consultations, this research used a total of 26 
official and publicly-accessible documents and 14 consultations. Ten consultations 
were with the FDCs and 4 were with relevant government and NGOs officials. 
Documents were later grouped and coded words were interpreted. 
4.3.1.4 Theme Cards 
This study used theme cards to extract thematic qualitative information or textual 
materials for subjective understanding and for the exploration of new insights for the 
research objective (Tharenou et al. 2007). A unitary theme card was used for 
‘property rights’ to write the details of each category and subsequently create 
transcripts for discussion. Although each card contained only one category related to 
property rights in the forest policy texts, expression was made in more than one 
sentence. The theme cards were then sorted to develop categories inductively in such 
a way that common categories could be separated from others. Then the passages 
were content-analysed individually to distinguish positive or negative information 
with regards to theme and categories. In this way, theme cards facilitated the 
collection of data for the discussion of property rights under different policies of the 
SMF and their effects on FDCs. This is how forest policy analyses and discussions 
were undertaken in the subsequent sections of this chapter.  
4.3.1.5 Use of Coding 
The use of conceptual analysis in this study involves the identification of codes with 
categories prior to data collection (Liamputtong & Ezzy 2007). As coding is one of 
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the central processes of this method, it is used carefully in identifying the theme to 
establish the categories (Creswell 2003). Before coding, selected materials were first 
read carefully to identify and list the main themes following categories as a “group of 
words with similar meaning or connotations” (Weber 1990, p. 37). In various forest 
policy documents for the SMF, there were many overlapping and duplicate 
categories that required combination. According to Crabtree and Miller (1992), a 
comprehensive list of all categories was prepared as per two main broad concepts—
factors and actors—as mentioned earlier. Preparation of a codebook became 
important to generate themes with patterns and their interrelationships for qualitative 
interpretation of this research (Tharenou et al. 2007).  
4.3.2 Validity and Reliability 
The issues of validity and reliability were concurrently ensured with the application 
of content analysis in the following ways:   
i. Breaking down the material into the themes was expected to stabilise this 
research by having the same information presented in the same way over a 
period of time for reproducibility and accuracy. This was possible for the 
classification of texts related to the forest policies for specific historical time 
frames. 
ii. Identifying the presence of selected concepts related to the research question 
was expected to solve the overarching problem of conceptual analysis and 
allow a challengeable conclusion. The greatest reliability was achieved by 
reducing overlapping through coding categories with clear statements (Sommer 
& Sommer 1991).  
iii. To generalise, determining the concepts is imperative in order to define 
categories for accurate investigation of the research question. This research 
determined the concepts by triangulating them with concepts used by other 
researchers. For example, the abovementioned two broad concepts were used 
by Irimie and Essmann (2009) to investigate property rights in public policies 
for achieving societal change. This triangulation is expected to achieve 
reliability of those categories over a period of time and promote the stability of 
the research conclusion. 
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iv. As a useful technique for improving validity, pattern matching was used in this 
study for conceptual qualitative content analysis (Tharenou et al. 2007). In this 
regard, prior to data collection, ‘property rights’ was anticipated as a particular 
pattern variable derived from existing formal property rights theory pioneered 
by S&O (1992). This anticipated pattern served as a benchmark to interpret 
forest policy information for the SMF. This pattern was also compared with 
other patterns predicted from the same theory for empirical analysis and 
examined its degree of fit to achieve validity of this research finding (Lee 
1999). 
By ensuring reproducibility, overcoming the overarching problem of conceptual 
analysis and for generalised conclusions, this approach is expected to ensure the 
validity and reliability of this research. 
4.4 Evaluation of Forest Policies 
The following sections describe a brief history of forest policies, management and 
embeddedness of property rights for FDCs of the SMF. Before the Mughal period, 
the SMF extended from Hatiagarh, south of Diamond Harbour which comprised 
Sirkars Satgaon and Khalifabad of the undivided India (Kabir & Hossain 2008). At 
that time, no specific management regime could be identified. It was assumed that 
there were no restrictions on harvesting resources from this forest. The other four 
periods are analysed below. 
4.4.1 The Mughal Period (1526-1765) 
Until the beginning of the 19th century, the SMF had an area of 274 km (170 miles) 
eastwards along the coast from the estuary of the Hoogly of present-day India to that 
of the Meghna in present day Bangladesh. At that time, incentives were provided to 
claim areas of this forest for agricultural cultivation (Kabir & Hossain 2008). 
According to the description of the Royal historian of the Mughal Emperor Akbar, 
the SMF extended further north up to northern Nadia, a district of India and northern 
Jessore, now a district of Bangladesh (Kabir & Hossain 2008). From that description, 
the forest was then full of tigers and crocodiles.  
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The Mughal policy for managing this forest was indifferent and they used it mainly 
for game reserves and sports. They were also interested in extracting timber and used 
the forest for aesthetic and utilitarian purposes (Kabir & Hossain 2008). During this 
period, Sundarbans became a frontier zone for human settlement and colonisation. It 
was an economic frontier to local communities of wet rice farmers who converted its 
land to agricultural use; a political frontier for expanding centralised states from 
north India; and a cultural frontier for the worldwide Muslim community to spread 
Islam by occupying its land (Eaton 1990). However, they did not formulate any 
comprehensive policy concerning forests in general, including the SMF. Rather, they 
introduced a state recognition of forest clearance to produce substantial revenue by 
allowing agriculture (Biswas & Choudhury 2007; Chowdhury et al. 2009; Iftekhar & 
Islam 2004b). As there was no strict management policy, the local people basically 
treated the SMF as a public good with open access for harvesting and conversion for 
agriculture (Eaton 1990). 
4.4.2 The British Period (1765-1947) 
The end of the Mughal period was followed by the invasion of the East India 
Company, later transmitted to British rule. That period brought major changes in 
managing forests, including the SMF. During 1765 to the mid-1800s, the SMF was 
subjected to over-exploitation for two main reasons: shipbuilding and railway sleeper 
production. British India was then going through a massive rail infrastructure 
development and required the shipping of local resources abroad by waterways. 
Furthermore, over-exploitation was due to a focus on the SMF for revenue realisation 
from the export of forest produce (Chowdhury & Ahmed 1994) and for timber 
extraction for trading. In 1793, British rule introduced the Zamindary (Landlordship) 
system under the Permanent Settlement Act. The Act contained provision for 
landlords to lease out the Chars of the forest for agriculture. After 1813, the 
Zamindars started to bring the indigenous Munda people into the SMF region to clear 
the forest for cultivation, which reduced its size significantly. Although in 1855 the 
first memorandum with a plan for forest conservation was issued to proclaim the 
whole forest area of India, the SMF came into distinct focus only after the 
finalisation of the Forest Act in 1878. Realising the importance of various mammals 
and other resources, the British enforced its closure to ban shooting, hunting and 
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fishing in 1880 (Kabir & Hossain 2008). The enforcement was executed with the 
newly-established Forest Management Division in 1879 under the management of a 
professional forester stationed at Khulna (Chowdhury & Ahmed 1994).  
However, the first formal NFP was introduced later in 1894 for the whole of British 
India to ensure the rights and interests of FDCs, including those in the SMF (Kabir & 
Hossain 2008). However, it did not give any formal rights to these communities for 
resource harvesting, except grazing rights in other low-yielding forests without 
promoting any community institutions (Kabir & Hossain 2008).  
4.4.3 The Pakistan Period (1947-1971) 
British India was divided as India and Pakistan in 1947. After partition, the 
Government of Pakistan (then West Pakistan and East Pakistan; now Pakistan and 
Bangladesh respectively) inherited the NFP 1894 with forest areas equivalent to less 
than 2 per cent of the country’s land. Most importantly, that forest policy neither 
encouraged an increase in forest area nor emphasised sustained harvesting of forest 
resources from existing forests (Kabir & Hossain 2008). Thus, recognising the 
importance of the forestry sector, the Government of Pakistan started to reorganise 
forest policies for the new state. To address the deficiency of the NFP 1894, the 
Pakistan Forestry Conference was held in 1949 and adopted guidelines for forest 
management. Following this initiative, a new Forest Policy was declared in 1955, 
mainly to consolidate state control over forests that were being commercially 
exploited. The policy did not change the reserved forest status of the SMF. However, 
this policy emphasised the exploitation of forest produce from East Pakistan to West 
Pakistan and primarily targeted the SMF as a source of industrial raw materials 
(Kabir & Hossain 2008). Despite its status as a protected forest and the establishment 
of the Sundarban (East) Wildlife Sanctuary in 1960 (MOEF 2005d), over-extraction 
continued under the state property rights regime. The post of Chief Conservator of 
Forests was also created in 1960 that expedited overharvesting following the existing 
system of resource harvesting. Again, in 1962, the Forest Policy of 1955 was revised 
to strengthen the commercial use of the SMF, undermining its conservation values 
(Chowdhury et al. 2009). The revision did not define any rights for FDCs. The main 
aspects of the Forest Policy 1955 and its subsequent revision in 1962 are set out 
below.  
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4.4.3.1 Forest Policy 1955 
Promulgated by the Pakistan Government in 1955, the policy aimed at increasing 
available allocations of forest area in unused government lands to enhance forest 
cover. This directed the classification of the forests in terms of utility for proper 
utilisation of allocations. One of the main aspects of this policy was the recognition 
of non-use intangible values and benefits of forests for the first time (Alam 2009). 
Such recognition was enhanced through the provision of careful preservation of 
forests and their scientific management. However, through this policy, the Pakistani 
Government intended to consolidate their control over forest resources with strict 
management. The policy was adopted to manage all forests under approved 
management plans where there was no involvement of FDCs. This policy under the 
colonial rule of West Pakistan targeted East Pakistani forests primarily for monetary 
gains and maximising revenue (Muhammed et al. 2008). This policy encouraged 
illegal felling and became highly detrimental to the sustained conservation of the 
SMF.   
4.4.3.2 Forest Policy 1962 
Revising earlier policy in 1962, the Government of Pakistan adopted the second 
policy having five foci: forestry, watershed management, farm forestry, range 
management and soil conservation (Millat-e-Mustafa 2002). It made some 
unconventional suggestions to gain commercial benefits from first growing species 
and grazing from public forests with intensive management (Alam 2009). Because 
such management for commercial gain was the main aim of the policy, the SMF was 
targeted for resource extraction to meet huge industrial demands. For instance, this 
policy emphasised the use of Gewa to support the supply of raw materials for the 
state-owned Khulna News Print Mill (Choudhury 1994). The use of this species was 
minimal prior to the establishment of this mill. However, following its establishment, 
the SMF started an annual supply of over 4 million cubic feet of pulpwood to 
continue its production (Choudhury 1994). This supply was unsustainable and caused 
a huge degradation of this species. Consequently, the policy was not conducive to the 
growth of the SMF due to the over extraction of resources to meet excessive 
commercial demand (Hakim 2007). This new policy was basically introduced to 
emphasise an over-exploitation of forest resources from East Pakistan.  
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High anthropogenic pressure started to grow during that time. For instance, in 
Pakistan, the population growth rate was 3.45 per cent per annum between 1961 and 
1972 (Bean 1974). In 1971, the net rate of population growth was 3.3 per cent and 
population was expected to be doubled in 25 years (Ahmad 1972). This increased 
population caused illegal felling and overharvesting, leading to ecological 
degradation of bio-diversity and tree density. Adequate institutional support to 
address these issues was denied (Khan 2001). Consequently, the principle of 
sustainable harvesting was ignored in the SMF.  
4.4.4 The Bangladesh Period (1971–to the present)    
After independence from Pakistan in 1971, Bangladesh adopted the following 
conservation policy initiatives. 
4.4.4.1 Bangladesh Wildlife (Preservation) Order 1973 
The Bangladesh Government adopted the Bangladesh Wildlife (Preservation) Order 
in 1973 (henceforth Wildlife Order) to protect and preserve valuable forests, 
including the SMF (MOEF 2005d). As per Article 23 of that Wildlife Order, the 
SMF was redefined as a reserved forest with a Wildlife Sanctuary status and was 
closed to hunting, shooting and trapping of wild animals. This allowed undisturbed 
breeding and the protection of its wildlife and natural resources. The Article also 
kept the provision to protect the forests by prohibiting activities therein. Basically, 
the Wildlife Order designated the SMF as a ‘reserved forest’ under the Forest Act of 
1927 wherein everything was prohibited without any formal permission of the BFD 
(Rahman 2005). 
4.4.4.2 National Forest Policy 1979 
Although overharvesting was experienced under the Government of Pakistan, the 
first NFP was adopted in 1979 (GOB 1979) without addressing this issue. The policy 
had several foci: restructuring of the BFD, horizontal expansion of forest, scientific 
management, careful preservation, optimum extraction, and establishment of new 
forest-based industries (Alam 2009). The policy was considered very general and 
vague in terms of providing specific directions to achieve these aims. The notable 
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aspects of the policy were to designate all government forests as national forests and 
to strictly limit the conversion of forests to other non-forestry uses.  
The major drawback of the policy was its continued philosophy of previous colonial 
governments in treating local people as the main threat to forests (Ali 2002). Thus, 
the main aim of the policy was to provide authority to the BFD to protect forests 
from local communities by applying strict rules. That exclusionary approach to forest 
protection had negative effects on SMF resources in the long run (Choudhury 2003). 
It did not address the fundamental and crucial issues, in particular, functional 
classification and forest use as an ecological foundation for sustainable production 
and the livelihood-security of huge FDCs (Kabir & Hossain 2008). These 
deficiencies necessitated the government amending its policy for management 
change in the SMF. Subsequently, the government adopted a 20-year Forestry Sector 
Master Plan for the period of 1993-2012. This plan emphasised the SMF’s protection 
as a reserved forest and consolidated state control and prohibited the granting of any 
new rights to FDCs. It maintained the restriction of any human activity inside the 
forest.  
4.4.4.3 National Forest Policy 1994  
This is the second and the current forest policy adopted against the background of 
rapid and continuous forest depletion at a rate of 90 sq. km/yr (FAO 1999). Thus, by 
amending Forest Policy 1979, the Government adopted the new NFP to bring 
remarkable changes to forest management (GOB 1994). Notably, this NFP 
recognised the interests of marginalised and disadvantaged local communities by 
committing to the equitable distribution of forest resources among them (GOB 
1994). The policy also sought to address the encroachment and degradation of the 
SMF (Iftekhar & Hoque 2005). Overall, this policy was developed to ensure the 
livelihood security of the people who depend on trees and forests, along with their 
participation in afforestation programmes. This allowed the incorporation of opinions 
and suggestions of local people in the planning and decision-making processes.  
Among others, one of the objectives of that policy was to prevent illegal occupation 
of forest lands through local people’s participation. In this regard, it was noted that 
the role of forests should include the socio-economic development of the FDCs 
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(Muhammed et al. 2008). However, by 2002 it was reported that the increase of 
forest resource cover was only 1 per cent. This rate was far below the estimated 
target and highly unrealistic in comparison with policy declaration (Muhammed et al. 
2008). Moreover, this policy violated its participatory commitment by maintaining a 
conservation policy that excluded FDCs from management and policy formulation 
and did not allocate them an appropriate level of property rights.    
4.4.4.4 Government Notification, 1996 
In 1996, Bangladesh Wildlife (Preservation) Order 1973 was modified by issuing a 
notification that designated some parts of the SMF as protected forest, including 
three wildlife sanctuaries (UNESCO 2008). The notification also redefined the 
Sundarban East Wildlife Sanctuary established in 1960 (MOEF 2005d). This 
approach not only restricted the use of buffer zones to ensure the survival of large 
mammals and birds and provide food, nesting and roosting sites over larger areas, but 
also restricted harvesting. However, no clear consideration was given to granting 
property rights options for FDCs to reduce extraction pressure on remaining sites.  
4.4.4.5 Forest (Amendment) Act 2000 
As a result of the commitment to the earlier policy, a Master Plan was developed in 
1995 (Muhammed et al. 2008). Under the plan, a good number of development 
projects were undertaken for the SMF with financial and Technical Assistance (TA) 
from different development partners and organisations including the World Bank, 
Asian Development Bank, United Nations Development Programme and the FAO. 
Thus, it was necessary to ensure the livelihood-security of FDCs and their 
involvement by enhancing the earlier policy with the newly-enacted Forest 
(Amendment) Act 2000. Consequently, the Forestry Act was amended in 2000 only 
to accommodate social forestry (Alam 2009). However, the Act overlooked the role 
of FDCs. Rather, it emphasised social forestry with the involvement of the local 
people with defined entitlement to gain benefits from selling forest resources other 
than from the SMF.  
Thus, the livelihood-security of a large number of these people remained 
unaddressed in the Act, and forest degradation continues at an alarming rate. As an 
example, among all development interventions under the Master Plan, the largest one 
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was the Sundarbans Biodiversity Conservation Project, financed by multiple 
development partners. This development project was undertaken for the period of 
1999-2006 under the sole management of the BFD, with the aim of promoting 
biodiversity conservation in the SMF by involving its dependent communities. The 
project could not attain its goals and objectives and was cancelled (Hossain & Roy 
2007). At the time of cancellation in January 2005, the physical progress of the 
project achieved “only 24 per cent against an elapsed project period of 75 per cent” 
(ADB 2008, p. 9). Thus, it was clear that policies aimed at making local people 
responsible in managing the SMF needed to be implemented. 
4.4.5 Evaluation Summary 
Historical analyses of management practices of the SMF reveal that this forest has 
been under significant anthropogenic pressure for a long time. No past policy 
allowed appropriate property rights for local FDCs. Thus, over-exploitation has led 
to the degradation of the SMF—which continues at an alarming rate. Consequently, 
today this forest covers only half the area it covered in the late Mughal and early 
British periods. In spite of that, no policy has sought to define property rights for its 
FDCs, nor sought to involve them in management and policy-making. According to 
Kabir and Hossain (2008, p. 69), “uncontrolled deforestation and land settlement 
caused this reduction in the forest’s size” during the Mughal and early British 
periods. Although the conservation of the SMF has received high priority from 
policy-makers in different time periods, they did not link their conservation efforts 
with the livelihood-security of the local dependent people. Furthermore, policies did 
not recognise any FDC attachment and belonging to the forest. Policy-makers in the 
four time periods appeared to treat the forest as a public good under state property 
rights regime.  
4.5 Discussions 
The following sections discuss the implications of property rights for the above 
policies and how they affected the sustainability of the SMF. 
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4.5.1 Property Rights Regimes and their Sustainability Implications  
The evolution of forest policies in Bangladesh provides an historical analytical 
framework for the management of the SMF (Iftekhar & Islam 2004b). Under the 
colonial governments of Britain and Pakistan, the role of property rights in managing 
the SMF was minimal. This trend still persists. Management plans under the first 
policy of British period in 1894 categorised SMF as a ‘production forest’. The 
Pakistan Forest Policy 1955 and 1962 emphasised ‘commercial use’ of this forest 
(Iftekhar & Islam 2004b). Since the Mughal period, there has been a tendency by 
state property regimes to emphasise and facilitate overharvesting and to consolidate 
state hegemony over the forest (Eaton 1990). That tendency resulted in forest 
depletion. Consequently, the 1994 policy advocated a common property rights 
regime in its Declaration No 1 for “the active partnership of the local people” (GOB 
1994, p. 3). However, this is still not practised. 
Since the Mughal period, state property rights regimes in the SMF has hinged on 
satisfying outsiders’ demands. The implications of those policies in the sustainable 
management of this forest are narrated in the following sections.  
The application of S&O’s theory (1992) to different property rights regimes in a 
content analysis matrix is discussed. The analyses present how forest policies of 
these historical periods distorted the sustainable management of the forest. 
According to Colfer et al. (1999), one criterion for sustainable forest management is 
that people link their own and their children’s futures to forest resource condition. 
Defined property rights for forest users are conducive to achieving this criterion of 
sustainability. However, policy-makers have failed to develop any best-fit measures 
to establish a clear connection between sustainable forest management and 
appropriate types of property rights regimes to address forest-people relationships 
(Pavri & Deshmukh 2003). In the case of management of the SMF, the underlying 
relationship between the BFD and the FDCs is legitimised by the current institutional 
systems of government rules and rights for determining how the resources will be 
extracted and by whom (Bromley 1991; Herath 2005). This relationship is imposed 
upon the FDCs by the BFD who define institutional efficacy in terms of community 
behaviour patterns and environmental practices. This ultimately impacts on the 
quality and quantity of resource harvesting in the SMF (Robbins 1998). Based on 
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these issues, investigation was made as to how the property rights regime affected 
the sustainability of this forest by enhancing institutional efficacy in management. 
This discussion thus lays the groundwork of investigating the adequacy of the 
existing property rights regime to achieve the sustainability of the SMF. Thus, the 
following sections reflect whether the existing property rights regime is adequate to 
achieve sustainability. 
4.5.2 Content Analysis Matrix 
A reciprocal relationship between forest policies and outcomes needs to be generated 
for the benefit of FDCs. This denotes incentives and rationales for the sustainability 
of the SMF. Policy without defined property rights for these communities does not 
ensure their livelihood-security. Furthermore, it does not develop ownership to 
conserve the forest; rather, it results in continuous overharvesting. Property rights of 
different regimes appear in the following qualitative content analysis matrix. This 
matrix has been developed on the basis of the grounded property rights regimes and 
their time periods. They are interpreted with S&O’s (1992) constituents of property 
rights bundles.  
The property rights theory explains the role and functioning of property rights over 
the resources of the SMF “and in part their emergence (ex ante design)” (Irimie & 
Essmann 2009, p. 96). In this regard, it also interprets how property rights bundles 
become the subject of policy actors’ interests (ex post enforcement) towards the 
‘factors’ such as ‘allocation of property rights’ and ‘capping degradation’. Thus, 
these bundles are interpreted with the ‘factors’ and ‘actors’ of the policies adopted in 
different time periods.  
The matrix (Table 4.1) analyses attitudes and behaviours of owners of the SMF in 
relation to physical outcomes from their actions. In the Mughal period, rights to 
forest produce were regulated with the combination of two types of property rights 
regimes: state and open access. The first type appeared to allow the then state 
property regime use for hunting and sport (Muhammed et al. 2008). The second type 
was subsequent to the absence of any forest regulatory control, resulting in FDCs 
also using the SMF as an open access regime (Iftekhar & Islam 2004b).  
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Table 4.1: Community property rights for different periods based on S&O’s 
(1992) typology 
Periods State 
property 
regime 
Common 
property 
regime 
Open access 
property 
regime 
Private 
property 
regime 
Mughal Access and 
withdrawal 
- Access and 
withdrawal 
- 
British  Access and 
withdrawal 
- - - 
Pakistan Access and 
withdrawal 
- - - 
Bangladesh Access and 
withdrawal 
- - - 
 
Today’s reduced SMF size indicates the degradation that has occurred due to 
overharvesting and encroachment under an open access property rights regime. A 
strict conservation scheme under British rule failed because it aimed primarily to 
produce exports. For instance, it promised a net revenue of Rs.1.5 lakhs from tax 
collections on forest products export (Ascoli 1921). At that time, FDCs had no 
property rights to support their livelihood-security beyond access and withdrawal. 
During the Pakistani period, the government legalised overharvesting for commercial 
gain (Chowdhury et al. 2009) without allocating any new rights to these 
communities. Thus, the matrix shows that the FDCs never enjoyed rights beyond 
authorised use. Being an important resource stake, their exclusion from forest 
management led them to undermine the process of conservation. They were not 
recognised, as per Colfer et al. (1999), for their proximity to the forests, pre-existing 
rights, dependency, poverty, local knowledge, and importance of the forest to their 
culture. Neither were existing stakeholder power deficits recognised, such as those 
suggested by Colfer et al. (1999).  This undermined their status as key stakeholders. 
The theoretical framework of property rights distribution under different regimes 
reveals interests of the state and Government undermining FDCs’ livelihood security. 
In this regard, earlier governments did not understand the multifunctional use of the 
forest. This attitude undermined the sustainability of the forests, and the interests of 
these communities and individuals. In this regard, the multiple use of this forest 
could be better regulated on a larger scale if a common property regime were 
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considered. This could engage the entrepreneurial spirit of the FDCs by generating 
direct benefit streams. 
It is sometimes argued that the state has more physical or material capacity to 
regulate forest economies of scale with organised state administration, and can 
allocate resources for forest management better than its non-state counterparts 
(Irimie & Essmann 2009). This argument was wrong in the case of the SMF. Under 
the top-down state control during all periods, the SMF was subject to constant 
degradation. For instance, the regular reclamation of the SMF is said to have started 
in 1830. A large part of this forest was cleared from 1830 to 1875 (Karim 1994a). 
Further, the Mughal was a period of de facto open access and caused resource 
degradation. In none of the periods were the communities given common property 
rights, despite at times playing a more positive role in forest management than the 
state. In common property regimes, communities take advantage of their own 
strengths with low enforcement costs. In contrast, state property regimes displace this 
potential management capacity, and communities perform poorly (Irimie & Essmann 
2009). 
Another major reason for degradation of the forest is the tripartite management role 
and interrelations between FDCs, the BFD staff and forest policy stakeholders. In 
this management system, the government undermined the role of property rights that 
might yield better outcomes under the common property regime structure. In 
protection of its own interests, in different time periods the government received 
significant benefit streams from unsustainable resources. Moreover, it paid much 
attention to enforcing and establishing property rights, with less attention directed 
towards a sustainable ecosystem management. This disintegration of management in 
all periods not only allowed the forest personnel and policy stakeholders to act 
unsustainably, but also to gain illegally from the forest resources. Thus, it hindered 
institutional changes in property rights regimes.  
Consistent with the concept of new institutional economics, the BFD was very wary 
of losing out with any likely changes. They remained cautious of not disrupting their 
illegal stream of benefits and protecting state access to the unsustainable 
overharvested resources. This enhanced the motivation of FDCs to defend and 
change the institutional structure to gain recognition of property rights. This context 
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helps understand the conflicts between forest communities and the FD that has 
encouraged overharvesting in the absence of defined and structured property rights 
for the former. However, FDCs were powerless to raise their voice against the well-
structured institutional power of the BFD. Their poor socio-economic condition also 
enhanced exploitation and the authoritarian rule of the FD in all periods.  
4.5.3 Supply of Forest Products 
The conservation rule of 1878 brought the extraction of resources under direct 
control of the then British Government. It was targeted mainly to meet national 
demands for building infrastructure. In fact, during the British rule, the only vital 
mode of transport was via the waterways. Even today, Bangladesh is a country of 
rivers. Thus, it can easily be understood that the water system was very important for 
transportation during British rule. The then largest Mongla seaport was established at 
the Mongla Upazilla in the SIZ. After that time, the British Government extended the 
transportation system by establishing railway networks that needed a large supply of 
sleepers from the forest. 
In the Pakistani colonial period, Gewa timber was used as a raw material in the 
Khulna Newsprint Mill to supply under-priced paper to the newspaper industries and 
government offices (Hakim 2007). Because of the unsustainable supply of Gewa as a 
raw material (Figure 4.1), the forest could not meet the mill’s production needs and it 
was permanently closed down in 2002 (Alauddin 2010). Likewise, many small and 
large plant-based industries were developed in the region, including the Khulna 
Hardboard Mill based on Sundari as its raw material. Other important plant-based 
industries are match factories, furniture making and boat-building. These are based 
on raw materials from the forest and these industries continue carrying on production 
without considering adverse consequences to the forest. The forest-based industrial 
development in the Khulna region does not focus on the needs of millions of forest-
dependent people; rather, it stimulates illegal felling and overharvesting to meet 
industries’ needs. For instance, the main two species Heritiera fomes and Excoecaria 
agallocha declined by 42 per cent and 34 per cent per hectare for trees with a 
diameter at chest height of 7.5 cm or more in blocks 1-6 for the former, and in the 
entire forest for the latter between 1959 and 1983 (Chowdhury & Ahmed 1994). The 
merchantable volumes of species Bruguiera gymnorrhiza and Heritiera fomes also 
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declined by 45 per cent and 8 per cent respectively in the same period (Chowdhury & 
Ahmed 1994).  
Figure 4.1: Supply of Gewa as pulpwood to the Khulna newsprint mill   
 
Source: Ramsar (2003)  
The abovementioned commercial and industrial aspects of resource extraction 
policies demotivated FDCs in becoming conservation-friendly because rules and 
regulations were not designed to benefit them. Moreover, these rules and regulations 
supported forest-based industries and the position of elites overlooking the needs of 
large dependent communities.  
4.5.4 Extra-legal Arrangements 
State property regimes have allowed the government to make arrangements to 
provide forest products from the SMF to people, mainly in administration. These 
people pursue such arrangements for their own interests by issuing instructions from 
the MOEF which, in turn, “accelerate resource destruction” (Ostrom 2009, p. 419). 
These instructions are issued by Government Order that provides a ‘withdrawal’ 
right. Such arrangements are completely against the Forest Policy 1994 that 
promised sustainability of the forest and an increase in forest cover. These high-
profile vested administrative interests can gain access to such orders without any 
reference to the main policy instrument or the government officials making these 
arrangements. In other words, they provide justification while making arrangements 
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to supply timber products for their own needs. In reality, these people rarely use their 
allocated timber for their own consumption. Immediately after securing the allotment 
from the MOEF, most of them sell their timber allotment to selected brokers. This 
has become a regular phenomenon among government officials, politicians and the 
elites, even though these politicians often make commitments to end this cycle before 
each election (Roy 2010). 
4.5.5 Illegal Felling and Overharvesting 
The exclusion approach to forest policy did not become a pragmatic means for the 
BFD to protect the SMF; rather, it increased new conflicts with neighbouring FDCs. 
Earlier forest policy (1979) was targeted to commercialisation and generation of state 
revenue through unsustainable extraction of forest resources. The poor livelihood 
conditions of the marginalised and disadvantaged FDCs and their lack of any 
alternative income-generating opportunities in the SIZ have been exploited by the 
timber traders, who have engaged them in illicit forest cutting and other activities 
detrimental to the SMF. This finding is supported by Safa (2005) who found that 
FDCs in and around the Sal forest of Bangladesh were induced by the illegal timber 
traders “to join the illegal felling activities instead of bribe” (p. 2). 
In spite of these adverse consequences, the previous management principles were not 
amended to address community livelihood insecurity and overharvesting issues. 
Instead, the forest has been controlled in a traditional bureaucratic way and without 
partnership with the FDCs. The BFD creates harvesting rules without any reference 
to communities’ needs for the wider varieties of forest products instead of particular 
and limited forest products. Thus, the majority of FDCs are forced to meet their 
needs by entering the forest and harvesting resources illegally. A notable example of 
overharvesting a non-wood forest product in the Bangladeshi period is fish. Fishing 
effort increased 43 per cent from 2003 to 2009 (MOF 2009). This increase caused 
serious harm to the growth of the forest’s mangroves because of conversion of 
forestland into fish farms. The violation of the Forest Policy 1994 and exclusion of 
these communities is causing a rapid decline and depletion of forest resources.  
Cyclone Aila caused huge damage to agriculture and shifted livelihood pressure to 
the forest (Figure 4.2). The denuding of and encroachment on the SMF is largely led 
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by local poor FDCs and illegal timber traders patronised by the BFD, local 
politicians and elites. More recently, overall degradation is happening due to illegal 
harvesting by local, politically, financially and socially influential people. Illegal fish 
overharvesting in the Dubla Jele Palli (fisher villages) is an example (Dulal 2012).  
Figure 4.2: Livelihoods vulnerability after Aila 
(a) Homeless people living on 
embankment 
(b) Saline water in the cultivable 
lands in Koyra after Aila 
 
 
Source: Daily Star, accessed on 2/5/2011, 
http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/in
dex.php 
Source: The Daily Prothom Alo, 
accessed on 23/5/2011, 
http://www.prothom-alo.com/ 
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(c) Female harvesters lost their jobs and 
put pressure on the SMF 
 
(d) Aila-hit people cry for 
rehabilitation in the capital city 
  
Source: Unknown Source: The Daily Star, accessed on 
26/5/2011, 
http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/in
dex.php 
4.5.6 Deforestation 
The direct causes of deforestation include the under-development of the SIZ, 
inappropriate forest policies and regulations affected by bureaucratic and political 
corruption. For instance, the BFD collect excess money equivalent to Tk 50 million 
yearly in the name of revenue from the fisher villages in Dubla; while they deposit 
less than 30 to 40 per cent of the collected money equivalent to Tk 15 to 20 million 
into the government exchequer (Dulal 2012). Besides illicit felling and over-
exploitation, there is a qualitative depletion of forest resources due to salinity 
intrusion and ‘top-dying’ disease of trees (Iftekhar & Islam 2004b).  
Although the prevalence of corrupt practices is the subject of much discussion and 
perceived as usual practice within the policy-making process (FAO 2003), there is 
little concern expressed when it comes to the area of forest resource management in 
Bangladesh. One study found that FDCs perceived present malpractices by the BFD 
officials and local elites to be the major cause of deforestation and degradation of 
this forest under the prevailing structure (Iftekhar & Hoque 2005). Such illegal 
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practices could be either deliberate corrupt activities by BFD staff and elites, or 
determined as limitations of existing administrative capacity.  
The implementation of the state property rights regime heavily depends on the 
availability of foreign funds and technologies overlooking the development of socio-
economic conditions of the forest people. For example, the share of foreign funds for 
the MOEF was more than 50 per cent in the 2008-2009 ADP (MOEF 2009). The 
amount was around 6 per cent more than the country’s overall foreign fund allocation 
(MOF 2009). These funds are mostly allocated for the implementation of TA projects 
to address deforestation, rather than basic investment for the development of the 
forest. For example, for the same period MOEF implemented 35 projects of which 17 
were TA projects. However, compared to 2008-2009 the amount of foreign funds has 
significantly increased (by 63 per cent) in 2010-2011 (PC 2010).  
The allocation of foreign funds to the MOEF is higher than to other ministries and 
indicates the extent of foreign technical (consultancy) dependence for the 
development of the forest sector. This over-reliance on TA overlooks the use of de 
facto customary knowledge for both forest protection and community livelihood-
security. These limitations undermine the forest people’s capacity to mobilise local 
resources, control deforestation and develop their socio-economic condition.  
4.5.7 Protection of the SMF  
The BFD, under the state property rights regime, has issued some Government 
Orders. These include provisions to manage the forest by forming committees such 
as the Stewardship Committee, comprising eminent, concerned persons to provide 
overall guidelines to BFD officials, as well as the Project Steering Committee (PSC) 
and the Project Implementation Committee (PIC) whose roles are designed to 
facilitate policy implementation. These committees are proposed and approved by 
the MOEF (PD 2008), however, local people are never consulted. The Stakeholder 
Council has authority to engage representatives from various extractor groups and 
others from the SIZ to facilitate forest management. The Upazila Council is 
responsible for facilitating these committees and helping them implement necessary 
activities to support the BFD. Although the Stakeholder Council has a provision for 
community involvement, in reality, it has no financial and administrative powers to 
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execute its decisions over management. Besides, its situation at the bottom level of 
power impedes its contribution to policy formation under the hierarchical structure of 
the BFD. All other committees, without involvement from FDCs, have some 
financial and administrative role to monitor development activities and expenditures. 
These committees inappropriately use their roles to have extra legal arrangements. 
The Government is taking the opportunity to exclude communities from committees, 
as they have no property rights. Thus, the rights of FDCs are denied in efforts to 
protect the forest. 
4.5.8 Ignorance of Community Customary Knowledge 
It is now theoretically assumed that local forest people have some comparative 
advantages over the state in managing the forests at local levels, especially for better 
monitoring, enforcement of rules and regulations and adaptation to local conditions 
(Behera 2009). A large number of empirical studies found a comparative advantage 
of local users over resource management and show their potential interest and skills 
in solving management-related problems (Baland & Platteau 1996; Ostrom 1990). 
The experience of community involvement in forest management suggests that this 
local level institution is very successful in enhancing effective management systems 
and in ensuring equitable distribution of forest resources and benefits derived from 
the forests (Behera 2009). Thus, in recent days, many governments have adopted a 
forest co-management structure to allow a process of decentralisation and devolution 
where costs and benefits are shared with communities (Baland & Platteau 1996; 
Gautam 2006).  
However, the above concept of community involvement with permit licensing 
mechanisms does not involve community customary knowledge in management and 
policy formulation. Thus, the government has failed to achieve the objectives of 
SMF management in creating a social fence for its protection from depletion with 
encroachment, illegal felling and overharvesting. Consequently, the depletion of the 
SMF is still rampant as there is no recognition that these de facto rights are essential 
in managing forest sustainably. 
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4.5.9 Policy Instrument as Disincentive 
It is generally accepted that an incentive-process policy instrument in a co-
management structure with the involvement of FDCs generates better output than a 
regulatory-process policy instrument in a top-down conservation structure (Guldin 
2003). Community exclusion from policy structures prevents them playing any role 
in capping overharvesting and other negative externalities (Libecap 2009). Thus, 
regulatory-process policy instruments have been less successful compared to 
incentive-process policy instruments (Guldin 2003).  
Current economic and regulatory instruments do not have any provision to gain 
private returns from community investment in conservation. Consequently, they 
maximise private returns through cheating—for example, through wilful bribery in 
Dubla Jele Palli. These instruments become agents against the state and resources 
suffer. Drawing on Libecap (2009), the key point is that the benefits for FDCs of 
existing regulation enforcement through state property rights in mitigating open-
access losses relative to resource and political costs are absent. This is because of the 
failure of socially preferred rights-based regimes solutions to the ‘Tragedy of the 
Commons’ in the SMF.      
Alternatively, present top-down conservation policy instruments focus on a 
regulatory approach prohibiting the use of the products of this forest without the 
permission of the BFD. In contrast, the extra legal bylaws have permitted the overuse 
of forest products to cater to the activities of higher-level civil servants and 
politicians working at the policy level. In allocating property rights, it is very 
important in the long term for policy interventions to designate a defined role for the 
dependent communities if they are to have an effect on the sustainability of the forest 
(Gautam 2006). FDCs can then also gain from reduced over-use of the forest.  
4.6 Suggestions for Sustainability of the SMF 
In the management of the SMF, the underlying relationship between the BFD and 
FDCs is legitimised by current government rules and rights to determine who will 
extract the forest’s resources and how they will be extracted. This relationship is 
imposed upon communities by the BFD who define the present institutional 
arrangement for this forest to determine community behaviour patterns and to 
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produce sustainable management practices. Selected FDCs now enjoy certain rights 
allocated by the BFD under permit licences to control the quality and quantity of 
resource harvesting. These insufficient rights are solely designed and controlled by 
insiders (i.e. the BFD) and are unable to meet the livelihoods needs of all outsiders 
(i.e. FDCs) (Roy et al. 2012). This enhances degradation with the de-motivation of 
deprived outsiders and the failures of insiders to ensure equitable distribution of 
forest resources. It also generates negative community interest in conservation and 
management initiatives of the SMF. The BFD’s institutional setup needs to recognise 
forest property rights.  
However, a change in property rights enforcement within prevalent rights regimes 
may be proved wrong. The policy analysis of this chapter recognises that state 
property rights over resources of the SMF did not play much of a role in regulating 
externalities and developing entrepreneurship to manage resources. Property rights 
are not static. They evolve continuously in periods of political, economic and social 
change (Irimie & Essmann 2009). Property change occurs as a result of action and 
reaction of actual and presumptive owners (motivated actors) through gradual 
increases in bargaining power. In the long historical management of the SMF, this 
process of property rights change is absent. The forest remains under state ownership 
where the BFD has failed to show its entrepreneurship role in sustained conservation.  
Thus, a shift in rights regime is inevitable. For the sustainable management of the 
SMF, defined rights up to a level of ‘exclusion’, meaning ‘proprietorship’, are 
necessary. This inevitably must involve FDCs in management and policy formulation 
for the sustainable management of the SMF (Figure 4.3). FDCs with sufficient rights 
of ‘proprietorship’ could encourage interested stakeholders’ long-term investment in 
the SMF. This is how inclusion approach interventions in a common property regime 
may enhance conservation of the forest.  
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Figure 4.3: Suggested Policy Model for the SMF 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                      = Interventions existed; and            = Interventions needed 
4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter critically reviews forest policies and institutional settings in addressing 
sustainability issues of the SMF in four major time periods. It demonstrates the 
historical importance of the forest to the various rulers under different regimes. The 
forest was not only over-exploited in colonial times, but is also being over-exploited 
currently under the strict state property rights regime. Dependent forest communities 
have never been part of the development process for its conservation—either within 
a co-management structure or with defined property rights—other than strictly 
limited and controlled ‘access’ and ‘withdrawal’ rights for harvesting only.  
State property rights regimes using the hierarchical institutional setting not only 
failed to address local needs in the policy process, but also increased forest 
dependency and depletion. This increased depletion indicates the inadequacy of the 
existing property rights regime in achieving sustainability of the forest. Findings of 
this research suggest that regime efficacy should be fostered from state-forest 
community partnerships with a clearly embedded property rights regime. Existing 
traditional management patterns need to be amended to adapt to changing 
contemporary socio-spatial contexts with necessary modifications to prevailing 
Forest policy 
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Exclusion approach 
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State property 
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Common property 
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‘access’ and ‘withdrawal’ rights up to the granting of ‘exclusion’ rights for FDCs. 
Consequently, this research concludes that the existing property rights regime is not 
adequate to achieve the sustainability of the SMF. In this regard, common sense 
suggests that managing this forest sustainably requires using an appropriate property 
rights regime, and for the state to mediate resource access to ensure the sustainability 
of the SMF.      
The next chapter discusses the methodology and explains how the quantitative 
research into FDC perceptions towards existing SMF conservation efforts was 
carried out.  
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Chapter 5 
Research Methodology, Survey Design and Data 
Collection 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to describe the methodology and survey design procedures 
to understand the interaction between the existing property rights regime and levels 
of conservation of forest resources in the SMF. Data were gathered from both 
primary and secondary sources regarding existing property rights, harvesting systems 
and perceptions of overall management of the SMF. A variety of socio-demographic 
data was collected. Data collection procedures included both qualitative and 
quantitative methods and techniques. Methods to ensure the validity and reliability of 
the data are also described.     
This chapter is divided into twelve sections. Section 5.2 presents various data 
collection methods. Section 5.3 narrates the survey design procedure including 
collection mode, outlining target populations and units of analysis. Section 5.4 
describes the sample frame and sample selection procedure. Section 5.5 outlines 
fieldwork and data collection procedures. Section 5.6 introduces the survey 
instruments. Its design frame includes co-management and sustainable forest 
management issues in Section 5.7. This is continued with an outline of property 
rights and demand-side policy intervention-related questions in Section 5.8. Section 
5.9 justifies issues of validity and reliability in survey design. Techniques and 
measures to achieve accuracy in data collection and descriptions of various potential 
validity and reliability measures are analysed in Section 5.10. Section 5.11 explains 
the methods of data analysis and various test statistics for interpreting data. 
Discussions in Section 5.12 conclude the chapter. 
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5.2 Methods 
Various methods were adopted for data collection including: (i) case study, (ii) 
survey, (iii) use of secondary sources, (iv) content analysis, (vi) direct observation, 
(v) focus group discussions (FGDs), and (viii) personal discussions with local 
communities. The main source of data was through the use of written surveys using 
close-ended questionnaires for households.  Questions were related to the theoretical 
framework of this study. A significant portion of questions focused on demand-side 
interventions and alternative property rights. All data and information were collected 
through field visits between October 2010 and February 2011. The various data 
collection methods and survey design are now described in detail.   
(i) Case Study: Case study is very important as the researcher should integrate real-
world events with the needs of data collection plan (Yin 1994). Behera (2009) 
strongly supports the use of the case study method for participatory forest 
management research. Here, the investigation is substantiated through the estimation 
of parameters and relationships between variables identified. Data relating to current 
conservation policy and practices, resource extraction, degradation trends, and socio-
economic conditions of the forest people were collected. While staying in the study 
area for three months, regular personal visits were made to the Dakshin and Uttar 
Bedkashi Unions (Union is the lowest local government tier in Bangladesh), 
particularly from Jurshing to Hariharpur (this village is in Uttar Bedkashi Union) 
villages and Gharilal Bazar to Gulkhali villages. Several trips were made inside the 
SMF from the Bojbaja Forest Office (this forest office is 2 kms inside the SMF) by 
trawler (Bojbaja in Figure 5.4). Case study method was used to help draw the policy 
inference regarding community involvement in management of the SMF.  
(ii) In Person Survey: Quantitative surveying has become a widely used method of 
enquiry in social science research (Neuman 2003). The applied survey method, based 
on a deductive approach with empirical measurement and data analysis, is used here.  
Because of the absence of co-management in the SMF, alternative property rights 
regime-related data were totally unavailable. To address this gap, data were collected 
for selected variables through closed-ended questionnaires for quantitative analysis 
and through semi-structured questionnaires for qualitative analysis. The survey 
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instrument asked questions on property rights regimes and alternative livelihood 
options. This was to generate primary data regarding formulation of demand-side 
policy interventions. The theory of property rights and demand-side management 
intervention concepts, described in Chapter Three, were used to investigate 
community perceptions regarding common property rights regimes.  
(iii) Use of Secondary Sources: Secondary information is required in order to 
interpret the current conservation policy and resource extraction methods. Current 
management and alternative livelihood-related data were collected from many 
sources. The local office of the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS) at Koyra 
Upazila headquarters was the main source of information related to socio-
demographic conditions of the community. The observed method was also used to 
collect data regarding community livelihoods, income and expenditure. Data from 
both government and NGO sources have been used to examine alternative property 
rights. Special care was taken to triangulate the data and interpret research findings. 
Variations in information provided by government and private sources are acute in 
Bangladesh. For instance, there is a difference between the indicated prices of 
harvested resources as determined by the BFD and the actual market prices. Usually 
market prices of harvested resources are found to be higher (Roy 2009). Secondary 
sources of data are various. A complete list of sources is provided in Appendix 1. 
Additional data and information were collected from many sources. These included: 
 Newspapers and magazines 
 Journals and periodicals 
 Research reports (draft and completed) 
 Published and unpublished reports, monographs and literature 
 Authenticated official and institutional records 
 Various websites.  
When conducting this research, many government officials and NGOs were visited 
for in-person discussions and interviews. These personal communications helped 
authenticate the collected data by matching it with secondary sources. In Bangladesh, 
collecting data from government sources is time-consuming due to cumbersome 
bureaucratic procedures. So, face-to-face communications and consultation with the 
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relevant government departmental bureaucrats were instrumental in gathering 
appropriate information.  
Face-to-face personal communications were also very helpful in seeking expert 
opinions regarding alternative property rights regimes and alternative sources of 
forest community livelihoods. These personal consultations were made with 
educationists, researchers, departmental experts, concerned officials and consultants 
(Appendix 2). Such consultations not only helped validate the research findings, but 
also ensured their reliability. The collection of these opinions was mainly confined to 
policy formulation and implementation regarding the NFP 1994. Specifically, face-
to-face discussions with these organisations and persons were very helpful in 
clarifying and modifying the baseline questions.   
(iv) Content Analysis: A content analysis of national daily newspapers to 
investigate the management problems of the SMF was also undertaken. Six famous 
national dailies were selected. Of those, four were in the local language (Bengali), 
namely, The Daily Purbanchal, The Daily Prothom Alo, The Daily Janakantha and 
The Daily Jugantor and two were in English, namely, The Daily Star and The Daily 
Independent. Among them, The Daily Prothom Alo and The Daily Star are the most 
circulated newspapers in Bengali and English respectively. The Daily Purbanchal is 
the most famous local national daily published in Khulna. This analysis was 
conducted over the time period between 1 January 2010 and March 31 2011. The 
data and information were collected from the internet versions of these six 
newspapers.  
(v) Direct Observation: The researcher was based in the Planning Commission of 
Bangladesh and made several visits to many sub-districts in the SIZ. Direct visits to 
the SIZ played a vital role in shaping the research design. During field visits, the 
researcher spent three months in Binapani village of Dakshin Bedkashi Union 
adjacent to the SMF. During this stay, several visits were made to the SMF. Relevant 
Forest Offices were also regularly visited. The researcher made several trawler trips 
in the rivers and canals to see the current level of tree density (Figure 5.1). Almost 
every day, visits were undertaken to forest community households to generate data, 
information and other relevant concepts. 
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Figure 5.1: Trips to the SMF  
(a) Trawler trips to the SMF (b) Visit made to inside the SMF 
  
  
(c) Bojbaja Forest Office inside the SMF (d) Pugmark in the SMF 
 
  
 
The researcher conducted several meetings with the forest communities. The 
researcher also participated in meetings held with both the BFD and communities in 
the presence of local leaders. The BFD conducted all of these meetings to create 
awareness among the forest communities and local leaders. Data on the views of 
these stakeholders towards the conservation policy and sustainable management of 
the SMF were collected at these meetings.   
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(vi) Focus Group Discussions: FGDs, in which communities and concerned 
organisations actively participated, were also conducted. These discussions were 
undertaken for two underlying reasons, namely, (i) to shape the survey 
questionnaires; and (ii) to outline the views of policy and decision-making authorities 
regarding conservation policy and community livelihoods options. These FGDs were 
conducted with the communities, academics, environmentalists, forest bureaucrats, 
civil society activists, NGO experts and development practitioners. The missing link 
between forest community livelihoods and conservation policy was investigated in 
the FGDs. Such discussions gave deep insights into the prospects for policy adoption 
of the common property rights regime.  
(vii) Personal Discussions: Apart from the above methods, personal discussions 
were undertaken with the communities and community leaders to shape the survey 
instrument and to develop rapport.   
The following sections of the chapter discuss the survey design and probable biases 
in detail.  
5.3 Design of the Survey  
The overall survey design of this research is now outlined.   
5.3.1 Method for Conducting Interviews 
There are many types of data collection survey such as mail surveys, telephone 
interviews, face-to-face interviews or web surveys. This study was conducted in one 
of the remotest areas of Bangladesh. In a developing country like Bangladesh, mail 
or telephone interviews are not possible due to the widespread unavailability of these 
facilities. No community member had land phone connection. Only one post office is 
found in the local area and it does not distribute letters to villagers—rather, they have 
to collect them personally. Therefore, in this situation mail surveys would be 
unworkable. Moreover, there is no directory containing the full addresses of local 
community members. Most respondents are illiterate or have very little education. 
These illiterate people are not able to read mailed survey instruments. Any survey 
reliant on the use of internet is also impractical and not common in Bangladesh. 
Web-based interviews were also not possible due to technological unavailability. 
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Thus, in-person surveying was conducted for this study (Figure 5.2). This method 
provides the advantage of deriving more information by building rapport between the 
interviewer and interviewee. It can also allow complicated scenarios to be outlined. 
This method is very convenient as it leads to a purposeful conversation between the 
interviewer and interviewee and can be used in different situations to generate data 
about a multidimensional topic (Oishi 2003).  
Figure 5.2: Conducting survey 
(a) One-to-One Interview with the FDCs 
  
 
5.3.2 Target Population for the Survey 
For any research, determining the correct target population is very important for the 
collection of relevant data and information (Berkowitz 1996a). The ‘correct’ target 
population enables investigators to draw wider inferences through the application of 
sample statistics (Groves et al. 2004). Thus, target populations of this study were 
defined in size, specified with time restrictions and observable (Groves et al. 2004).  
Primary data were collected using a multi-stage sampling method. The SMF is 
situated in the geographical area of three districts, of which Khulna (the third largest 
city in the country) was randomly selected. This city is in close proximity to FDCs. 
Key government departments are located here. Khulna district has 14 Upazilas, of 
which 6 Upazilas border the forest. From these 6 Upazilas, Koyra Upazila was 
selected randomly at the second stage. Likewise, Dakshin and Uttar Bedkashi Unions 
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were randomly selected from 5 adjacent Unions of Koyra. Maps of Koyra and the 
study area are provided in Figures 5.3 and 5.4. These two unions have 12 villages, 
from which 6 were again selected randomly. Five villages were from Dakshin 
Bedkashi and one village was from Uttar Bedkashi. Lastly, 412 respondents were 
randomly selected from these six villages in proportion with household size from 
each of them. A lottery method was used for all of these random selections. It should 
be noted that the list of adjacent Upazilas, Unions and villages of the SIZ were 
collected from the BFD (BFD 2011). The sample size is more than the optimal size 
suggested for a quantitative research (Perry 2008). The survey was conducted 
between November 2010 and February 2011 using experienced interviewers and a 
pre-tested questionnaire. Seventy-four per cent of households are primarily 
dependent on this forest for their livelihoods. The interviews were conducted in the 
local Bengali language. Data were analysed using 3 statistical software programmes: 
SPSS/PASW version 19, STATA version 11 and R version 2.13.0.  
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Figure 5.3: Map of Koyra Upazila in Khulna district 
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Figure 5.4: Map of the study area 
 
 
Ninety thousand forest people live in the Koyra and nearby Paikgacha sub-districts 
(Unnayan-Onneshan 2009). The target population of the survey is, thus, forest 
communities. Using socio-economic and demographic data such as household size 
and literacy rate, it is found that all the sub-districts of the SIZ are almost identical 
(BBS 2001). Target populations of this survey are the residents of a house—either an 
independent house or a shanty on the embankment. Of the 90,000, 40,000 are living 
in these two unions of Koyra (Unnayan-Onneshan 2009). These villages are adjacent 
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to the SMF. All of the five different forest communities—fishers, Munda, Bawalis 
and Mawalis—were represented.   
5.3.3 Unit of Analysis 
In sampling, one of the most vital components is the unit of analysis (Liamputtong & 
Ezzy 2005). Usually, units are decided on the basis of previous research analysis. In 
this study, ‘household’ was taken as the unit of analysis rather than individual 
respondent. ‘Household’ here was defined as an occupied housing unit where all 
persons of a family live and eat together. The reason behind such selection was 
related to the family structures most evident in Bangladesh. This allows both 
individual households and joint-family systems to co-exist, where income is 
generally earned by the main member (head of the household) of the family, and 
expenditures and other family decisions are made by him/her too. In this research, 
the researcher had defined household as “a dwelling unit where one or more persons 
live and eat together under a common cooking arrangement” (BBS 2007b, p. 147). 
5.4 Sampling Frame and Sample Selection Procedure 
In the last population census in 2001, BBS selected this Khulna district for the 
sample frame which again included Koyra for designing Enumeration Areas (BBS 
2007c). A total of 2,299 households are living in these six villages, with an average 
of 5 persons per household (BBS 2007a).   
In selecting the sample from the target population the researcher needs to pay acute 
attention to how the respondents are selected. For framing the sample, the most 
convenient option would have been to use the list of the permit holders in the forest 
communities.  However, the BFD does not retain such a list for the case study area.  
To strengthen the sample selection from the target population of 1,705 households, 
Bangladesh’s voter list was used. This number was the proportion of total forest 
community households (2299) engaging in resource harvesting from the SMF.  
Bangladesh first prepared electronic voter lists in 2008. Consequently, this survey 
used the voter list to finalise the sampling frame. Relying on the voter list, personal 
communications were made with members of the Union Parishads and villagers to 
identify samples of the four forest communities.  
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Sample Size:  In planning a sample survey, one of the most important issues to 
clarify “is that of determining how large a sample is needed for the estimates to be 
reliable enough to meet the objectives of the survey” (Islam 2009, p. 115). A sample 
size of around 30 cases seems to be the bare minimum to analyse statistical data for a 
study (Champion 1970). However, many researchers argue for 50; and some regard 
100 cases to be the minimum (Islam 2009). Chhatre and Agrawal (2009) used a 
sample size of 80 to conduct their research for testing the hypothesis for carbon 
storage and livelihood generation. Behera (2009) surveyed 55 households to explain 
the performance of state-community joint forest management in India. On the one 
hand, from different empirical studies, Perry (2008) suggested the optimal sample 
size to be 350 for a structured interview. However, on the other hand, Meyers et al. 
(2006) suggested larger samples for logistic regression than for linear regression for 
valid interpretation of results.  
This study determined sample size by using a more statistically sound approach such 
as “determination of sample size in estimating population proportion” (Islam 2009, p. 
118). Sample size of 296 is robust when the population size is regarded as large and a 
sample size of 313 is robust when the population size is regarded as small. If it is 
assumed that the proportion of the total population of 2299 with a particular 
characteristic is not known or difficult to assume, robust estimates give a sample size 
of 384 (Islam 2009). Details of sample size estimation in three scenarios are 
explained in Appendix 3. This study interviewed 412 households, which is more than 
the required sample size and exceeds that used in previous research. Although larger 
samples can cause a non-response bias by lowering response rates (Berkowitz 
1996c), this did not occur here. This survey minimised non-response rate to only 4 
per cent, much lower than 10-15 per cent suggested by United Nations (UN) (2005) 
for a community household survey. The sample selection and details of the 
population proportions are presented in Table 5.1.   
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Table 5.1: Target population and sample selection  
Name of village Total number of 
households 
FDC households Number of FDC 
households 
selected for the 
survey 
Gulkhali 660 637 154 
Jurshing 677 538 130 
Patakhali 280 250 60 
Binapani 447 90 22 
Ganthirgiri 87 70 17 
Hariharpur 148 120 29 
Total 2299 1705 412 
Source: Dakshin Bedkashi and Uttar Bedkashi Union Parishad Offices  
In the villages, the major problem encountered was in identifying households other 
than the forest communities. In most cases, non-forest community households also 
collect resources casually from the SMF. On the other hand, except for fishers, some 
forest communities do not harvest resources all the year round. All of these issues 
posed a problem in ensuring an authentic and representative sampling frame. Thus, 
this survey addressed these issues by adopting the following methods and techniques 
to build the sampling frame of the FDC households.      
Stratifying Random Sampling: For any study, it is necessary to make sure that the 
sample is representative of the population (Neuman 2003, 2006). A stratified simple 
random sampling technique was applied in this study to separate two subpopulations: 
forest-dependent households and others. One group was the population whose major 
professions were selling labour, fish farming, livestock, agriculture, etc. The other 
group was forest-dependent households who relied on resource harvesting from the 
SMF. 
As per the above interpretation, each village was stratified into two constituents: 
‘Sundarban dependent communities (SDC)’ and ‘non-Sundarban dependent 
communities (NSDC)’. The sample of 412 SDC households was taken from each 
village proportionately to their population. The number of households ranged 
between 17 and 154 in each village within the SDC (Table 5.1). The selection of 
samples was based on the simple random technique followed by a lottery method to 
select the SDC households. Thereby, the research reached a trade-off between 
accuracy, cost and time.      
139 
 
Household Selection: Research associates were appointed and trained in data 
collection. They observed physically the location of SDC in each village and 
finalised the listing of the total number of households for each village. They listed 
the households from the entrance of the village and ended with the last household, 
interviewing in that order. The entrance is assumed to be the household at the start-
point of a village from the largest road that touches the village. To make the selection 
random, every 4th household was selected for interview. If the selected household 
was not available for interview, three more visits were made in the following three 
days to attempt to conduct the interview. After three visits if the selected household 
was not available then the household next to the selected household located before 
and after were contacted respectively as a ‘replacement sample’ (Alam 2003).  
Selection of the Respondent: The last phase of this sample selection procedure was 
the selection of the respondent from the selected household. For this purpose, a 
‘contact paper’ was prepared (Appendix 4). After visiting the household, the 
interviewer first asked for permission from the adult person who first came to talk to 
him/her regarding the interview. The interviewer then listed the full identity of the 
respondents who were eligible to take part in the survey. Three criteria were 
considered to be an eligible respondent of the survey. These were: (i) a respondent 
must be above 18 years of age, (ii) respondent must be a member of the forest 
communities, and (iii) respondent should be mentally and physically sound. In this 
regard, it should be mentioned that in Bangladesh sometimes any relative aged above 
18 years is found to live in a particular household. In this survey, such temporary-
outsider members were excluded, as they had no power in decision-making in the 
family.  
Eligible persons of a household were listed by their names and gender. According to 
social custom in Bangladesh, women usually do not tell the names of their husbands 
and fathers-in-law. In that case, instead of names of the households, serial numbers 
were used. Generally, in Bangladesh, two scenarios are common. First, the oldest 
person of the household is selected by the household members to respond. Second, 
the husband is usually selected by the wife to take part in the survey. In both cases, 
these persons were treated as the head of the households. In Bangladesh, the head of 
the household was selected as the respondent for the last ‘Household Income and 
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Expenditure Survey 2005’ conducted by BBS. This survey defines “head of 
household means a member of the household who is the decision-maker regarding 
the different activities of the household. This household is also being run under his 
command .....… a member is regarded as head of a household when the other 
members consider him so” (BBS 2007b, p. 148).  
After selecting the head of the household as the contact person, the interview was 
conducted on the same day, provided he/she agreed to take part in the interview. It 
should be mentioned here that the interviewer requested the interview be held on the 
same date since visiting the same place at different times would be time-consuming 
and expensive when: (i) these communities live in the remotest part of the country; 
(ii) the interviewers live in a different part of the villages (in most cases in different 
villages) which required them to walk on foot; (iii) there is no mode of transport 
available in the selected villages; (iv) there is a fear of ‘tiger-attack’ and other sorts 
of physical insecurity; and (v) communities live in different areas. Alternatively, 
another mutually accepted date was fixed. It is mentioned here that the Munda 
community use their own indigenous language, which is not familiar to the 
interviewers. Thus, all interviews were conducted in Bengali—the dominant local 
language.  
5.5 Data Collection and Fieldwork Procedures  
During this data collection period, eight interviewers, who were trained and 
supervised by the researcher, conducted the survey. They were trained for one day 
regarding the theoretical and conceptual aspects of the research. Training content 
included basic aspects of the research such as objectives, socio-demographic aspects 
of the households, interview techniques, interview scheduling, and possible biases of 
interviewers. They were also trained in conducting FGDs.   
In the training session, the interviewers were intensively trained to understand every 
single question, its objective(s) and prospective answer(s). The objectives of the 
training were to direct them to extract accurate answers. In this regard, during 
training, several mock interviews were conducted on how to conduct the interview.  
All eight interviewers were from selected villages in the study area due to their 
familiarity with norms, culture and geographical locations of the forest communities. 
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Of the eight interviewers, seven were male and one was female. One interviewer was 
from the Munda community. Munda and Mahato are the two indigenous 
communities living at Koyra. Munda is the main community with its own language 
and culture. The selected Munda interviewer has vast experience in data collection. 
Consequently, he was selected for his access to and well-established rapport with his 
own community.  
Of these eight interviewers, four were primary school teachers from two government 
primary schools situated in Binapani and Gulkhali villages. They were trained in 
school classrooms. The other interviewers previously worked in different NGOs such 
as: Pradipon, Unnayan Onneshan, ASA, and BRAC. They were trained at the BRAC 
Training Centre at Koyra. Lunch, morning and evening tea and transport allowances 
were given to the participants for attending the training.  
There was no payment to the survey respondents. Forest community households 
were very enthusiastic and curious about the survey. In personal and informal 
discussions with respondents, it was found that they were enthusiastic about the 
research topic. Almost all respondents were participating in an interview for the first 
time in their life. Almost all of the respondents did not have any previous knowledge 
of offering information regarding the linkage between conservation of the 
Sundarbans and their livelihoods. The concepts of property rights and demand-side 
interventions were new and created enthusiasm among respondents. Respondents 
were very courteous during the interview and on many occasions they entertained the 
interviewers with light refreshments including home-made food items like Muri 
(fried rice), Chira (rice-made snacks), Pitha (rice-made bread) etc. At the time of the 
researcher’s final departure from the village, many forest community members came 
and provided harvested forest resources (such as honey) as gifts.  
Four hundred and thirty households were contacted to achieve the target of 412. 
Interviews continued until the expected number of samples was achieved for each 
village. After collection, each survey instrument was carefully checked by the 
researcher as to whether there was any inconsistency or non-response. Except in very 
few cases, there were no discrepancies identified in the completed instruments. Most 
of the discrepancies were solved through additional consultations with the 
interviewers. In a few circumstances, an insignificant numbers of gaps were 
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identified which were again sent back to the interviewers for corrections or, if 
necessary, for re-interviews. As the interviewers were local people, it was very easy 
for them to re-communicate with the respondents to make corrections. On average, 
each interview took 29 minutes, the shortest time was 22 minutes and the longest 
time was 54 minutes. The response rate of the respondents was very good at 96 per 
cent (details are given in Appendix 5). This was due to the emphasis on making 
convenient times and place for interviews and on employing efficient and educated 
local interviewers. The researcher oversaw all aspects of the data collection effort.  
5.6 Survey Instrument 
The Human Research Ethics Committee of the University of Southern Queensland 
provided ethical clearance for conducting the survey. The development of the 
questionnaires was completed by August 2010. An initial version of the Interview 
Schedule (IS) was modified through two informal FGDs and ten one-to-one trial 
interviews with prospective respondents. The revised pilot instrument was then 
executed with fifteen respondents. The IS was also continuously revised as per 
feedback obtained from interviewers in the initial days of conducting interviews. The 
overall anatomy of the survey instrument was developed by adopting the following 
procedures.  
Focus Group Discussions: Two informal FGDs were conducted in two different 
locations of the study area (details of the FGD method will be discussed in Chapter 
Seven). According to Stewart et al. (2007), the contemporary focus group interview 
usually involves 8-12 individuals who take part in the discussion for one-and-a-half 
hours to two-and-a-half hours regarding a particular issue. But as a rule of thumb, 
FGDs should not last more than two hours and in most cases should be completed 
within one-and-a-half hours (Liamputtong & Ezzy 2005). On the other hand, Bloor et 
al. (2001) recommend 6-8 members as the optimum size for a group; whereas 
Pugsley (1996) and Thomas (1999) opined that the range of the size of a focus group 
should be 3-14 participants. In this study, each focus group contained 6-10 members, 
of at least eighteen years of age, and involved in forest resource harvesting as their 
main occupation. Each discussion lasted for one-and-a-half hours to two hours. 
FGDs method has two main criticisms: (i) it does not yield quantitative data and (ii) 
the group members may not be representative of a larger population (Stewart et al. 
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2007). Female members were also invited to avoid gender biases. Discussions were 
very successful due to the homogeneous nature of groups with similar social and 
cultural backgrounds. This enabled them to talk to one another comfortably and 
openly. The researcher’s role of a moderator was to steer the interaction and to 
ensure that the discussions continued towards the topic of interest (Berkowitz 
1996b).   
The purpose of the FGDs was to test the IS for respondent understanding and to 
gather their suggestions for further revision. Following the FGDs, ten trial interviews 
were conducted to finalise the IS. All of these interviews were held in FDC 
households.     
The interview period coincided with the peak season for harvesting resources by 
FDCs. Thus, the opportunity cost of attending the FGDs for them was high. 
Considering their opportunity costs, all FDC attendees were given a gift voucher of 
Tk. 100 (US$ 1.5). All participants accepted it very happily.    
Pre-testing of Survey Instruments: Berkowitz (1996a) stresses pre-testing as 
essential for an in-person survey instrument because of the necessity to examine 
whether the appropriate questions are being asked to respondents and the correct 
information is being collected. Berkowitz (1996a) also added that “pre-testing 
involves administering the instrument to a small number of persons as similar as 
possible to the proposed respondents using exactly the same procedures that are used 
in the full study” (p. 47). Following this assertion, pre-testing was conducted to 
address two main issues. One was to modify the IS for better understanding by 
incorporating easy and socially- and culturally-acceptable wording to respondents; 
and, secondly, to develop interview techniques and methodology for the collection of 
correct data and information (Alam 2003).  
In pre-testing, emphasis was given to examining the correctness of the structures of 
the IS by adopting the same method to be followed in the real survey. In this regard, 
special focus was given to three elements of the IS: (i) to amend the questions of the 
Likert scale in order to make the variables understandable to respondents; (ii) to 
extract accurate answers regarding the alternative property rights regime; and (iii) to 
ensure accurate alternative livelihoods information.  
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Pre-testing certainly detected major problems in structure, pacing, questions and 
wording and necessitated further adjustments of the IS. In that process, the 
construction of the IS and its logical sequence were very carefully scrutinised and 
then reframed accordingly. In most cases, the modifications needed were in wording 
and sentence structure.  
At the time of pre-testing, it was found that interviewers were taking too long to 
complete interviews and in most cases many questions remained unaddressed. The 
main reason was the language barrier, especially for the Munda communities as they 
use their indigenous language rather than Bengali. Another problem related to the 
original version of the questionnaire, in English, gaining approval from the Ethics 
Committee. The translation from English to Bengali was reframed according to the 
local colloquial terms to make it more understandable to them.  
During pretesting, replacement samples were made after finding the absence of the 
head of the household in three subsequent visits in three consecutive days. However, 
an exception was made for Mawalis and fishers who stay deep in the forest for 
around 30 and 15 days respectively.  
Finalisation of the IS: The original preliminary questionnaire sought to incorporate 
all necessary elements including variables and a wide range of issues. After 
pretesting, the IS was modified and made ready for the main survey by following 
several techniques. Appropriate, understandable words were inserted where 
necessary to add understanding. Social-religious customs and norms were also 
followed to avoid any embarrassing situations at the time of conducting the survey. 
The draft was finalised after taking final opinion from supervisors at the University 
of Southern Queensland. The principal supervisor of this research was from 
Bangladesh. Thus, the IS was continuously developed with his close guidance. The 
final version of the IS comprises 27 main questions in four sections. Appendix 6 
provides a full version of the IS.  
Conducting the Main Survey: The final survey was conducted between 
1 December 2010 and 15 February 2011. Due to the damage of the WAPDA 
embankment from Cyclone Sidr and Aila, the whole of Koyra was under water in the 
month of October 2010.  
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Post-survey Crosschecking: Post-survey assessment was necessary in a few cases 
to fill in gaps in skipped questions and to verify responses. This post survey check 
was performed by the researcher within two weeks of the completion of the IS by 
mobile phone. This enhanced the reliability of the survey data. To conduct this 
check, 30 respondents who owned mobile telephones were selected. Those 
respondents were asked whether they were satisfied with the interview procedure and 
whether all the aspects were understandable to them. The consistency of their 
responses in this second discussion to their initial responses was closely examined. 
The full version of the questionnaire format for the re-interview is in Appendix 7. 
Use of Likert Scale: Following Likert’s (Likert 1932) work, respondents were asked 
to give their views on a five-point scale to investigate whether variations in question 
structure have any detectable effects on survey findings (Schuman & Presser 1981). 
It is found that ‘the use of scales in attitude testing has been well established for 
several decades’ (Ryan & Garland 1999, p. 107). Thus, Likert scale type questions 
are commonly used to capture subjective assessments of phenomena for eliciting the 
opinions, attitudes and perceptions of respondents in social research (Ryan & 
Garland 1999). As this study was designed to measure subjective community 
perceptions about tree density of the SMF, the Likert scale was found to be the most 
useful research method. This study used a 5-point scale to measure the perceptions of 
the FDCs of the SMF. This scale was used in and cited for participatory forest 
management research by Kearney and Bradley (1998), Lund et al. (2010) and 
Shahbaz (2009).     
5.7 Elements of the Interview Schedule  
Gomm (2004) opines that the first issue of any questionnaire relates to its construct 
validity, that is, to make it free from any biases. The structure of the questionnaire 
was arranged in a logical sequence as it needed to address selected variables and 
issues from the theoretical and conceptual framework to test the hypothesis. Data and 
information needed to be reliable and valid to obtain authentic results. According to 
Gelcich et al. (2007), it is important to know harvesting behaviour under the state 
conservation system to enhance biological sustainability through the proper 
allocation of property rights. Thus, three basic domains were identified in the IS: 
(i) forest conservation, (ii) co-management and property rights and (iii) alternative 
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livelihood options. Questions related to socio-economic, demographic conditions and 
perceptions of the respondents were also asked. An introductory statement explained 
the purpose of the survey to respondents.  
Section-wise contents of the IS are described in turn:   
(i) Opinions and General Information: The first section was designed to 
understand the perceptions and attitudes of the respondents towards the overall 
management of the SMF and resource harvesting patterns. It consisted of 
respondents’ general opinions on various issues around sustainable management of 
the SMF and its present status. First, the respondents were asked to identify which 
community they belong to. They were asked to quantify the importance of the SMF 
for their livelihoods and its status in terms of tree density on a five-point scale such 
as: (i) very high; (ii) high; (iii) medium; (iv) low; (v) very low. They were then asked 
about the overall management of the SMF, again on a five-point scale such as: 
(i) very good; (ii) good; (iii) barely acceptable; (iv) poor; (v) very poor. Respondents 
were then asked about any changes in tree density in the SMF over the years. Where 
decreases were noted, they were then asked to nominate five main reasons for this 
occurrence. The respondents were asked whether they feel there is a need to protect 
the SMF. They were also asked to give information regarding their resource 
harvesting activities over the past month: (i) number of visits; (ii) days stayed; 
(iii) kinds of resources derived; and (iv) distance of harvesting sites from their 
homes. 
The intensity of the communities’ opinions about the reasons for degradation under 
the state property rights was also identified. These questions presented in-depth 
insights into the perceptions and attitudes of the forest communities regarding the use 
of this forest. These questions presented core information on underlying beliefs and 
values of forest community members living adjacent to the SMF.        
(ii) Variables for Sustainable Forest Management: The questions in this section 
were aimed at identifying variables regarding management and harvesting in the 
SMF. All variables were taken from S&O’s theory of property rights and empirical 
research findings. First, respondents were asked to identify the policy instrument 
through which they were allowed to harvest resources. The next questions sought 
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their opinions on various variables on a five-point Likert scale such as: (i) strongly 
agree; (ii) agree; (iii) undecided; (iv) disagree; (v) strongly disagree. The first five 
questions captured property rights-related variables: ‘access’, ‘withdrawal’, 
‘management’ and ‘exclusion’. Other questions were asked to capture other variables 
such as: consultation, tree plantation, conflicts of interest, discrimination, social 
capital and intention to participate in co-management. They were then asked whether 
they can harvest resources without any harassments/hazards. In case of ‘no’, they 
were asked to rank the identified harassments/hazards. The section ended by 
estimating the level of social capital with respect to the length of involvement in the 
community-based organisations.   
(iii) Co-management: This section began by asking respondents how long they have 
been living in their villages. Then they were asked to identify specific property rights 
regimes. They were then requested to choose one of the four property rights regimes, 
namely, state, private, common, and open-access property regimes. Remaining 
questions were posed to gather information regarding co-management structure in 
the SMF. These included whether the respondents intended to be involved with a co-
management regime. In the case of a ‘yes’ response, subsequent information was 
gathered as to how they would like to be involved in co-management and what 
contribution they would make. These questions gave them multiple options for 
involvement in co-management such as: management process, developing 
community institutions, benefit-sharing structure, selling cheapest labour and others. 
The options for their contribution to co-management were: labour, monitoring, 
management, awareness building or all of the above.  
Next, the respondents were given the opportunity to identify the rights they would 
like to enjoy under a co-management structure. The property rights bundles of this 
theory were translated into understandable wording. ‘Access’, ‘withdrawal’, 
‘management’ and ‘exclusion’ rights were translated into ‘to harvest specific 
products’, ‘to regulate harvesting patterns to improve harvested resources’, and ‘to 
make decisions regarding the access and transfer of access rights to others’, 
respectively. These rights were also blended to identify ‘authorised claimant’ and 
‘proprietor’ bundles of rights associated with their positions.    
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All of these questions were framed to draw out their willingness to be involved in co-
management. The last two questions sought to understand what they thought were 
the barriers to co-management and how those barriers could be overcome. They were 
also asked to explain potential measures to overcome those barriers.     
(iv) Socio-economic and Demographic Information: The last section of the IS 
derived detailed information on socio-economic and demographic characteristics. 
Information obtained included household income, education, age, family-size, 
employment, marital status, and types of dwelling. These data are very important for 
three main reasons. First, these data allow testing as to whether the sample is 
representative of the population of the study area. Second, they explain how FDCs 
react to state property rights regimes and how their circumstances impact on their 
differing property rights choices. Third, they enable essential and detailed social 
analysis of households’ perceptions, attitudes and understanding towards broader 
issues of sustainable natural resource management.  
5.8 Framing the Property Rights and Demand-side Intervention Questions 
The techniques of framing the property rights and demand-side intervention 
questions are narrated below. 
5.8.1 Property Rights Question Formats 
The S&O’s (Schlager & Ostrom 1992) model was used in framing the property rights 
questions. These questions were framed on a five-point Likert scale and in multiple-
choice options. These questions were designed to apply Common’s (1968) view as to 
how a property right becomes enforceable, enabling particular actions in a specific 
domain such as sustainable forest management. Respondents were given an 
opportunity to translate property rights by defining their actions in relation to others 
(Ostrom 2003). For ‘access’ rights the question asked whether forest communities 
are allowed to harvest forest resources. The next question asked whether 
communities expect to gain desired benefits from harvesting through permits to 
reflect the ‘withdrawal’ right.  It asked whether forest communities are able to make 
decisions about internal use patterns and transform harvested resources by making 
improvements, representing the ‘management’ right.  Information on the ‘exclusion’ 
right was obtained by asking whether forest communities are able to make decisions 
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about which community members can use the forest. Lastly, respondents were given 
these rights as options and asked which one they prefer under a co-management 
system. By answering these particular questions, respondents basically identified 
their positions on common-pool resource management. The positions are authorised 
entrant, authorised user, authorised claimant and proprietor. 
5.8.2 Demand-side Management Question Format  
Forest resources are often exploited at unsustainable rates because of their common 
property characteristics (Caviglia-Harris et al. 2003). Supply-side policies are 
primarily responsible and can be overcome by introducing demand-side policies 
which create alternative livelihoods through managing forest communities’ demands 
in a sustainable and alternative way. Consequently, research questions were framed 
related to demand-side policy-related interventions and alternative livelihoods. 
Following Caviglia-Harris et al. (2003), these questions gathered information to 
(i) enhance long-term conservation; (ii) promote the achievement of economic 
efficiency; and, most importantly, (iii) render greater political acceptability compared 
to supply-side policies. 
In relation to income and expenditure, respondents were asked to give their income 
earned from resource harvesting from the SMF and other sources. Respondents were 
asked where they get financial help in case of financial difficulties. They were then 
asked to identify the major problems in acquiring jobs other than forest resource 
harvesting. From the FGDs at the stage of piloting the IS, it was found that after 
Cyclone Aila in 2009 the forest communities became more dependent on the SMF 
for their livelihoods. In this regard, two questions were framed: (i) what was their 
income before and after Aila and (ii) what were the sources of income then and now. 
It was expected that answers to these questions might suggest that a shift to demand-
side policies could encourage a pro-poor conservation approach to create viable 
future opportunities outside the SMF for the dependent forest communities 
(Tumusiime et al. 2011).      
5.8.3 Follow-up Questions    
The re-interview schedule was designed to examine how well the survey accurately 
derived data and information (Cantor et al. 2007). These questions gathered data 
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from the respondents to allow a comparison of the estimates of the demographic and 
socioeconomic information and the findings of property rights, co-management and 
livelihood-related questions.  
5.9 Validity and Reliability 
It is very important to establish the validity and reliability of the research. It is very 
difficult to assess validity and reliability by establishing the standardisation of data 
collection in any particular research method, especially in qualitative research 
(Kumar 2011). In spite of these difficulties, these methods are described below:  
5.9.1 Validity  
This study tests several validity measures: (i) construct validity; (ii) instrument 
validity; (iii) criterion validity; (iv) content validity; (v) face validity; and 
(vi) translation validity. Construct validity relates to the measure of various abstract 
concepts with regard to intelligence, motivation, perceptions and attitudes (Black 
1999). The questions used appropriate wording and statements to minimise false and 
distorted answers that often arise from bias, misinterpretation and social desirability. 
Instrument validity was ensured through piloting the questions to extract the most 
valid indicators with greatest commonality for the final instrument. According to 
Pokharel and Suvedi (2007), validation of variables are achieved through conducting 
a pilot study. Criterion validity was ensured by checking the variables in the 
instrument with the other instruments of a similar nature. The variables in the 
research instrument were compared with instruments used by Salam et al. (2005) (for 
forest management related variables) and Ahmed et al. (2008) and (Coleman 2011) 
(for property right-related variables).  
Content validity ensures “the subjective measure of how appropriate the items seem 
to a set of reviewers who have some knowledge of the subject matter” (Litwin 1995, 
p. 35). This validity assessed an organised review of the survey’s content to ensure 
the inclusion of every necessary and relevant aspect. The review was performed by 
the two supervisors of this research and two well-regarded researchers and 
academicians from Bangladesh. One expert was from Unnayan Onneshan (The 
Innovators), and has extensive knowledge of working with forest communities of the 
SMF. Unnayan Onneshan is a pioneer Dhaka-based independent research 
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organisation with which the researcher had very good rapport during data collection. 
As content validity is not quantified (Litwin 1995), only these experts’ views were 
reflected in designing the instrument and survey. This provided a good foundation 
for building a methodologically rigorous assessment of the survey instrument’s 
validity.  
Face validity is achieved by casual assessment of item appropriateness by a few 
untrained individuals (Berkowitz 1996a; Litwin 1995). The researcher used one 
research assistant from Unnayan Onneshan working at Korya and one community 
member to review the appropriateness of the IS items. The concerned head of its 
forest research department instructed the local officials positioned at its Khulna 
Divisional Office and Koyra Office to intensively help the researcher in conducting 
the field survey and collecting various secondary data. Necessary amendments were 
made as per their comments on vagueness, cultural connotation, use of 
colloquialisms and item inappropriateness.   
As the instrument was prepared in English and then translated into Bengali with local 
colloquial language to make it understandable to the respondents, ensuring 
translation validity became a benchmark criterion for assessing its quality (Mueller 
1986; Pokharel & Suvedi 2007). Thus, this translated version of the IS was first 
reviewed by the principal supervisor of this study. To fit with the local colloquial 
understanding, the translated version was again reviewed by the research assistant of 
Unnayan Onneshan who hails from Koyra and by another community member from 
Binapani Village. After that, the translated version was finalised through individual 
piloting and FGDs.    
The validity of this survey was ensured by comparing it with the household survey 
guidelines of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the Statistics 
Division of UN (UN 2005). Careful consideration of this guideline helped achieve 
valid responses from the respondents (detailed elaboration of this is contained in 
Section 5.9.3). Validity was also established through extended analysis of the socio-
economic and demographic characteristics of the respondents and drawing 
comparisons with local and national data. Moreover, numerous statistical measures 
were employed to test hypotheses using an econometric model (described in the next 
chapter). The test results also established the validity of the research.     
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5.9.2 Reliability  
Reliability is the measure by which an instrument replicates the same findings with 
repeated administration (Graziano & Raulin 2010). A highly reliable instrument 
gives more confident results reflecting an individual’s true score by measuring the 
variability among responses (Black 1999). However, it is difficult to ensure 
reliability in any research as “no instrument is perfect, so you can expect some error 
to occur during the measurement process” (Litwin 1995, p. 6). To ensure the 
reliability of results of the household survey, a post survey check approach and a 
variant of test-retest were undertaken to lower the measurement error of the collected 
data. Re-interviews were also conducted. Following Vaus (2002), the researcher re-
interviewed the same respondents using eight questions two weeks after completion 
of the IS. Since “there is no evidence regarding the ideal interval between testing and 
retesting” (Considine et al. 2005, p. 21), due to time constraints, the researcher 
considered two weeks as the appropriate interval period. This approach is also 
supported by Vaus (2002).  
The process adopted was to randomly select 30 cell-telephone owning respondents 
from a total of 42 cell-telephone owning households. The lottery method was applied 
for selection. A few questions were repeated from the IS to test reliability 
(Appendix 7). The re-interview found high correlation of the responses in the survey 
and post-survey check, giving an authentic reliable measurement of the survey. The 
findings showed few discrepancies. Two respondents gave inconsistent answers in 
selecting property rights bundles. One incorrectly identified the main barrier of co-
management. All discrepancies were adjusted. The overall finding is that minimal 
discrepancies occurred.  
5.9.3 United Nations’ Guidelines  
Although household surveys are commonly used by many researchers for cross-
sectional data collection, no standard guideline to establish validity and reliability is 
agreed. The Statistics Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of 
the UN appointed a group of experts with multidisciplinary and multinational 
background to develop ‘Designing Household Survey Samples: Practical Guidelines’ 
(hereafter UN guidelines) to design and implement various techniques for data 
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collection (UN 2005). The guidelines recommend sample survey design, 
administration and data analysis practices to be followed by researchers and analysts 
involved in sample survey work and activities. According to the guidelines, a well-
designed household survey and its proper implementation can guarantee data and 
information with sufficient quality and accuracy with speed at a relatively low cost 
(UN 2005). 
The survey instrument and procedures followed the recommendations of the 
guidelines, except in a few cases. The exceptions were due to geographical 
conditions of the study area, time and budget constraints. The respondents were also 
extremely poor and illiterate, or very poorly educated. The detailed comparison 
between the recommendations in the UN guidelines and the survey procedure applied 
for this research are incorporated in the Appendix 8.  
5.10 Potential Sources of Bias and Remedial Measures 
Examining validity and reliability is very important as the implementation of 
household surveys suffers from various types of biases related to survey and 
sampling designs. For household surveys, it is necessary to be aware of some aspects 
of bias to reduce total error (Henry 2009). The survey procedures adopted some 
remedial measures to overcome potential sources of bias in the design of the IS. 
According to Henry (2009) and Singer (2006), the main sources of bias in household 
surveys are: (i) sampling design and (ii) non-responses. These aspects are described 
below:  
Non-sampling Bias: This bias arises from the difference between the true target 
population value and the obtained population (study population). In this study, two 
indigenous communities were identified: Munda and Mahato (as they originated 
from Munda, they can be treated as a sub-group). Mahatos were found in one of the 
six study villages, but in very insignificant numbers. They are not very involved in 
resource harvesting from the SMF; rather, they make their livelihood by selling 
physical labour. Moreover, they were not included in the survey due to the non-
availability of a Mahato interviewer and other logistic support. Mahatos return at 
night from their work place. At the time the survey was conducted in Binapani 
village, there was no electricity or road communication to reach the Mahato Para 
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that was around 2-3 km away from Binapani. Due to presumed difficulties in 
communicating with them, they were excluded from the survey. This sub-group is 
very minor in respect of fishers, Bawalis, Mawalis and Munda. Consequently, 
omission of this sub-group from data collection is not expected to create a bias.  
Non-response Bias: Usually non-response results “from the researcher’s inability to 
contact certain members of the population or from some target population members’ 
choice to exercise their right not to participate in a survey or provide other data for 
the research” (Henry 2009, p. 87). Non-response creates a serious error if it is not 
random. However, non-response does not represent a bias if it is truly random 
(Fowler 2009; Henry 2009). 
Empirical research suggests that non-response more frequently comes from sub-
groups (Henry 2009). This study found that few Munda households declined to 
participate in the survey. This was assisted by developing good relationships and 
employing a Munda interviewer. Overall, the total number of non-responses was 
considerably reduced by employing highly trained interviewers, asking 
understandable and easy questions (Vaus 2002) and developing very good 
relationships with the communities. If the inferential paradigm of probability 
sampling is seen as the relationship between non-response rates and non-response 
bias, it is found that this survey does not have any problem in this regard (Singer 
2006). The low 4 per cent non-response rate was found to be extremely random. 
Consequently, a potential non-response bias did not arise (UN 2005).  
Non-response is very common and important in cross-section household surveys. 
This non-response bias happens when some crucial characteristics of individuals or 
existing differences between two populations of respondents and non-respondents is 
evidenced (Garcia et al. 2009). Sample selection bias can also arise due to the 
difference between observable or non-observable characteristics for each sub-sample. 
This survey design was carefully structured to avoid these sources of non-response 
biases. The socio-economic characteristics of the respondents and non-respondents 
were identical. Various sub-groups such as: Fishers, Munda, Bawalis and Mawalis 
have the same observable characteristics. Most importantly, non-responses were not 
a problem in this survey.  
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In the survey, the number of non-responses was 18. The failure to interview these 
people was due to their non-availability at contact time period for three visits. No 
contacted respondent refused to take part in the interview, with the exception of one 
woman. Respondents showed enthusiasm for the survey because of its close relation 
to their livelihoods.   
Non-sample error was extremely minimal due to the in-person face-to-face 
interviews.  
Information Bias: Inexperienced respondents can lead to this bias occurring because 
of their insufficient knowledge regarding the research issue. The survey necessarily 
addressed issues like the degradation trend of tree density; alternative property rights 
regimes and possible policy interventions. All of these issues needed authentic and 
appropriate information provided by respondents. To reduce this bias, the age of the 
respondents was a minimum of 18 years.    
Interviewer Bias: Careful selection of interviewers and intensive training are very 
important in conducting unbiased surveying. The interviewers were recruited 
independently from a pool of experienced local and relevant interviewers. They were 
intensively trained and guided to comprehend each question. However, comparing 
survey results among interviewers was not considered as a test of potential bias for 
two reasons. First, the author reviewed the IS responses from interviewers regularly. 
Second, little variation was found due to the unique nature of socio-economic 
characteristics of the respondents and their extensive training and motivation.    
Although potential biases can exist, the above sections show that the methods 
adopted to obtain estimates from households minimised biases.  
5.11 Data Analysis and Selection of Test Statistics 
Survey data and information were collected using various sources and methods. The 
overall objective was to assess the present management regime of the SMF and 
investigate the interaction between existing property rights and conservation of forest 
resources. The investigation was carried out by developing an extended logit-model 
using property rights and management-related variables—described in the next 
chapter. The analysis will lead to an assessment of the acceptability of alternative 
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property rights regimes. The survey data are also extensively analysed using 
descriptive statistics (see Chapter Seven).   
Data analysis methods were selected on the basis of the required statistical analysis 
and nature of data collected. The use of descriptive statistics is expected to achieve 
this purpose. Following this, the level of measurement was designed to be categorical 
and mostly on a nominal scale with non-parametric estimates. Hence, hypothesis 
tests were designed to establish the relationship between ‘forest condition’ and other 
variables. Null hypotheses (H0) were established with the assumption of H0 = 
relationships do not exist; meaning that willingness to conserve is independent of 
property rights or other socio-demographic variables. Pearson’s chi-square (χ2) test is 
applied with respect to accepting or rejecting H0. In this regard, two types of χ2 tests 
are employed: χ2 test for goodness of fit to describe a single categorical variable; and 
χ2 test for independence is applied to interpret relationships between two categorical 
variables. These tests are employed to find differences between two or more actual 
samples. This assesses the difference between an actual sample and another 
hypothetical or previously-established distribution to examine whether the 
expectation is due to chance or probability. The following equation has been used to 
employ χ2 test.  
        χ2 = ∑
(Fo − Fe)
2
Fe
  …………………………………………..………. (Eqn. 5.1) 
where Fo = observed and Fe = expected frequencies of the distribution.  
Although an alpha (α) cut off value of 0.05 is suggested for rejection of H0, this study 
applies 0.10 as α cut off value. This value is commonly used by researchers, for 
example, Alam (2011) and Joshi and Arano (2009). 
Considering the socio-economic characteristics of FDCs, present resource harvesting 
patterns, policy implications and experience from other empirical research (Behera 
2009), this study has used a logit model for econometric analysis to address the 
second research question.  
A discrete and continuous variable logit analysis is used to identify the indicators that 
may influence the adoption of co-management in the SMF. Researchers have 
successfully used this model to test forest sustainability (Behera 2009; Salam & 
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Noguchi 2005; Salam et al. 2005). Following Salam et al. (2005), one model of this 
research uses the variation of predictors with dichotomous type questions. It is 
expected that respondents’ attitude measurement will allow more useful information 
and avoid a serious multicollinearity problem. Thus, for this study, this allows a 
correct interpretation of the decisions of the respondents as to whether they agree that 
the current conservation policy is conducive to sustainable management of the SMF. 
It assumes that community members are faced with a choice between two 
alternatives and a set of potential scale items rated on a 1-5 agree-disagree scale of 
responses. The choice depends on identifiable variables whose magnitudes denote 
the embeddedness of property rights and impacts on sustained conservation. A 
logistic probability function has been used to model this kind of cumulative density 
function.  
The model findings are interpreted through the maximum likelihood method with the 
use of R2, coefficients, p-values, odds ratios, Wald statistics, marginal effects, 
elasticities and beta coefficients. These tools are used to investigate the statistical 
validity of community perceptions regarding the interaction between existing 
property rights and the conservation of forest resources.   
5.12 Conclusion 
This chapter describes different methods to gather data and information. The survey 
instrument was designed to apply property rights bundles to assess the current 
management system of the SMF and to investigate the need for alternative livelihood 
measures. The IS was examined through FGDs and piloting to make it pragmatic and 
understandable to the respondents. Appropriate wording and colloquialisms were 
used in line with local needs and contexts. A detailed description of potential biases 
associated with measurement instruments was made to ensure the accuracy of survey 
data and information by applying relevant validity and reliability measures. This 
description was extended with the application of recommendations made by UN 
guidelines for household surveying with few exceptions necessary for particular 
contextual and geographical conditions of the study area. These recommendations 
are expected to achieve high validity and reliability of the survey findings.    
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The chapter also explains how descriptive statistics and regression analysis is applied 
to interpret the survey data and information. Based on the survey methods and 
procedures as described in this chapter, the forthcoming chapter assesses community 
perceptions regarding the interaction between the existing property rights regime and 
the conservation of forest resources. These data and information are also used in 
Chapter Seven to investigate whether an alternative property rights regime of co-
management is able to achieve forest sustainability of the SMF.   
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Chapter 6 
Determinants of Forest-dependent Community 
Participation in Mangrove Conservation Practices  
 
6.1 Introduction 
The theories and methods described in Chapters Three and Five are applied in this 
chapter to examine the factors that influence conservation practices in the SMF. It 
measures variables of interest from theories of conservation, property rights, co-
management and social capital. The first aim of this chapter is to analyse the efficacy 
of a state property rights regime in managing the SMF. In this regard, it examines the 
association between ownership and mangrove conservation practices. The second 
aim is to explore FDCs’ perceptions about their participation in conservation 
practices and management in the SMF. This chapter applies S&O’s (1992) 
theoretical framework to examine the role of ownership variations in common 
property resource management. In its application to the SMF, a survey of 412 FDC 
households was undertaken.  
Based on FDC views, this chapter examines whether different ownership positions 
could increase the community desire to participate in mangrove conservation 
activities. Consequently, to achieve conservation through co-management, the aim of 
the study is to identify factors that could influence conservation practices of the 
FDCs in the SMF. Thus, this study addresses the following research question:  
 
How do communities perceive the interaction between the existing property rights 
regime and the conservation of forest resources? 
 
The chapter is divided into fourteen sections. Section 6.2 pinpoints the necessity of 
perception study. Section 6.3 is concerned with participants’ socio-economic and 
demographic attributes. Section 6.4 describes the efficacy of state property rights in 
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managing the SMF. Section 6.5 examines whether there is any association between 
ownership positions and mangrove conservation practices. Section 6.6 analyses the 
perceptions of FDCs about their potential participation in mangrove practices. A 
model of factors influencing forest condition using four theories is presented in 
Section 6.7. Section 6.8 elaborates the use of econometric models and their 
specifications with variables. Section 6.9 establishes the reliability of the models by 
presenting various diagnostic tests. Estimation of the results of the statistical models 
is provided in Section 6.10. Section 6.11 discusses the findings for each of the 
independent variables. Section 6.12 justifies model elasticities for forecasting, with 
quantifying relative significance of model determinants in Section 6.13. Section 6.14 
concludes the chapter.    
6.2 Necessity of Perception Studies 
In the context of developing countries, researchers have studied local people’s 
perceptions of conservation with the assumption that sustainability, more 
responsibility and long-term management of forest resources depend on local 
residents’ support (Triguero-Mas et al. 2010). From various research findings, it is 
known that FDCs’ socio-economic characteristics such as age, gender, schooling, 
affluence, household size, types of dwelling, marital status, property rights, co-
management and social capital can partially determine attitudes towards conservation 
(Heinen & Shrivastava 2009; Infield & Namara 2001; Macura et al. 2011; Mehta & 
Heinen 2001; Shibia 2010). Attitudes of FD staff and their perceptions of 
conservation practices also affect FDC perceptions towards sustainability. For 
instance, conflict between FDCs and FD staff on resource harvesting allowances, 
strict rules on access, and rude behaviour or harassment by FD staff generates 
negative attitudes towards conservation. The lack of FDC involvement in decision-
making processes and forest management is also a vital determinant of negative 
attitudes towards conservation (Silori 2006). Although there is a large body of 
research analysing local people’s attitudes towards conservation, an analysis of 
perceptions towards the SMF is absent. For example, the establishment of reserved 
forests has affected FDCs since colonial times (Guha 1983), but nothing is known 
about their attitudes towards this reserved forest. To address this gap, this study aims 
to assess perceptions towards management regimes and conservation practices in an 
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effort to discern the main factors that influence these perceptions. This will enable an 
understanding of potential FDCs’ participation in management and policy-making.  
Sustained conservation practices are community-promoted activities to balance the 
conservation-development nexus from a dynamic-institutional perspective (Tai 
2007). It is acknowledged that a medley of political, historical, social and economic 
factors influence community participation in natural resource management (Agrawal 
& Gibson 1999; Horwich & Lyon 2007). Thus, mangrove conservation policy and 
management need to reflect the perceptions of local communities. This enhances an 
understanding of the factors influencing conservation choices, economic activities 
and existing conflicts between their actions and conservation practices. No research 
has explored such perceptions for the SMF. Hence, this chapter focuses on an 
assessment of factors responsible for the existing level of FDCs’ participation in 
mangrove conservation. Econometric/statistical software such as SPSS/PASW 
version 19 and STATA version 11 are used for data analysis.  
6.3 Respondents’ Characteristics  
The socio-economic and demographic characteristics of the FDCs are important in 
assessing their relationships with existing conservation practices and the effects of 
external factors for future design (Infield & Namara 2001; Sarker & Røskaft 2011). 
Household characteristics of the respondents are presented in Table 6.1. The survey 
data reflect the commonality regarding respondents’ sex. This is due to the issuing of 
permits by the BFD to male FDCs only. The BFD does not allow women to enter the 
SMF on the grounds of security and social norms (Kabir & Hossain 2008). 
According to Kabir and Hossain (2008), all members of the indigenous and FDCs 
believe that the SMF is a sacred place where the presence of women would violate its 
sanctity because of their menstruation. As the focus of this study is on the resource 
users’ knowledge, perceptions and attitudes, male respondents were interviewed 
purposively in larger numbers. Moreover, all age groups above 18 years were 
interviewed in order to understand the mode of transmission of customary knowledge 
to upcoming generations. The minimum age of the respondents is 20 and maximum 
age is 80, with a mean age of 44 years. Most of the respondents were either illiterate 
or had primary school level education. Monthly incomes of respondents ranged from 
two thousand to more than ten thousand Tk (US $1 = Tk 68, February 2011). 
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Seventy-four per cent of village households in the villages of the study area were 
found to be directly dependent on the SMF. 
Fishing and crab harvesting are the main sources of income. Secondary activities are 
wood and/or firewood harvesting. Other sources of income are honey and Gol leaves 
collection in a three month production period. Few respondents earn income from 
agriculture and livestock rearing.  
Table 6.1: Household characteristics 
Variable Description Number % 
Gender Male 
Female 
 
400 
12 
97 
3 
Age 18-29  
30-39 
40-49 
50-59 
60+ 
 
26 
145 
134 
49 
68 
6 
35 
33 
12 
14 
Education level No school 
Primary  
Secondary  
Higher secondary/Graduate 
 
133 
174 
102 
3 
32 
42 
25 
1 
Primary sources of 
income 
Fishing and crab harvesting 
Wood and firewood harvesting 
Honey harvesting 
Gol leaves harvesting 
Other 
 
351 
36 
4 
24 
6 
85 
9 
1 
6 
1 
 
Monthly income 
from all sources 
<Tk. 2000 
Tk. 2001-4000 
Tk. 4001-6000 
Tk. 6001-8000 
Tk. 8001-10000 
>Tk. 10000 
 
16 
216 
117 
38 
31 
4 
4 
52 
26 
9 
8 
1 
Marital status Unmarried 
Married 
Widowed 
Divorced/separated 
 
18 
388 
2 
4 
4 
94 
1 
1 
Types of dwelling Gol leaves/straw/wood 
Chala/mud 
Tin/wood built 
Cement/brick built  
Others 
 
218 
26 
157 
1 
10 
53 
6 
38 
0.2 
2 
Household size 1-2 
3-4 
5-6 
7-8 
9-10 
11+ 
19 
166 
149 
59 
14 
5 
5 
40 
36 
14 
3 
1 
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Most of the FDCs lost their houses during Sidr and Aila cyclones in 2007 and 2009 
respectively. They are now living on the flood-control embankments. Because of 
poverty, they built their houses with materials such as Gol leaves, stretching 
materials and wood collected from the SMF. Only a few built their houses with wood 
and corrugated sheet to cover the roof. Sheets are locally known as tin and were 
given mainly free as ‘cyclone relief’ by the Government and other NGOs working in 
this area. Wood was collected illegally from the SMF. Among the respondents, most 
are married and over 18 years. The average household size is 5. Prior to 
independence in 1971, the country’s average family size was 6 whereas in rural areas 
it was 5.4 (Ahmad 1972). The finding is very significant in that after 40 years of 
independence the household size has not changed significantly. It clearly indicates 
the enormous pressure on the SMF by continually increasing population. Seventy-six 
per cent of respondent households range in size between 3 and 6. This is because of 
the lower average age of marriage by Muslim couples which is 23.05 years for males 
and 15.11 years for females (Uddin 2007). Women produce more babies in their full 
reproductive life cycle between 15 and 45 years.    
6.4 Role of the State Property Rights Regime 
Respondents’ attitudes towards various ownership positions are presented with 
categories based on S&O’s (1992) theory. Two hundred and twelve forest people 
(51.5%) harvest resources with permits from the BFD (Figure 6.1). The number of 
illegal harvesters is almost similar (48.5%). Permit holders are allowed access and 
withdrawal rights. The choices of respondents for various categories of property 
rights are authorised user, claimant and proprietor. Following S&O, these categories 
of property rights allow access and withdrawal, management and exclusion (Schlager 
& Ostrom 1992).  
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Figure 6.1: Present users of the SMF 
             
Table 6.2 shows that the respondents overwhelmingly believe there has been a 
reduction in tree density. The question posed was: “Do you think that there have 
been any changes of tree density of the Sundarbans over the years?” Almost all the 
respondents observed long term damage. However, non-responses for the 30 year 
time horizon are mainly seen among younger respondents.  
Table 6.2: Perceptions regarding tree density changes in the SMF 
Time 
horizon 
(Years) 
Authorised harvesters Illegal harvesters Missing/no response 
Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Authorised 
harvesters 
Illegal 
harvesters 
5 9% 90% 5% 95% 1% - 
15 2% 98% 2% 98% - - 
30 1% 91% 2% 86% 8% 12% 
 
Table 6.3 shows that respondents believe there was a 41 per cent reduction in tree 
density reductions in last 30 years.  The degradation rate in the last 5 years was 20 
per cent. This is mainly due to the damage caused by the two recent devastating 
cyclones. There were no remarkable differences between authorised and illegal 
harvesters.     
  
212, 
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200, 
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Table 6.3: Quantifying tree density changes in the SMF 
Time 
horizon 
(Years) 
Authorised harvesters Illegal harvesters 
Increase Decrease Increase Decrease 
5 1%  19% <1% 22% 
15 <1% 29% <1% 34% 
30 <1% 40% <1% 42% 
 
Respondents were given four options to rank and identify the reasons for such 
degradation. As shown in Figure 6.2, almost half (47%) the respondents identified 
‘corruption’ as primarily responsible for the evidenced degradation. This finding is 
similar to the Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB) report. TIB found yearly 
trafficking of valuable logs including Sundari, Pashur and Goran to be worth about 
Tk 2.41 billion by Bawalis and Mawalis, in connivance with the BFD and local 
police (Manzoor-E-Khoda 2008; Zaman & Manzoor-E-Khoda 2011). The report also 
exposed annual bribe income of Tk 230 million and Tk 62.5 million by BFD officials 
from fishers and Bawalis respectively.    
Figure 6.2: Reasons for tree density reduction in the SMF 
 
Bangladesh is facing high population pressure with an exponential growth rate of 
1.42% per year (BBS 2006). As a result, respondents identified population pressure 
as the second largest influence on degradation. However, a low number of 
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respondents identified present top-down management and overall environmental 
degradation as the main reasons for tree density reduction in the SMF.  
Socio-demographic and economic characteristics of the FDCs are very important as 
they could impinge on forest conditions, although not always linearly (Agarwal 
2009). These characteristics of the respondents need to be selected carefully as they 
vary in most of the cases (Sarker & Røskaft 2011). Many researchers like Sarker and 
Røskaft (2011), Chang et al. (2009), Coulibaly-Lingani et al. (2011) commonly used 
education, occupation, household size, sex and age of the respondents as variables in 
perceptions and attitude studies about conservation or protected areas and people’s 
participation in management. Following them, this researcher has used these 
common characteristics in this analysis.      
Throughout much of the world, extra-legal exchanges (corruption), in the form of 
bribery and illegal exchange, allow access to natural resource management and 
become the rule rather than the exception (Robbins 2000). In Table 6.4, the 
researcher demonstrates that there is no significant association between the 
perceptions of the top-down bureaucratic management system and the socio-
demographic characteristics of the FDCs except for age, which is significant. This 
immediately suggests the need for alternative livelihood measures for the two largest 
age groups of 30-39 and 40-49 to lessen their pressure on the SMF. Participants’ 
education, age and sex have no significant association with perceptions of 
environmental degradation. Industrial effluents, oil spills and chemical fertilizer use 
in agriculture are the main sources of environmental degradation (Awal 2010). 
Respondents, however, do not perceive them to be major problems. It was found that 
FDCs’ main occupations (fishing and crab harvesting) and their household incomes 
are significantly associated with perceptions of environmental degradation of the 
forest. This means that the BFD has failed to monitor overharvesting.  
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Table 6.4: Concerns about tree density degradation in the SMF 
 Present 
management 
Environment 
degradation 
Population 
pressure 
Corruption 
 χ2 P-
value 
χ2 P-
value 
χ2 P-
value 
χ2 P-
value 
Education 
level 
 
16.384 
(df=20) 
0.693 7.076 
(df=12) 
0.853 26.123 
(df=12)  
0.010 25.032 
(df=12)  
0.015 
Main 
occupation 
 
9.402 
(df=10) 
0.494 13.458 
(df=6) 
0.036 21.547 
(df=6) 
0.001 9.184 
(df=6) 
0.163 
Household 
income 
 
25.138 
(df=25) 
0.455 29.117 
(df=15) 
0.016 73.126 
(df=15) 
0.000 84.611 
(df=15) 
0.000 
Sex  
 
 
1.373 
(df=5) 
0.927 1.898 
(df=3) 
0.594 2.846 
(df=3) 
0.416 11.504 
(df=3) 
0.009 
Age 29.127 
(df=20) 
0.085 11.376 
(df=12) 
0.497 19.654 
(df=12) 
0.074 10.828 
(df=12) 
0.544 
 
Population pressure is highly associated with demographic characteristics except sex, 
which might be explained by the male domination of respondents. Perceptions of 
corruption are also highly associated with almost all demographic characteristics 
except age and occupation. Corruption is common and widespread under the state 
property rights regime. During the field work, respondents expressed the opinion that 
BFD staff take bribes at every opportunity, from collecting permits to the end of 
resource harvesting. They take bribes from both authorised and unauthorised users. 
At the time of permit issuance, BFD staff charge several times higher than the actual 
fees set by the Government. Permits are issued for seven days. Usually poor 
communities cannot complete harvesting in this short time, as they need to leave the 
forest to sell their harvested resources. BFD staff also take bribes in addition to 
actual fines for staying each unauthorised day in the forest. To meet the expenses of 
bribes, harvesters extract more resources than the limits determined by the BFD who 
also remain indifferent to overharvesting. This corruption negatively impacts existing 
ownership positions of the BFD and sustainable mangrove conservation practices.   
At harvesting time, BFD retains a certain amount of money in the name of a ‘duty 
charge’ from the FDCs. Although everyone has to pay this illegal ‘duty charge’, the 
rate is more for illegal harvesters than for permit holders. If they decline to give 
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bribes, BFD staff intimidate them by lodging false forest cases against them. Again, 
these BFD staff have a close liaison with the illegal harvesters from whom they take 
money to allow them to illegally harvest timber. Respondents indicated that in lieu of 
only Taka 250 (US $3.68), BFD staff allow illegal harvesters to collect timber at 
night time. They are the lowest level forest officials responsible for the management 
and implementation of licensing. These staff have an interest in undermining the 
monitoring and enforcement of access rules in return for bribes.  
Corruption is also facilitated by the lack of accountability of the BFD to the local 
community or any institution at the local level. It is important to note that all the 
FDCs live in abject poverty (Unnayan-Onneshan 2009). Eighty-seven per cent of 
people of Koyra lost their source of income from agriculture and became mostly 
dependent on the SMF as a result of cyclone Aila (Unnayan-Onneshan 2009).  
6.5 Ownership Positions and Mangrove Conservation 
From the above discussions of the role of the state property rights regime, it is 
necessary to understand the concerns about tree density degradation from the 
perspective of authorised and illegal harvesters, and those with and without access 
and withdrawal rights. The differential analyses of these two groups will contribute 
to comprehending further tree density degradation under existing mangrove 
conservation practice.  
As shown in Table 6.5, it is found that for authorised harvesters, their level of 
education, gender and age are not associated with degradation. On the other hand, 
main occupation and household income are significantly associated with degradation. 
This means that community household incomes come from the major activities of 
fishing and crab harvesting and cause huge environmental degradation. Income and 
gender are also associated with corruption as a reason for tree density reduction. This 
means that harvesters have to pay bribes to the BFD staff for resource harvesting, 
despite having permits for enjoying access and withdrawal rights.    
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Table 6.5: Concerns of authorised harvesters about tree density degradation 
 Present 
management 
Environment 
degradation 
Population 
pressure 
Corruption 
 χ2 P-
value 
χ2 P-
value 
χ2 P-
value 
χ2 P-
value 
Education 
level 
 
7.387 
(df=12) 
0.831 2.036 
(df=9) 
0.991 12.693 
(df=9)  
0.177 8.292 
(df=9)  
0.505 
Main 
occupation 
 
12.709 
(df=8) 
0.122 20.514 
(df=6) 
0.002 18.659 
(df=6) 
0.005 4.560 
(df=6) 
0.601 
Household 
income 
 
17.380 
(df=20) 
0.628 28.600 
(df=15) 
0.018 22.841 
(df=15) 
0.088 32.308 
(df=15) 
0.006 
Sex  
 
 
2.099 
(df=4) 
0.718 0.549 
(df=3) 
0.908 2.119 
(df=3) 
0.548 8.656 
(df=3) 
0.034 
Age 16.288 
(df=16) 
0.433 8.793 
(df=12) 
0.721 16.213 
(df=12) 
0.182 6.922 
(df=12) 
0.863 
 
In comparison with the above associations of authorised harvesters, when the 
researcher examined illegal harvesters and the reasons for tree density degradation, 
significantly different results were found. Table 6.6 indicates that the socio-
demographic characteristics of illegal harvesters are more significantly associated 
with the causes of degradation. Unlike authorised harvesters, education and main 
occupation are significantly associated with the view that the current conservation 
practice is a reason for degradation. However, except for income of the illegal 
harvesters, no other socio-demographic characteristics are associated with 
environmental degradation. In contrast, education, main occupation and income are 
highly significant and strongly associated with population pressure and corruption. 
Further, gender is also found to be significantly associated with corruption.    
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Table 6.6: Concerns of illegal harvesters about tree density degradation 
 Present 
management 
Environment 
degradation 
Population 
pressure 
Corruption 
 χ2 P-
value 
χ2 P-
value 
χ2 P-
value 
χ2 P-
value 
Education 
level 
 
26.260 
(df=16) 
0.050 10.695 
(df=12) 
0.555 21.842 
(df=12)  
0.039 26.537 
(df=12)  
0.009 
Main 
occupation 
 
18.783 
(df=8) 
0.016 7.339 
(df=6) 
0.291 22.728 
(df=6) 
0.001 17.236 
(df=6) 
0.008 
Household 
income 
 
22.338 
(df=20) 
0.322 22.869 
(df=15) 
0.087 54.317 
(df=15) 
0.000 74.867 
(df=15) 
0.000 
Sex  
 
 
2.169 
(df=4) 
0.705 3.005 
(df=3) 
0.391 1.145 
(df=3) 
0.766 6.788 
(df=3) 
0.079 
Age 20.602 
(df=16) 
0.194 12.067 
(df=12) 
0.440 13.449 
(df=12) 
0.337 12.242 
(df=12) 
0.426 
 
From the above comparison presented in Tables 6.5 and 6.6, it is found that socio-
demographic features of the illegal harvesters are strongly associated with 
degradation. Furthermore, it can be noted that respondents saw degradation as mostly 
associated with the population pressure and corruption, suggesting a lack of other 
options for livelihood other than harvesting. Consequently, these illegal harvesters 
are being victimised by the corruption of BFD staff. This is mainly due to their 
higher dependence and lack of any property rights for entrance and harvesting.   
As the government owns the SMF, it is necessary to know whether there is any 
association between ownership positions and mangrove conservation practices 
adopted by the BFD. It is surprising that all respondents know that the forest is 
protected with certain restrictions and rules regarding resource harvesting. They, 
thus, believe that the present management system assigns the BFD the sole authority 
to manage this forest. To this end, respondents were asked to assess the overall 
management of the SMF by the BFD. Most respondents believe that the overall 
management by the BFD is barely acceptable. Ten per cent of respondents were 
found to be happy with the overall management of the forest. These people were 
found to have close relations with BFD staff who allow them to illegally harvest. A 
significant portion of the respondents (41%) were found to be satisfied with the 
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present management due to transmitting de jure rights into corruption-led de facto 
rights. The remaining (49%) of the respondents were unhappy. This finding is in 
contrast with the earlier perceptions regarding the role of the BFD in enhancing tree 
density degradation through corruption.  
From the above views of the respondents, it is necessary to find out whether there is 
any significant association between tree density degradation and the current 
management by the BFD. As outlined in Table 6.7, it is found that there are 
significant associations between the existing state property regime with respect to 
most of the participants’ demographic characteristics. Participants’ main occupations 
are highly associated with present management. This indicates the high dependence 
of FDCs on their occupations as sources of income. Gender and age are also highly 
significant. It is to be noted that almost all the resource harvesters are males. 
Alienation rights allow illegal entrance and overharvesting without any oversight.  
Table 6.7: Perceptions regarding state property rights regime 
 State property rights regime 
 χ2 P-value 
Education level 22.900 (df=16) 0.116 
Main occupation 29.563 (df=8) 0.000 
Household income 21.310 (df=20) 0.379 
Sex  19.022 (df=4) 0.001 
Age 27.210 (df=16) 0.039 
 
Education level was not found to be significant. This may be due to only 58.5% 
literacy rate of respondents, which is almost the same as the national level of 58.6% 
for males (as almost all respondents are male) in rural areas (BBS 2009). In 
comparison with the definition of literacy (BBS 2007c), this study defines literacy as 
having education up to grade two level. These FDCs with basic literacy realise the 
degradation trend to be unsustainable in the present organised de jure rule system. 
They understand that corruption has become a special form of resource management 
by the BFD. However, there is no significant association between household income 
and current management. This means that the degraded SMF cannot alleviate the 
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livelihood pressures of highly dependent FDCs. For instance, around 50,000 people 
are in the forest each day for resource harvesting. Although, the BFD is supposed to 
govern both the timing and spacing of individual extraction behaviour, the allowing 
of illegal harvesting demonstrates there is an extra-legal relationship between them 
and the FDCs. This results in overharvesting. The state property rights regime does 
not ensure conservation practices by merging formal constituted national and 
regional rules with local systems to create the actual “operational” rules of use 
(Ostrom 1990). Higher levels of education help the respondents predict that state 
sponsored institutions commonly encourage corruption where BFD staff have a 
monopoly over the use of the SMF. 
One of the key findings of this study is that there is a significant association between 
existing overall management of the SMF and key demographic characteristics, 
except education. This striking result particularly demonstrates that the forest is the 
only source of income for the poor FDCs. Under the ownership of the BFD, the state 
property rights regime has failed to create any avenues to apply conservation-friendly 
de facto rights by creating a co-management partnership culture.    
6.6 Community Perceptions towards Participation in Conservation Practices 
Figure 6.3 presents the rights categories FDCs preferred; and Figure 6.4 presents the 
preferences expressed by authorised and illegal harvesters. The researcher finds a 
very surprising and interesting result with a huge difference in the preferences for 
ownership positions by the two groups. It is also found that there is highly significant 
association between the FDCs’ views regarding current management and their desire 
for expected rights (χ2 = 39.250; df = 16, p = 0.001). Following this finding, it 
categorises respondents depending on their preferences for rights possession to 
participate in conservation. Figure 6.3 indicates that only 18 respondents desire 
access and withdrawal rights to be authorised users, of whom 11 are authorised 
harvesters. This is in sharp contrast to the number of respondents using access and 
withdrawal rights through permits under the current management system. This may 
be an indication of communities’ dissatisfaction towards the BFD. It indicates that 
there is no correlation between current rights holdings and preferences for rights. 
Hence, it appears that present authorised users have no role in conservation activities 
without any collective choice right. This means that the BFD is only interested in 
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resource harvesting without taking any initiative to allow communities to participate 
in conservation. Insufficient rights, thus, de-motivates FDCs to participate in 
conservation. This finding is also in line with the literature which suggests 
investment withdrawal in common property resources without community 
involvement (Ahmed et al. 2008).  
Figure 6.3: Overall community preferences for ownership positions 
 
  
Figure 6.4: Preferences for ownership positions by authorised and illegal 
harvesters (in frequency) 
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One hundred and thirteen respondents chose the right “to regulate harvesting patterns 
and improvement of harvested resources” for management rights. As illegal 
harvesters are not getting permits, most of them (71) opted for this right. The option 
for exclusion rights such as “to make decisions regarding the access and transfer of 
access rights to others” is chosen by comparatively less respondents. Only 50 
respondents chose rights up to management level. These can be categorised as 
claimants. This is because FDCs have no faith in the current forest bureaucrats. 
Harassing of individuals in communities is a common practice and it has become 
institutionalised in the local BFD offices. It appears that the right to manage is not 
enough to change this bribery-led institutional culture.  
To address this culture, respondents opted for more power sharing with the BFD to 
ensure and sustain their involvement in conservation practices. However, 
surprisingly, the largest number (190) desire to have rights up to exclusion. These 
respondents chose the two statements above in addition to access and withdrawal 
rights. It is important to note that most of these respondents are authorised users 
(121). A significant number of illegal users (69) also opted for this right category. 
Basically, illegal users doubted that the state property rights regime will share their 
rights and power under the current bureaucratic administrative arrangements. 
According to S&O (1992), with rights categories up to exclusion level, these 
respondents can be classified as proprietors. This implies that FDCs desire rights to 
decide who has access to the SMF and who does not. This finding is consistent with 
the designated exclusion rights of joint forest management in India where rule 
enforcement allows communities the right to cancel an individual household’s 
membership and to decide who has access to the forest and who does not (Behera & 
Engel 2006). The respondents indicated that management rights were not enough to 
stop corruption as the BFD’s hegemony would persist. This finding clearly shows a 
demarcation between authorised users and proprietors seeking exclusionary rights.  
Table 6.8 summarises the second aim of the study that explores the attitudes of FDCs 
towards their participation in conservation practices. The key finding here is that the 
allocation of rights to FDCs is highly significant and associated with tree density 
degradation. If FDCs are allocated rights up to their desired level (up to exclusion 
level), they will be able to contribute to conservation practices with their active 
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participation in management. Rights up to proprietor level can certainly be expected 
to ensure their participation in conservation practices to reduce corruption and 
environmental degradation through improved management.  
Table 6.8: Participants’ perceptions towards rights allocation 
 Present 
management 
Environment 
degradation 
Population 
pressure 
Corruption 
 χ2 P-
value 
χ2 P-
value 
χ2 P-
value 
χ2 P-
value 
FDCs’ 
perceptions 
for rights 
allocation 
34.218 
(df=20) 
0.025 33.260 
(df=12) 
0.001 49.045 
(df=12)  
0.000 55.343 
(df=12)  
0.000 
 
6.7 Model for Sustainable Forest Management 
The concept of institutional resource regime refers to the ownership and rights to a 
resource and to the policies that regulate the use and protection of a particular 
resource (Gerber et al. 2009). Thereby, this study has used the theories of 
conservation and property rights to assess the bundle of property rights and their 
association with natural resource conservation. Allocation of property rights is very 
important to ensure public participation in natural resource management in a co-
management structure. This also involves social aspects of participation in networks, 
shared values, understanding and norms (Plummer & Fitzgibbon 2006). This study, 
thus, also uses theories of co-management and social capital.     
6.7.1 Theory of Conservation 
To provide both economic benefits to people and conservation benefits to wildlife 
and biodiversity, conservation theory suggests the need for strictly protected areas to 
enable a full complement of biological diversity for a particular region to persist over 
the long term (Noss et al. 1999; Nyhus & Tilson 2004). Following this theory, buffer 
zones are frequently established within the core protected areas as the most common 
practice of combating population growth impacts and maintaining the integrity of 
flora and fauna (Groom et al. 1999). This theory endorses the expectation that 
mangrove buffer zones would extend the availability of habitats for plants and 
animals, as well as providing resources and services to people (MacKinnon et al. 
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1986). Hence, management authority enhances strict compliance of conservation 
practices in the buffer zones without restricting FDCs from resource harvesting. 
However, in reality, one of the great challenges is to identify land use systems and its 
management to meet both the above roles simultaneously (Salafsky 1993), while 
minimising conflict among mangrove resource management and FDCs (Nugent 
2003). Conservation is not achieved in many countries under the sole bureaucratic 
management of FDs (Davidar et al. 2008; Stone et al. 2008) which do not allocate 
property rights to FDCs at an appropriate level (Schlager & Ostrom 1992). Thus, it is 
hypothesised that conservation can be achieved by maintaining good forest 
conditions with inclusive and participatory policy and practice with defined property 
rights. These policies and practices need to focus on understanding the attitudes, 
needs and aspirations of local people (Mehta & Heinen 2001). 
6.7.2 Theory of Property Rights 
While transaction costs and agency theories of organisation offer an optimistic 
perspective of equilibrium, classical property rights theory is better placed to handle 
shared ownership (Kim & Mahoney 2005). ‘Classical’ forms of property rights 
theory pay greater attention to historical and institutional contexts to shape and 
change property rights (Coase 1937, 1959, 1960). However, the theory fails to 
explain situations where inefficient outcomes persist. This fails to link the roles of 
FDCs to mangrove conservation efforts because of ill-defined property rights 
(Barbier 2006; Nugent 2003).   
One of the most important issues regarding resource governance is to explore the 
relationship between equality of power among stakeholders and governance 
outcomes (Brockington 2002). From this perspective, many researchers and scholars 
have shown interest in the application of the theory of property rights for local level 
sustainable forest resources outcomes (Hayes & Persha 2010; Irimie & Essmann 
2009).  
Consistent with S&O (1992), a relationship between the FDCs and policy-makers is 
perceived as inevitable for community outcomes and their collective action (Irimie & 
Essmann 2009). Ostrom and Ahn (2003) proposed that property rights theory needed 
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to link with other resource-based theories such as theories of co-management and 
social capital. This would enable sustainable management to be achieved.  
6.7.3 Theory of Co-management 
Central to the theory of co-management is the distribution of property rights and 
responsibilities related to a particular resource. This demonstrates reciprocal altruism 
by providing property right bundles to local user groups at an appropriate level 
(Plummer & Fennell 2007; Plummer & Fitzgibbon 2004a). Thus, the theory of co-
management supports the application of community customary knowledge and joint 
monitoring to cap illegal harvesting (Jentoft 1989; Matose 2006). Co-management 
involves the process of sharing management decisions between centralised 
government agencies and local user groups (Beem 2007). Hence, co-management 
needs to be translated into area and region specific co-management structure to frame 
operational mechanism to achieve sustainability. In fact, co-management structures 
involve a range of relationships by conferring power sharing, and decision-making 
authority, and adopting a people-centred governance approach for problem solving 
(Berkes 2009). 
6.7.4 Theory of Social Capital 
However, co-management has failed to improve forest condition where limited 
attention has been given to the nestedness of community-based organisation (Brown 
et al. 2007). Gough et al. (2008) identified improper attention to enhancing 
community social capital as the underlying reason for such failure. Spellerberg 
(2001) defines social capital as relationships among actors of individuals, groups 
and/or organisations that drive the development of mutual benefit or common 
purpose. In the absence of social capital, cooperative behaviours are not developed to 
solve problems pertaining to group governance (Adhikari & Goldey 2010). In this 
regard, the theory of property rights fails to recognise shared ownership as a valid 
incentive structure between contracting parties. Hence, the theory of social capital 
refers to social assets formed through enhancing the institutional capacity of local 
users (Adhikari & Goldey 2010).  
In this regard, the above four theories are applied in developing a model for 
sustainable management of the SMF. Figure 6.5 presents a model of factors 
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influencing forest conditions as a function of property rights, co-management and 
social capital variables.  
Figure 6.5: A model of factors influencing forest condition  
      Dependent variable       Independent variables 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Investigating FDCs’ attitudes, taking into account their needs, and respecting their 
opinions should become a priority to enable community participation in conservation 
of the SMF. Following Agarwal (2009), tree density is used as a proxy for forest 
condition for subjective measurement of forest conservation. This approach 
replicates the existing top-down conservation approach of the BFD. Consistent with 
S&O (1992), this study translated permits as access and withdrawal, termed as 
operation level rights; and management and exclusion as collective level rights. 
FDCs use collective level rights to gain livelihood benefits from forest ecosystems 
that invariably require collective choice governance approaches to function as a 
collective endeavour. Consequently, they are more likely to use customary 
knowledge as a conflict resolution mechanism to reduce illegal harvesting through 
joint monitoring in benefit-sharing participation. This regime should enhance 
conservation practices through vertical and horizontal relationships between FDCs 
and BFD staff with extended participation of the former in management and policy 
making. This co-management regime also encourages plantations to offset tree 
density reduction. Thus, perceptions regarding the interaction between the existing 
Property rights 
 Operation level rights 
(permit rights) 
 Collective level rights 
Co-management 
 Benefit-sharing 
 Customary knowledge 
 Conflict resolution 
 Plantation  
Forest condition (for 
evaluating conservation) 
Social capital 
 Institutional capacity 
 Corruption  
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property rights regime and conservation of forest resources are assessed to 
understand the level of conservation practices in the SMF. 
6.8 Statistical Model 
The above model is analysed using regression techniques to examine the effects and 
magnitude of the abovementioned factors on forest conditions. The following 
sections present the logit model derivation and specification for this study. 
6.8.1 Derivation of Logistic Regression Model 
The conditional normal model for flexible generalisation of ordinary linear 
regression is a generalised linear model (GLM). A GLM describes a relationship 
between the mean of a response variable Y and an independent variable 𝑥. But the 
relationship may be more complicated than the E(𝑌𝑖) = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑥𝑖. 
A GLM consists of three components: random, systematic, and link function (MO 
2010). 
(1) The response variables 𝑌1, … … , 𝑌𝑛 are the random component. They are 
assumed to be independent random variables, each with a distribution from a 
specified exponential family. The 𝑌𝑖s are not identically distributed, but they 
each have a distribution from the same family: binomial, poisson, normal, etc. 
(2) The systematic component of the model is the function of the predictor 
variable 𝑥𝑖, linear in the parameters, which is related to the mean of 𝑌𝑖. So the 
systematic component could be α + β𝑥𝑖  or α +  
𝛽
𝑥𝑖⁄  , for example.   
However, in case of a simple logistic regression, only α + β𝑥𝑖 is considered 
here with an assumption “that there are no significant outliers, the data are not 
over or under dispersed, and that neither of the variables require 
transforming” (Hutcheson & Sofroniou 1999, p. 130).  
(3) Finally, the link function 𝑔(𝜇𝑖) links the two components by asserting 𝑔(𝜇𝑖)= 
α + β𝑥𝑖 ,  
Where 𝜇𝑖=E(Yi ). 
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The conditional normal regression model is an example of a GLM. In that model, all 
responses, 𝑌𝑖s, have normal distributions. Of course, the normal family is an 
exponential family in the random component. This forms the regression function as α 
+ β𝑥𝑖 in this model which is the systematic component. Finally, the relationship 𝜇𝑖 = 
E(Yi ) = α + β𝑥𝑖  is assumed. This means the link function is 𝑔(𝜇) = 𝜇. This simple 
link function is called the identity link. 
Another very useful GLM is the logistic regression model. In this model, the 
responses 𝑌1, …, 𝑌𝑛 are independent and 𝑌𝑖~ 𝐵𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑖 (𝜋𝑖). The Bernoulli family 
is an exponential family with 𝐸(𝑌𝑖) = 𝜋𝑖 = 𝑃(𝑌𝑖 = 1). Here, 𝜋𝑖 is assumed to be 
related to 𝑥𝑖 by 
log (
𝜋𝑖
1−𝜋𝑖
) = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑥𝑖  ………………………………………………. (Eqn. 6.1) 
The left-hand side is the log of the odds of success for 𝑌𝑖 . The model assumes this 
log odds (or logit ) is a linear function of the predictor 𝑥. The Bernoulli probability 
mass function can be written in exponential family form as: 
𝜋𝑦(1 − 𝜋)1−𝑦 = (1 − 𝜋) exp{ 𝑦𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝜋𝑖
1−𝜋𝑖
)} . 
The term 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝜋 (1 − 𝜋)⁄ ) is the natural parameter of this exponential family and the 
link function 𝑔(𝜋) = 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝜋 (1 − 𝜋)⁄ ) is used in equation 6.1. It is called the 
canonical link when the natural parameter is used in this way. In that case, equation 
6.1 can be rewritten as:  
𝜋𝑖 =  
𝑒𝛼+𝛽𝑥𝑖
1+𝑒𝛼+𝛽𝑥𝑖
  ………………………………………………………... (Eqn. 6.2) 
Or, more generally,  𝜋(𝑥) =  
𝑒𝛼+𝛽𝑥𝑖
1+𝑒𝛼+𝛽𝑥𝑖
  ……………………………….. (Eqn. 6.3)  
It is seen that 0 < 𝜋(𝑥) < 1 which seems appropriate because 𝜋(𝑥) is a probability. 
If it is possible that 𝜋(𝑥) =  0 𝑜𝑟 1 for some 𝑥, this model is not appropriate. Thus, if 
𝜋(𝑥) is examined more closely, its derivative can be written as follows:  
𝑑𝜋(𝑥)
𝑑𝑥
=  𝛽𝜋(𝑥)(1 − 𝜋(𝑥))  …………………………………………… (Eqn. 6.4) 
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As the term 𝜋(𝑥)(1 − 𝜋(𝑥)) is always positive, the derivative of 𝜋(𝑥) is positive, 0, 
or negative according to 𝛽 is positive, 0, or negative. If 𝛽 is positive, 𝜋(𝑥) is strictly 
increasing function of 𝑥; if 𝛽 is negative, 𝜋(𝑥) is strictly decreasing function of 𝑥; if 
𝛽 = 0, 𝜋(𝑥) =  𝑒
𝛼
(1 + 𝑒𝛼)⁄   for all 𝑥s. As in simple linear regression, if 𝛽 =
0, there is no relationship between 𝜋 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑥. Also in a logistic regression, it is found 
that 𝜋 (−
𝛼
𝛽
) =
1
2
. A logistic regression function exhibits this kind of symmetry for 
any 𝑐, 𝜋 ((−
𝛼
𝛽
) + 𝑐) = 1 − 𝜋 ((−
𝛼
𝛽
) − 𝑐). 
The parameters 𝛼 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛽 have meanings similar to those in simple linear regression. 
Setting 𝑥 = 0 in equation 6.1 yields 𝛼 to be the log-odds of success at 𝑥 = 0. For any 
𝑥, evaluation of equation 6.1 at 𝑥 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑥 + 1 yields 
log ( 
𝜋(𝑥+1)
1−𝜋(𝑥+1)
) − log ( 
𝜋(𝑥)
1−𝜋(𝑥)
) =  𝛼 + 𝛽(𝑥 + 1) − 𝛼 − 𝛽(𝑥) = 𝛽. 
Thus, 𝛽 is the change in the log-odds of success corresponding to a one-unit increase 
in 𝑥. In simple linear regression, 𝛽 is the change in the mean of 𝑌 corresponding to a 
one-unit increase in 𝑥. Exponentiating both sides of this equality yields 
𝑒𝛽= 
𝜋(𝑥+1) (1−𝜋(𝑥+1))⁄
𝜋(𝑥) (1−𝜋(𝑥))⁄
  …………………………………………………. (Eqn. 6.5) 
The right hand side is the odds ratio comparing the odds of success at 𝑥 + 1 to the 
odds of success at 𝑥. In a logistic regression model, this ratio is constant as a function 
of 𝑥.  
Finally, it is found  
𝜋(𝑥+1)
1−𝜋(𝑥+1)
=  𝑒𝛽
𝜋(𝑥)
1−𝜋(𝑥)
  …………………………….. (Eqn. 6.6) 
That means 𝑒𝛽 is the multiplicative change in the odds of success corresponding to a 
one-unit increase in 𝑥.   
6.8.2 Model Explanation  
The above central mathematical concept underlies logistic regression as the logit—
the natural logarithm of an odds ratio. The simplest example of a logit derivation is 
from a 2 × 2 contingency table where a test of independence using chi-square could 
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be applied (Peng et al. 2002). This regression is well suited for interpreting and 
testing hypotheses about relationships between a categorical outcome variable and 
one or more categorical or continuous predictors. With an Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) regression equation due to the dichotomy of outcomes, two parallel lines are 
difficult to explain; rather, categories for the predictors may be created along with 
the computation of the mean of the outcome variable for the respective categories. 
Although the plot of categories’ means appears in the middle, much like an ordinary 
scatter plot, the curves at the ends become S-shaped (Figure 6.6). Such sigmoidal or 
S-shaped curve is difficult to describe with a linear equation because of the extremes 
not following any linearity. Logistic regression solves this problem by logit 
transformation to the outcome variable. Thus, the simple logistic model has the 
following form suggested by Peng et al. (2002).  
logit (Y) = natural log(odds) = ln(
л
1−л
) = α + βX  ....................................... (Eqn. 6.7) 
Figure 6.6: S-shaped curve of logistic regression 
 
 
 
 
 
Taking the antilog of equation 6.7 on both sides, the derivation of an equation to 
predict the probability of the occurrence of the outcome of interest is as follows: 
π = Probability (Y = outcome of interest | X = x, a specific value of X) = 
𝑒α+βx
1+ 𝑒α+βx
 
………………………………………….………………………………….. (Eqn. 6.8) 
where π = probability of ‘event’ of outcome of interest,  α = Y intercept and β = is 
the regression coefficient and e = the base of the system of natural logarithms. 
An extension of the above logic from simple to multiple regression predictors is as 
follows: 
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logit (Y) = ln(
л
1−л
) = α + β1X1 + β2X2  ......................................................... (Eqn. 6.9) 
Therefore,  
π = Probability (Y = outcome of interest | X1 = x1, X2 = x2) = 
𝑒α+  β1x1+ β2x2  
1+ 𝑒α+β1x1+ β2x2 
 
................................................................................................................... (Eqn. 6.10) 
where βs are the regression coefficients and Xs are a set of predictors and α and βs 
are typically estimated by the maximum likelihood method over the weighted least 
square approach. 
The model states null hypotheses that βs equal zero where rejection of null implies at 
least one β does not equal zero in the population. This means the logit model predicts 
the probability of the outcome better than the mean of the outcome variable Y.   
6.8.3 Application of the Model to Forest Conservation 
To identify factors influencing the perceptions of FDCs towards sustainable 
conservation practices, a discrete variable logit analysis was adopted. Participants’ 
views as to whether they believed ‘sustainable conservation practices under the 
existing management system were not possible’ were framed as a binary-choice 
model using tree density changes over the last ten years as a proxy. The model 
assumed a choice between two alternatives—an increase or a decrease of tree 
density.  
Let Ti represents a dichotomous variable. It is 1 if the participant believes tree density 
has decreased and 0 otherwise. So, the probability of a participant ‘agrees’, Pr (Ti 
=1), is a cumulative density function F evaluated at Xiβ, where Xi is a vector of 
explanatory variables and β is a vector of unknown parameters. A logistic probability 
function is used to model this cumulative density function (Salam et al. 2005). The 
form of the logistic probability function is as follows: 
Pr (community members agree with forest conservation in terms of tree density) = 
Pr(Ti = 1) = 
)exp(1
)exp(


i
i
X
X

……………………………………………….. (Eqn. 6.11) 
185 
 
This study builds an empirical relationship between the probabilities of dichotomous 
options [Xi(1,0)] and a set of explanatory variables relating to current conservation 
practices in the SMF. The logistic transformation estimation form of this probability 
of community members’ opinions in favour of sustainable conservation practices 
Pr(Ti = 1) is expressed in the following form:  
𝐋𝐧 [
𝐏𝐫 (𝑻𝒊=𝟏)
𝟏−𝑷𝒓(𝑻𝒊)
] = β0 + β1X1+ β2X2 +………….+βnXn ……………………… Eqn. 6.12) 
Where, β0 is the “intercept” and β1, β2, β3, …….., βn are the “regression coefficients” 
of X1, X2, X3, ……., Xn respectively.  
To estimate the parameters of the variables, a maximum likelihood method is used 
(Chatterjee & Hadi 2006; Gujarati 2003).  
6.8.4 Model Variables 
The dependent variable  
International Forestry Resources and Institutions (IFRI) commonly assessed outcome 
variables based on a subjective assessment of ‘forest condition’ (Agrawal & Chhatre 
2006; Andersson & Agrawal 2011; Coleman 2011). Following Behera (2009), Hayes 
(2006) and other IFRI researchers and protocol mentioned by Lund et al. (2010), the 
outcome variable is sustainable conservation practices in terms of tree density 
changes used as a proxy. Thus, causal influences explain the interaction between 
existing property rights, management of the BFD and participants’ social capital.  
Independent variables  
It is hypothesised that the property rights categories of S&O (1992) influence 
participants’ perceptions towards sustainable conservation practices. Four rights 
categories are drawn from S&O’s (1992) model—access, withdrawal, management 
and exclusion—and are used as variables. Other factors, listed in Table 6.9, are 
extracted from the literature (Behera 2009; Ostrom & Ahn 2003; Salam et al. 2005) 
and from the pre-test pilot of the survey instrument. All the factors are selected from 
the theoretical model outlined in Figure 6.5 and translated into quantifiable variables 
and described in Table 6.9. Furthermore, it can be mentioned that the choice of 
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explanatory variables for this study was based on data availability and literature. The 
variables used are in parentheses.    
Table 6.9: Independent variables 
Variable 
code 
Variable Variable description Theory 
AR  Access right (Behera 
2009; Kabir et al. 
2011) 
‘Access’ rights to enter the SMF under 
present conservation practices allocating 
permit licences to the FDCs  
Theory of 
property rights 
(‘access’ and 
‘withdrawal’ as 
operation level 
rights and 
‘management’ 
and ‘exclusion’ as 
collective level 
rights) 
WRD  Withdrawal Right 
(Kabir et al. 2011) 
Harvest with permits as per FDC 
demands  
WRT  Withdrawal Right  Completion of harvesting time as per 
permits  
MR  Management right 
(Coleman 2011) 
FDCs’ decisions about internal use 
patterns and transform harvested 
resources by making improvements  
ER  Exclusion right 
(Coleman 2011) 
FDCs’ decisions about which community 
member can use the SMF  
CM  Benefit-sharing 
partnership (Salam et 
al. 2005) 
FDCs’ intention to be involved in 
management of the SMF  
Theory of co-
management 
CHD Customary 
knowledge (Salam et 
al. 2005) 
Consultation between BFD and FDCs 
regarding harvesting and distribution  
PMCI Conflict resolution 
(Agrawal & Chhatre 
2006; Kabir et al. 
2011) 
Conflicts between present management 
and community interests  
SSP Plantation (Salam et 
al. 2005) 
FDCs’ satisfaction in species plantation  
CBO Institutional capacity 
building  (Behera 
2009) 
FDCs’ satisfaction with involvement in 
community-based organisations  
Theory of social 
capital 
DCP Corruption and 
discrimination 
Discrimination or corruption in 
allocating permits   
 
6.8.5 Model Specification  
In the following specification based on Eqn. 6.12, all variables from Table 6.9 are 
included. Following Salam et al. (2005), to identify factors that may influence the 
mangrove conservation, a discrete variable binary logit analysis was carried out. The 
logistic analyses results of these factors are assumed to present the perceptions of the 
FDCs towards current conservation policy and practices. Findings are expected to 
provide guidelines to policy-makers and practitioners for subsequent conservation 
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interventions of the SMF. Given the above-hypothesised factors in favour of 
sustainable forest conservation, the model to be estimated is:  
𝐋𝐧 [
𝐏𝐫 (𝑻𝒊=𝟏)
𝟏−𝑷𝒓(𝑻𝒊)
] = β0 + β1(AR) +β2(WRD) +β3(WRT) + β4(MR) + β5(ER) +β6(CM)  
+β7(CHD) + β8(PMCI) + β9(SSP) + β10(CBO) + β11(DCP) + Є  
............................................................................................................... (Eqn. 6.13) 
Moreover, χ2 tests for independence and goodness of fit were applied to examine the 
null hypotheses whether there where relationships existed between sustained 
conservation and other socio-demographic variables. Hence, a separate multiple 
regression model was also used to examine the relationship between socio-
demographic attributes of participants and their attitudes to mangrove conservation. 
These variables are of both discrete and objective or continuous types. As mentioned 
in Section 6.4, these attributes are used to understand effects on forest conditions. 
Thus, this model is assumed to provide guidelines on how FDCs’ socio-economic 
conditions help in shaping conservation policy and practices for the SMF. The 
following model was estimated using the socio-economic attributes of the 
respondents, namely, age, education, income, household size, gender, dwelling 
pattern and marital status. 
𝐋𝐧 [
𝐏𝐫 (𝑻𝒊=𝟏)
𝟏−𝑷𝒓(𝑻𝒊)
] = β0 + β1(age) + β2(education) + β3(income) + β4(hhsize) + β5(sex) + 
β6(dwelling) + β7(marital) + Є ……………........................................... (Eqn. 6.14)   
These models present coefficients and other results of the socio-demographic and 
policy-related variables separately. Factors influencing participation in the 
management of the SMF conservation programme is predicted to be influenced by 
these socio-demographic and policy-conservation factors (Coulibaly-Lingani et al. 
2011). In both the models Є is the error term.  
6.9 Model Reliability and Diagnostic Checks for Empowerment 
The estimation of the binary logit model was undertaken based on model reliability. 
In the initial run, duration of stay and distance to harvesting site were added to the 
model. Subsequently, they were dropped, as they were not significant. Moreover, 
both the models were used with or without some of the explanatory variables, such as 
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community capacity building and monitoring, presuming these variables to be 
endogenous, as found in the literature (Coleman 2009). The results showed that after 
inclusion of these variables, no significant change in the parameter estimates 
occurred. The following diagnostic tests were undertaken to establish model 
reliability and empowerment. 
6.9.1 Normality Test 
The nominal scale outlier test was performed following Tabachnick and Fidell 
(1996). No outlier was identified except ‘benefit-sharing partnership’, which had less 
than 10 per cent (7.3 per cent) of the sample in one of its two categories. However, 
following Salam et al. (2005), who used a variable with 2.1 per cent of samples in 
one of two categories, this lop-sided variable was not removed from analysis. 
For ratio variables, a normality test was performed to test the disturbance terms 
based on the OLS estimation of both regression models for empowerment (Kabir et 
al. 2011). To draw a conclusion as to whether values of ratio variables were large 
enough in varying significantly from normality, z-scores were considered (Manning 
& Munro 2007). Following the criteria suggested by Tabachnick and Fidell (1996), 
for samples >300, if estimated z-value exceeds an absolute value of 3.29 (p < 0.001), 
the skew and kurtosis are considered as significant. Following this criterion, the 
skews of ‘education’ and kurtosis of ‘age’ were 3.092 and 0.942. These non-
significant (p > 0.001) absolute terms indicated the normality of distribution. On the 
other hand, the ratio of skew to Standard Error for ‘income’ and ‘household size’ 
were significant (11.05 and 8.275, p < 0.001). However, these two variables were not 
square-rooted or log transformed as they were categorised and ranged for analyses. 
Moreover, considering the original scale to be widely understood and meaningfully 
interpreted (Manning & Munro 2007), the researcher chose not to transform them.     
6.9.2 Collinearity Test  
Before performing the logistic regression, multivariate correlation analysis was 
conducted to examine collinearity between the covariates (Coulibaly-Lingani et al. 
2009). The values were all above the expected threshold levels, meaning there were 
no collinearity problems. It was found that correlation of the variables was p ≤ 0.05 
(estimated p ≤ 0.03) for both the models. 
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6.9.3 Multicollinearity Test 
The models were tested for multicolliniarity using a correlation matrix. Moreover, 
the OLS models were fitted and the models were again tested for multicollinearity by 
using a tolerance and variance inflation factor (VIF). According to Menard (1995), a 
tolerance value less than 0.1 always indicates a serious collinearity problem. For 
socio-economic and sustainability models, estimated tolerance values are more than 
0.1 (0.856 to 0.928 and 0.772 to 0.946 respectively). On the other hand, Myers 
(1990) suggests that a VIF value greater than 10 causes multicollinearity. The OLS 
models show VIFs for all variables are less than 10. VIFs were found to be 1.045 to 
1.169, and 1.057 to 1.295 for socio-economic and sustainability models respectively. 
These indicate that multicolliniarity in these models is not a serious problem at all 
(Appendices 9-12).     
6.9.4 Likelihood Ratio Test 
Finally, the model was run and tested for validity using several tests. From the 
application of a backward likelihood ratio method, the classification tables indicate 
the proportion of correct assignments with 84 and 85 per cent accuracy of the socio-
economic and sustainability models respectively. This is an improvement of the 
intercept-only rate of 83 and 82 per cent.  
6.9.5 Residual Chi-square Test 
Variables not in the equations 6.13 and 6.14, report that the residual χ2 statistic 
indicates the coefficients for the variables. The variables are significantly different 
from zero for socio-economic {χ2 (df = 7, n = 412) = 39.236, p = 0.000} and 
sustainability {χ2 (df =11, n = 412) = 71.885, p = 0.000} models. The π for residual 
χ2 is < p = 0.05, meaning that the addition of one or more of these variables to the 
model will significantly affect its predictive power (Field 2009). If residual χ2 would 
have been > p = 0.05, none of the variables excluded from the models could make a 
significant contribution to the predictive power. 
6.9.6 Omnibus Test 
The overall fit of the model is assessed using the log-likelihood (LL) statistic. This is 
predicted as 𝑃(𝑌𝑖) for π that Y occurs for the ith respondent, based on the 
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observations to denote whether the event did occur for that respondent. This could be 
denoted “as Yi, the actual outcome for ith person” (Field 2005, p. 221). Predicted 
P(Y) will be the value lying in either 0 or 1. Thus, for the observed and predicted 
values to assess the fit of the models, the following formula was applied.  
log − likelihood = ∑ {𝑌𝑖 ln(𝑃(𝑌𝑖)) + (1 −  𝑌𝑖 ) ln[1 − 𝑃(𝑌𝑖)]}
𝑛
𝑖=1
   ..… (Eqn. 6.15) 
Following this formula, the bottom line is that larger values of the LL statistic 
represent a poor fit with the statistical model. The log-likelihood results of both 
models met the conditions of having less than the values when only a constant was 
included in the model. The value is multiplied by -2 referred to as -2LL to have an 
approximate χ2 distribution to compared values against those that are expected 
through chance alone.  2LLs were found to be 371.598 and 317.947 for the socio-
economic and sustainability models respectively. But after inclusion of variables 
these values reduced to 329.935 and 238.017 respectively. These indicate the better 
predictive display rule of the models.  
However, this raises a question of how much better the models predict the outcome 
variable. These were assessed through the model χ2 statistic to measure the difference 
between the models with constant values and the models after inclusion of predictors. 
Subtracting 2LLs of new models from the baseline ones, the values stand at 41.663 
(371.598-329.935) for socio-economic and 79.929 (317.947-238.017) for 
sustainability models. Applying Omnibus tests of model coefficients, it is found that 
the models have χ2 (df = 7, n = 412) = 41.663, p = 0.000 and χ2 (df = 11, n = 412) = 
79.929, p = 0.000. Hence, these models show a statistically significant χ2 distribution.  
6.9.7 Hosmer-Lemeshow Test  
Alternatively, testing for goodness of fit was conducted for model χ2 to establish 
statistical significance. A non-significant Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness of fit test 
indicates a good model (Manning & Munro 2007). This test π indicates that the 
models are not significant. Using a criterion of α = 0.05, the models are a particularly 
good fit. A finding of χ2 (df = 8, n = 412) = 6.940, p = 0.543 for socio-economic and 
χ2 (df = 8, n = 412) = 8.318, p = 0.403 for sustainability models is non-significant. 
These high p-values indicate that all the systematic variance has been accounted for 
by the models (Gray & Kinnear 2012).  
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6.9.8 Model Fit 
Moreover, following Nagelkerke (1991), moderate R2 were found in the equations 
(Tables 6.10 and 6.13). The models explain 16 and 35 per cent variations 
respectively. This indicates the strength of the relationship in the models. 
Alternatively, demand for Pseudo R2
 
measures of fit is undeniable in logistic 
regression (Shtatland et al. 2002). Thus, calculated Pseudo R2 values are inherent in 
cross-sectional studies. Significant Z-statistics showed overall significance and 
goodness of fit of the models.  
All of these tests suggest that the econometric property of model reliability to be 
statistically significant.  
6.10 Results 
Considering the size of sample, results are based on Wald statistics where a 
coefficient is 0 and has a χ2 distribution corresponding at the 1 per cent, 5 per cent 
and 10 per cent level of significance to determine an acceptance or rejection of the 
null hypothesis.  
6.10.1 Analysing the Socio-demographic Attributes 
Socio-demographic attributes (Eqn. 14) accounted for 16 per cent of the variation in 
the attitudes towards conservation of the SMF (Table 6.10). Although the goodness 
of fit of the model appeared to be low (0.2), similar range of values are found for 
other cross-section studies (Atmis et al. 2007). Overall, regression analysis findings 
provide many important insights into the variables that affect FDCs’ perceptions 
towards sustained forest conservation.  
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Table 6.10: Results of the logistic regression analysis with socio-demographic 
attributes 
Dependent variable: FDCs’ attitudes towards 
sustained conservation 
  
Independent variable Co-
efficient 
Standard 
Error 
Odds-
ratio 
Sex 
Age 
-1.646** 
-0.383** 
0.720 
0.139 
0.193 
0.682 
Education -0.441** 0.195 0.643 
Income -0.326*** 0.129 0.722 
Marital status 1.527*** 0.529 4.601 
Dwelling -0.311** 0.144 0.733 
Household size 
 
0.254*** 0.091 1.289 
 
Constant -2.231   
Model χ2 41.66*** 
 
  
Nagelkerke R2 0.162   
Pseudo R2 0.112   
Note: ***p<0.01; and **p<0.05; *p<0.1 
The respondents’ household size has positive effects on sustained conservation, 
indicating that the heads of the households with more dependent family members are 
more engaged in resource harvesting than those with a lower number of dependents. 
Most of the heads of the households are single earners, meaning that larger 
household size contributes the same harvesters as smaller ones. A huge number of 
dependents have been identified as unadult in the study area, with no direct or 
indirect contribution to family income meaning that the head of the household is 
responsible for feeding them and maintaining their expenses. Consequently, income 
pressure has negative effects on harvesting and causes tree density degradation. The 
result supports earlier findings that identified individuals with larger families as 
heavily dependent on forest resources to diversify household livelihoods (Coulibaly-
Lingani et al. 2009). This is due to FDCs’ difficulty of access to any alternative 
sources of livelihood. The significant negative relationship of income with sustained 
conservation needs to be overcome. Earlier findings show that higher income is 
expected to be associated with higher probabilities of engaging in forest management 
activities by allowing increased capacity to acquire resources (Joshi & Arano 2009).  
In most cases, FDCs collect dwelling house building materials illegally while 
harvesting fish and crabs. Consequently, dwelling pattern has a significant negative 
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relationship with mangrove conservation. Likewise, education has a significant 
negative relation with conservation, meaning that FDCs having higher education are 
better informed about the pros and cons of conservation. Therefore, they can better 
understand mangrove degradation associated with corrupt engagement of BFD staff 
in forest management activities. 
In many studies, other attributes such as gender, age and marital status indicated 
positive or negative associations with forest conservation (Coulibaly-Lingani et al. 
2011; Joshi & Arano 2009). This may be due to the nature of mangrove conservation 
that differs from other forest conservation practices. However, here, regression 
analysis results provide negative associations between gender and mangrove 
conservation. This may be due to the bias of the BFD in issuing permits to male 
harvesters only. Likewise, there is negative relationship of the youth and 
inexperienced to conservation. Younger harvesters are less conservation friendly, 
indicating lower age enhances more resource harvesting.  
Marital status has positive effects on conservation. This means women’s 
contributions to income generation activities are gained by processing harvested 
resources in local and traditional ways. Moreover, women potentially have access to 
alternative resources. Shova and Hubacek (2011) found this to be an important factor 
influencing reduction of resource extraction behaviour.    
6.10.2 Marginal Effect Analyses of Socio-Economic Attributes 
However, the premise of the tree density reduction is the independent and 
homoscedastic disturbance terms of the basic model in equation 6.9. It is widely 
recognised that parameter estimation from discrete choice models like probit or logit 
have to be transformed for marginal effects estimations (Anderson & Newell 2003). 
Hence, the change is predicted probability associated with changes in the explanatory 
variables (Greene 2002). The parameter estimates of the logit model provide only the 
direction of the effect without showing any magnitude. Independent variables do not 
show any effect on the response variable. Thus, estimates neither represent the actual 
magnitude of change nor probabilities. Hence, it is necessary to differentiate equation 
6.9 in relation to the independent variables to provide marginal effects of the 
predictors. The measure of marginal effect is an instantaneous effect of changing in a 
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specific covariate with predicted probability of y keeping other covariates fixed. 
With respect to x, the derivation of a marginal effect computation applied the 
following equation. 
        
𝜕𝐸(𝑦|x)
𝜕𝑥
 = [
𝜕𝐹(𝛽´𝑥)
𝜕𝛽´x
] 𝛽 = ƒ(𝛽´x)𝛽 …………………………………… (Eqn. 6.16) 
Now it is necessary to find the marginal effects or marginal probabilities that have 
the function of the probability of a predictor itself. This will measure the expected 
change in probability of a particular choice which is made with respect to a unit or 
discrete change in a predictor from the mean (Greene 2002). However, a unit change 
in the independent variables is reported for measuring expected change in probability 
of a particular choice for continuous variables (Deressa et al. 2009). Following this, 
the estimated coefficients of Table 6.10 need to be compared with the base category 
of no sustained conservation practices. Table 6.11 represents the marginal effects of 
the attributes.       
Table 6.11: Marginal effects from the logistic regression analysis with socio-
demographic attributes 
Dependent variable: FDCs’ attitudes towards 
sustained conservation 
  
Independent variable Marginal 
effects 
Standard 
Error 
P level 
Gender 
Age 
-0.192 
-0.045 
0.084 
0.016 
0.022 
0.004 
Education -0.051 0.022 0.021 
Income -0.038 0.015 0.011 
Marital status 0.178 0.061 0.003 
Dwelling -0.036 0.017 0.028 
Household size 0.030 0.010 0.004 
 
The results show that gender and marital status provide excellent marginal values. 
Male-headed households do not contribute to conservation. Male-headed households 
were 19 per cent less likely to conserve the forest and are reluctant to regenerate. 
This is due to male dominance in resource harvesting. The result is supported by 
Agarwal (2009) and Agrawal and Chhatre (2006) who found women’s greater 
participation in a common-pool resource such as a forest leads to better resource 
conservation and regeneration. The study finds that this is one of the major causes of 
deforestation and degradation of the forest. However, marital status was found to 
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increase the probability of conservation by 18 per cent. When harvesting as the main 
source of income generation is shared by other income generation activities 
performed by wives, male households tend to harvest less resource.  
Representing age as experience (Deressa et al. 2009), less experienced households 
are greater in number. For instance, a unit increase in change of the age of household 
head leads to a 5 per cent decrease in the probability of conservation. One unit 
change in income and a discrete change in dwelling has a similar negative effect on 
conservation with a 4 per cent probability. Education implies the important role of 
increased institutional support and promoting the use of conservation options to 
reduce the negative impact of conservation by 5 per cent. However, household size 
has a 3 per cent probability of increasing conservation. It can be inferred that the 
larger the size of the household, the better the chance of conservation management 
due to diversified use of harvested resources and household engagement in other 
income generation activities.           
6.10.3 Characteristics of Other Model Variables 
Table 6.12 presents variables of the logistic regression model (Eqn. 13) and their 
characteristics. Three hundred and forty-three participants (83%) were found to be 
against sustained conservation practices. Almost all the participants (372) did not 
want wilful entrance. Two hundred and seventy participants were dissatisfied with 
harvesting permits not fulfilling their demands. In this regard, only 142 managed to 
complete their harvesting time as per their permits. Many participants (273) could 
not make decisions regarding internal use patterns and transformation of harvested 
resources to make necessary improvements. A significant portion of the participants 
(332) could not make any decisions regarding the use of the SMF for their 
community members. Most participants (307) disagreed that BFD consulted FDCs 
regarding conservation activities. For instance, 351 participants were dissatisfied 
with the historical process of mangrove plantation conducted by the BFD staff alone. 
A majority portion (81%) thought that existing conservation practices created severe 
conflicts, whereas major discrimination and corruption in issuing permits were 
identified by 309 participants. However, 277 participants were happy with their 
involvement with community-based organisations other than the BFD; whereas 77 
were not involved because of lack of available opportunity. To overcome these 
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problems, FDCs (93%) expressed their willingness to participate in the conservation 
practices in a co-management structure.  
Table 6.12: Characteristics of model variables 
Variable Yes  (%) No (%) 
Dependent variable 
FDCs’ attitudes towards sustained conservation 
 
16.7  
 
83.3 
   
Independent variable  
Whether believe in entrance into the forest as per 
their wills (AR) 
 
9.7 
 
90.3 
Whether harvest with permits as per their demands 
(WRD) 
41.7 58.3 
Whether harvesting is completed in time allowed by 
permits (WRT) 
34.5 65.5 
Whether able to take decisions about internal use 
patterns and transform harvested resources by making 
improvements (MR) 
33.7 66.3 
Whether able to make decisions about which 
community member can use the forest (ER) 
19.2 80.6 
   
Whether intend to be involved in co-management 
(CM) 
92.7 7.3 
Whether the BFD consults FDCs for harvesting and 
distribution (CHD) 
25.5 74.5 
Whether present management conflicts with 
community interests (PMCI) 
81.1 18.9 
Whether satisfied in species plantation (SSP) 14.8  85.2 
   
Whether satisfied with the involvement in various 
community-based organisations (CBO) 
67.2 14.1 
Whether there is any discrimination or corruption in 
giving permits (DCP) 
75.0 24.8 
 
6.10.4 Parameter Estimation of the Logistic Regression Model 
Table 6.13 presents the logistic regression model with tests of its 11 independent 
variables. The results suggest that participants’ beliefs in entrance to the forest as per 
their wills (AR) are significantly different from zero at 5 per cent significance level 
of χ2 with a highly expected negative sign. Harvesting with permits as per 
community demands (WRD) is significantly different from zero at 10 per cent 
significance level with an expected positive sign. The odds-ratio indicates that 
participants who show satisfaction with their lawful entrance to the SMF are 2.7 
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times more likely to show an interest in sustained conservation than those who are 
dissatisfied with the lawful entrance without any restriction. Participants are highly 
dissatisfied with the harvesting time completion (WRT), which is significantly 
different from zero at a 1 per cent level with an expected negative sign.  
Table 6.13: Results of the logistic regression analysis 
Dependent variable: FDCs’ attitudes towards 
sustained conservation 
  
Independent variable Co-
efficient 
Standard 
Error 
Odds-
ratio 
Whether believe in entrance into the forest as 
per their wills (AR) 
-0.996** 0.469 0.369 
Whether harvest with permits as per their 
demands (WRD) 
1.007* 0.379 2.738 
Whether harvesting time completed as per 
permits (WRT) 
-1.228*** 0.378 0.293 
Whether  able to take decisions about internal 
use patterns and transform harvested resources 
by making improvements (MR) 
-0.975*** 0.398 0.377 
Whether able to make decisions about which 
community member can use the forest (ER) 
-1.008*** 0.393 0.365 
    
Whether intend to be involved in co-
management (CM) 
1.314*** 0.555 3.722 
Whether the BFD consults FDCs for harvesting 
and distribution (CHD) 
-0.928** 0.407 0.395 
Whether present management conflicts with 
community interests (PMCI) 
0.883** 0.388 2.417 
Whether satisfied in species plantation (SSP) -1.335* 0.748 0.263 
    
Whether satisfied with the involvement in 
various community-based organisations (CBO) 
-1.337** 0.683 0.262 
Whether there is any discrimination or 
corruption in giving permits (DCP) 
0.851** 0.376 2.341 
    
Constant -2.718   
Model χ2 
 
Nagelkerke R2 
Pseudo R2 
79.93*** 
 
0.346 
0.251 
 
 
 
Note: ***p<0.01; and **p<0.05; *p<0.1  
Community concurrence towards taking decisions about internal use patterns and 
transform harvested resources (MR) is significant at zero at a 1 per cent χ2 value with 
an expected negative sign. Even so, concurrence of the participants to make 
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decisions about using the forest (ER) is also significantly zero at a 1 per cent χ2 value 
with an expected negative sign. FDCs’ desire to be involved in co-management (CM) 
is significantly different from zero at a 1 per cent significance level with an expected 
positive sign. The odds-ratio indicates that the participants who are assured of their 
involvement in co-management are 3.8 times more likely to show interest in tree 
density reduction, meaning sustained conservation, than those who are not. The 
BFD’s consultations with the FDCs also show significantly different from zero at 5 
per cent χ2 value with an unexpected negative sign meaning the dearth of fruitful 
consultation might not halt tree density reduction. Existing conflicts due to present 
conservation management (PMCI) is significantly different from zero at 5 per cent 
level of significance of χ2 value with an expected positive sign. The odds-ratio shows 
that participants who can resolve conflicts are 2.4 times more likely to have an 
interest in sustained conservation than those who cannot resolve conflict. Community 
satisfaction with species plantation is significantly different from zero at 10 per cent 
χ2 value with an expected negative sign.  
Community social capital with the involvement in community-based organisations 
(CBO) is also significantly different from zero at 5 per cent χ2 value with an 
unexpected negative sign. Existing discrimination or corruption under the present 
management system (DCP) is also found to be significant and highly different from 
zero at a 5 per cent χ2 value with an expected positive sign. The odds-ratio indicates 
that participants who are involved in discrimination or corruption are 2.3 times more 
likely to show an association with tree density reduction in comparison with those 
who are not. 
6.10.5 Marginal Effects of the Sustainability Model 
The above parameter estimates of the logit model provide only directions of the 
effect for the outcome variables on the response variable. Consequently, such 
estimates do not represent the actual magnitude of change or probabilities (Deressa et 
al. 2009). Marginal effects from the model would be needed to measure the expected 
change in the probability of a specific choice. The choice, here, is being made with 
respect to a discrete change in the outcome variable for reporting and discussions 
(Agarwal 2009). 
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The marginal effects of the above logit model are presented in Table 6.14.     
Table 6.14: Marginal effects of the logistic regression analysis 
Dependent variable: FDCs’ attitudes towards 
sustained conservation 
  
Independent variable Marginal 
effects 
Standard 
Error 
P value 
Whether believe in entrance into the forest as 
per their wills (AR) 
-0.125 0.074 0.088 
Whether harvest with permits as per their 
demands (WRD) 
0.091 0.035 0.009 
Whether harvesting time completed as per 
permits (WRT) 
-0.134 0.045 0.003 
Whether able to take decisions about internal 
use patterns and transform harvested resources 
by making improvements (MR) 
-0.106 0.048 0.028 
Whether able to make decisions about which 
community member can use the forest (ER) 
-0.120 0.058 0.040 
    
Whether intend to be involved in co-
management (CM) 
0.185 0.105 0.076 
Whether the BFD consults FDCs for harvesting 
and distribution (CHD) 
-0.106 0.056 0.057 
Whether present management conflicts with 
community interests (PMCI) 
0.102 0.055 0.063 
Whether satisfied in species plantation (SSP) -0.087 0.032 0.007 
    
Whether satisfied with the involvement in 
various community-based organisations (CBO) 
-0.091 0.032 0.004 
Whether there is any discrimination or 
corruption in giving permits (DCP) 
0.093 0.047 0.049 
    
The above marginal effects of independent variables are discussed in the following 
sections.  
6.11 Discussions 
6.11.1 General Patterns  
Table 6.13 presents the results of the logistic regression model of the factors of forest 
conservation across the top-down management structure of the BFD. Overall, the 
model is significant at a 1 per cent significance level from the maximum likelihood-
ratio test.  
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In considering the results of the individual variables in the model, it is found that all 
the variables are showing expected signs. Permits for harvesting wood and wood 
products were banned after Sidr and Aila. However, FDCs harvest illegally or by 
making extra-legal arrangements with the BFD. 
6.11.2 Theory of Property Rights and Mangrove Conservation 
6.11.2.1 Operational-level Rights 
The variables—access (AR) and withdrawal rights (WRD and WRT)—are conversely 
related to conservation, meaning that the present conservation system imposes strict 
restrictions for access to and withdrawal of resources from the forest to community 
members holding permits. Many researchers found that opportunity costs of 
harvesting resources had reverse relations (Gunatilake 1998; Gunatilake & 
Chakravorty 2003). It means opportunity costs decrease as distance to the forest 
increases. The negative relationship of access with conservation indicates 
communities from a long distance are willing to be involved in alternative income 
generation activities. In this regard, the short distance of resource harvesting places 
from adjacent villages enhances FDCs’ resource harvesting interests due to their easy 
illegal access. A discrete change of access has a 13 per cent probability of 
overharvesting or reducing tree density. Thus, instrument-based control increases the 
likelihood of reducing harvesting and positively impacts on tree density reduction by 
9 per cent. Community access and withdrawal show a significant relationship 
between harvesting of resources and forest conservation at an increasing rate of 
harvesting with decreasing distance from the SMF. 
Completion of resource harvesting within the permit times (WRT) was found to be 
significantly associated with the forest conditions, meaning present permits 
allocating only seven days for resource harvesting are too short. The researcher 
found that around 66 per cent of the FDCs are not satisfied with this harvesting time. 
These communities were 13 per cent more unlikely to increase tree density. Being 
unable to complete harvesting in that time period, they stay more days and harvest 
illegally. Usually, permitted harvesting time starts from the date of issuing permits. 
FDCs cannot cover fish and crab harvesting for the spring tides periods in which the 
difference between high and low tides is the greatest. This occurs when the moon is 
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either new or full, and the sun and the moon are in line with the earth. When this is 
the case, their collective gravitational pull on the earth's water is strengthened.   
Either of the two tides occurring at or just after new moon and full moon aligning 
with the tide-generating force of the sun acts in the same direction as that of the 
moon, reinforcing it and causing the greatest rise and fall in tidal level. This is the 
best time for the harvesters to catch vast amounts of fish and crabs. In that case, 
harvesters disregard harvesting time periods; rather, they concentrate on harvesting 
in the spring tides periods due to their huge demands as this is their only source of 
livelihood. They manage this unauthorised harvesting by offering bribes to BFD 
staff.  
6.11.2.2 Collective-level Rights 
Regarding collective-level management (MR) and exclusionary (ER) rights, 
statistical analyses identified some significant factors that might influence FDCs’ 
perceptions towards sustained conservation. Around 66 per cent of participants are 
not satisfied with the management rights of taking decisions about internal use 
patterns and transforming harvested resources by making improvements. On the 
other hand, more participants—around 81 per cent—are dissatisfied with the 
exclusionary rights and the government making decisions about community use of 
the forest. Consequently, logistic regression analysis results indicated that 
satisfaction with management and exclusionary rights were significant factors with 
negative effects on sustained conservation. Under present top-down management, a 
discrete change in management and exclusion would result in an 11 and 12 per cent 
decrease respectively in conservation probability. These factors imply FDCs’ 
expectation to be involved in conservation practices. This can be addressed by 
involving communities in management and decision-making processes and by 
allocating appropriate property rights.  
6.11.3 Co-management  
6.11.3.1 Benefit-sharing Partnership  
Community-based conservation needs to develop effective partnerships for sustained 
management with a view to securing joint benefits by sharing government-owned 
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restricted and protected forestlands. The results indicate that having access to co-
management has significantly positive effects with an extraordinary increase in 
likelihood of conservation of 19 per cent. This is very important in ensuring long-
term sustainability and replication of partnerships through creating an environment 
from which FDCs can gain constant economic returns (Jain & Singh 2000). For 
example, an introduction of a community forestry in Nepal, or a joint forest 
management system in India made economic contributions to the local people from 
the final harvested resources for secured, stable and reliable livelihood contributions 
as the most important motivation for collective management (Sarin 1995; Thoms 
2008). However, the present management of the SMF fails to create such a bond with 
the BFD. Rather, the technicalities of using permit systems create conflicts that make 
resource harvesters suspicious of collecting resources as per their demands. This 
ultimately hinders sustained conservation by causing tree density reduction. 
The regression analysis result is similar to co-management studies where community 
contribution was found to increase tree density (Nagendra & Gokhale 2008; Zoysa & 
Inoue 2008). However, this raises questions about the success of co-management 
under the present structure and control of the BFD. The weakness of the field of 
collective action and common property often determines the debates regarding 
collective ownership as a feasible form of property to manage natural resources, 
especially forest management (Cleaver 2000; Ostrom 1990). Contrary to largely 
traditional views of state or private property (Hardin 1968), it is very important to 
note that common property regimes under co-management are very supportive of 
assigning well-defined property rights. This collective co-management system needs 
to be enhanced with an incentive-oriented environment. This may encourage 
communities to invest in the resources for future benefits.  
6.10.3.2 Customary Knowledge 
Three-fourths of the participants asserted that the BFD officials never consulted with 
them about the resource harvesting system or the distribution of permits (CHD). 
Regression analysis significantly supports the hypothesis that the non-use of 
community customary knowledge is negatively related to sustained conservation 
through reduction of tree density. Avoidance of using customary knowledge 
decreases the probability of tree density reduction by 11 per cent. Many researchers 
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find that forest management interventions become more potential and successful in 
achieving sustainability in places where FDs work jointly with local people (Agarwal 
2009; Behera 2009; Behera & Engel 2006). This success is due mainly to two 
factors. First, joint management ensures mutual benefits in a continuous stream by 
allowing FDCs greater access to forest resources and, second, it reduces protection 
costs for successful forest management (Behera 2009; Stone et al. 2008). The 
regression analysis results strongly support the hypothesis that an absence of 
consultation systems between the BFD and FDCs regarding the use of community 
customary knowledge for resource harvesting and distribution (CHD) has a negative 
impact on the SMF condition. This absence is due to no bonding or linking of social 
capital. 
6.11.3.3 Conflict Resolution 
Social, economic and political factors required to develop successful forest 
management by the implementation of a successful natural resource conservation 
policy may conflict with FDCs’ needs (Castro & Nielsen 2001). The regression 
analysis results significantly support the hypothesis that conflicts between the present 
management and FDC interests (PMCI) have a positive impact on the sustained 
conservation of the SMF. The reduction of conflict increases the probability of tree 
density reduction by 10 per cent. From various experiences, it is shown that under 
the state property rights regime the BFD not only escalates existing conflicts, but 
also caused new conflicts (Hossain & Roy 2007). In reality, this happens even after 
the BFD allocates access and withdrawal rights, due to a tendency of strengthening 
BFD’s control over resource policy, management and allocation. This arrangement 
further marginalises communities and resource users instead of empowering FDCs. 
The present cultural, political and legal obstacles are encountered by communities 
who are unable to be involved in co-management arrangements or participate in 
decision-making. In this regard, one of the major problems of conservation practices 
is that the BFD isolates FDCs from benefit by treating them from a narrow focus. 
This ‘monocultures of mind’ characterised by Shiva (1993) poses a threat to the FDs, 
policy makers and scientists to progress from a narrow focus to a wider appreciation 
of conservation practices to achieve targets and goals of sustainability. To draw a 
fundamental consensus by resolving conflicts is necessary through enhancing local 
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level meetings for relevant negotiation and planning (Ramirez 1997). A common 
understanding and common mental mapping are needed to bridge differences by 
promoting an agreed conservation language.  
6.11.3.4 Plantation 
The regression analysis results significantly support the hypothesis that disagreement 
of the local people with species plantation (SSP) has a negative impact on the likely 
decrease of sustained conservation by 9 per cent. The results imply that species 
plantation is a very significant factor for effectively offsetting the current high 
deforestation and degradation trend. At present, plantation programmes of the SMF 
are conducted under the sole authority of the BFD once a year, mainly in the dry 
season (October-March). MOEF allocates a block budget for plantation programmes 
each year. Budgets are then disbursed via the BFD to the Sundarbans East and West 
Forest Offices. Under the direct supervision of the Range Officers, these funds are 
spent preparing seedbeds to grow nursery tree plants and plant them in deforested 
areas. The whole process of existing plantation programmes faces five serious 
problems. Firstly, when funds are reached after passing so many bureaucratic tiers, 
there remains very little time for implementing plantation programmes. Secondly, 
there is a lack of monitoring by BFD staff of the plantation programmes. Thirdly, the 
plantation closest to the Range Offices in shortest time yields very little to the forest 
growth due to the set in of the rainy season which causes huge damage to the plants. 
Fourthly, due to the long bureaucratic process and ineffective inter-ministerial 
cooperation over many years, the block allocation is not reached from the Ministry of 
Finance to the forest Range Offices. For instance, the researcher was informed by the 
Conservator of Forest, Khulna Circle, that in this study year (2010) no plantation was 
implemented because there were no funds available from the BFD head office. 
Fifthly, the existing plantation system does not have any assessment procedure for 
future betterment. Neither is there a mechanism for maintenance of high 
conservation value forests. Moreover, existing plantation planning and management 
are guided solely by the Forest Range Offices without any co-monitoring guidelines. 
Co-management may help to overcome such constraints, especially by ensuring 
monitoring occurs, making necessary investments for FDCs, and increasing 
government transparency and commitment to constituents. 
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6.11.4 Social Capital 
6.11.4.1 Institutional Capacity Building 
In Andhra Pradesh of India, social capital, proxied by the number of forest-related 
active community-based organisations, is found to have a positive effect on forest 
growth outcomes (Behera 2009). Conservation management needs to have 
contractual agreements specifying the distribution of authority, responsibilities, 
agreement tenure, and the share of benefits through expanding vertical and horizontal 
relationships (Salam et al. 2005). The current conservation practice of the SMF does 
not have such arrangements. This implies a certain negligence on the part of BFD 
officials in relation to ensuring community participation in conservation. There is no 
forest-related community-based organisation that has had any contact with the top-
down conservation management of the SMF. The participants are involved in a few 
NGOs from where they borrow money in case of difficulties. This is the only source 
of nascent social capital (CBO) found, and decreased the likelihood of tree density 
reduction by 9 per cent, as presented in Table 6.14. It is indicated that communities 
having high social capital are more likely to effectively manage forests in enhancing 
their economic activities in general and manage natural resources in particular at 
community level (Naidu 2009). Many studies also confirm that social capital 
increases institutional capacity building at local community level for the sustained 
conservation of natural resources (Ostrom & Ahn 2003; Pretty 2003). This is 
completely absent for the sustained conservation of the SMF. 
6.11.4.2 Corruption and Discrimination  
The regression analysis results strongly support the hypothesis that willingness of 
FDCs to reduce their involvement in corruption and discrimination (DCP) under 
present conservation practices in getting permits has a positive impact on sustained 
conservation. A discrete change in household exclusion from corruption or 
discrimination was 9 per cent more likely to conserve the forest. The findings 
indicate that existing conservation practices lack transparency and accountability to 
any other community or civil society organisation. This provides the BFD staff 
ample opportunity to profit from corruption and discrimination. Linking social 
capital is associated with reducing corruption through building vertical relationships. 
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FDCs need social organisation to be capable of advocating for mutual benefits (Peh 
& Drori 2010).   
6.12 Elasticity Measures of the Independent Variables 
For policy-making and forecasting, the relative measure of elasticities is more useful 
than the coefficient of an independent variable itself (Wang & Jain 2003). 
Theoretically, elasticity of a model variables x1, ……., xn are defined to be the per 
cent change in Y for 1 per cent change in each x. For an overall elasticity measure of 
these two models, the means of Y and X were used by applying the following 
mathematical formula.  
Ex (Elasticity of x) =    
ΔY/Y 
ΔX/X
  = b
X 
Y
 ………………………..……………. (Eqn. 6.17) 
From the elasticity measures, the magnitude of individual variable change has been 
derived in Tables 6.15 and 6.16. For example, the elasticities of ‘marital status’ (Ems) 
and ‘household size’ (Ehh) show higher and high positive relative changes of 3.640 
and 1.530 respectively in socio-economic model. As explained by Wang and Jain 
(2003), this means that on average for a 1 per cent increase in these two variables in 
real conservation measures, forest cover will increase by 3.640 and 1.530 per cent. 
Alternatively, lowest and lower elasticity of ‘sex’ (Es) and ‘age’ (Ea) were -2.043 and 
-1.347; indicating that on average for a 1 per cent increase in real conservation it will 
cause forest cover loss by 2.043 and 1.347 per cent.  
Table 6.15: Elasticities of independent variables in socio-economic model 
 
In the sustainability model, the elasticities of ‘benefit-sharing partnership’ (Ebp) and 
‘conflict resolution’ (Ecr) were highest and higher at 1.472 and 0.862 respectively. 
Variable Mean Regression 
co-efficient 
Elasticity Magnitude 
Positive Negative 
Sex  1.03  -1.646 -2.043   Lowest 
Marital status 1.98 1.526 3.640  Higher  
Types of dwelling 1.82 -0.311 -0.682   Moderate 
Age 2.92 -0.383 -1.347  Lower 
Education 0.94 -0.441 -0.499   Moderate 
Income 2.67 -0.325 -1.045   Low 
Household size 5.00 0.254 1.530  High  
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This means that 1.472 and 0.862 per cent of forest cover is expected to increase due 
to, on average, a 1 per cent increase of these two variables in real conservation 
measures. However, ‘plantation’ (Ep) and ‘institutional capacity building’ (Eicb) 
provided the lowest and lower elasticities at -1.367 and -1.337. This means that on 
average for a 1 per cent increase in absolute conservation measures, tree density will 
decrease by 1.367 and 1.337 per cent. Elasticities for the remaining variables of these 
models provided moderate change. 
Table 6.16: Elasticities of independent variables in a sustainability model  
 
The findings give a clear picture to policy-makers of the immediate necessity for 
policy directives to increase tree cover and conservation of the SMF by enhancing 
positive-effect variables. However, the results show a clear failure of the BFD in 
controlling negative effects found from the majority of the variables. Most 
importantly, positive-effect variables, especially ‘benefit-sharing partnership’, 
support the theory of co-management and its application to the management of the 
SMF. This finding will be of interest to policy makers in favour of common property 
rights regime.  
Variable Mean Regression 
co-efficient 
Elasticity Magnitude 
Positive Negative 
Access right 0.10 -0.996 -0.120   Moderate 
Withdrawal right 
(WRD) 
0.42 1.007 0.510 Moderate  
Withdrawal right 
(WRT) 
0.34 -1.229 -0.503   Low 
Management right 0.34 -0.975 -0.399  Moderate 
Exclusion right 0.19 -1.008 -0.231  Moderate 
 
Benefit-sharing 
partnership 
0.93 1.314 1.472  Highest  
Customary 
knowledge 
0.25 -0.928 -0.280   Moderate 
Conflict resolution 0.81 0.883 0.862 Higher  
Plantation 0.85 -1.335 -1.367   Lowest 
 
Institutional 
capacity building 
0.83 -1.337 -1.337   Lower 
Corruption and 
discrimination 
0.75 0.851 0.769 High  
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6.13 Relative Importance of Model Determinants 
Although the above analyses provide direction, magnitude and relative measures, 
they do not quantify relative importance clearly for policy directives. To overcome 
this main limitation, Meyers et al. (2006) suggested the application of a relative 
importance measure for independent variables while identifying their ranks. This 
estimate produces standardised (Beta) coefficients by transforming above 
unstandardised logit coefficients. Beta co-efficient estimates usually apply a 
regression model with normalized data. This is applied for the above regression 
models (Eqns. 13 and 14) by following Eqns. 6.18 – 6.21.  
𝑦𝑡 =
Yt−Y
sY
  …………………………………………………….. (Eqn. 6.18)  
 𝑥𝑡 =
Xt−X
sX
   …………………………………………………….. (Eqn. 6.19) 
ŷt = b´1x1t, + ……………b´nxnt ……………………………….. (Eqn. 6.20) 
However, because of a fixed relationship between the beta coefficients (b´1, ….., b´n) 
and the regression coefficients (b1, ……, bn) of the original models in Eqns. 13 and 
14, Eqn. 21 was employed to find out beta coefficient (Tables 6.17 and 6.18).  
           b´1 = b1
´ sX
sY
 ……………………………………………………..… (Eqn. 6.21) 
The results of individual explanatory variables x1, ……., xn provided relative 
importance against all other variables of the models. In absolute terms, ‘household 
size’ and ‘sex’ showed the largest and least beta coefficients in the socio-economic 
model. This indicated that ‘household size’ is relatively more important than other 
variables. The beta coefficients of ‘household size’ and ‘sex’ are 1.271 and -0.739, 
meaning that 1 standard deviation change in these two variables will result in a 1.271 
and -0.739 standard deviation change in Y. Consequently, these were the most and 
least important variables. This provides an urgent call to the policy makers to address 
existing high anthropogenic pressure. However, of no less importance is gender, 
which interestingly indicates the impracticality, from a conservation perspective, of 
the BFD’s issuing permits with a bias towards males. This is easy to correct by 
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issuing a mere Government Order from the MOEF/BFD to authorise harvesting 
rights irrespective of sex.     
Table 6.17: Beta coefficients in socio-economic model 
Variable Standard 
deviation 
Regression co-
efficient 
Beta 
coefficient 
Rank relative 
importance 
Sex  0.168              -1.646 -0.739  7th 
Marital status 0.295 1.526 1.204  2nd 
Types of dwelling 0.986 -0.311 -0.820  6th 
Age 1.133 -0.383 -1.160  3rd 
Education 0.781 -0.441 -0.921 4th 
Income 1.027 -0.325 -0.892  5th 
Household size 1.871 0.254 1.271  1st 
 
Likewise, ‘withdrawal’ (WRT) and ‘access’ rights indicated the largest and least 
relative important variables in the sustainability model. Beta coefficients of 
‘withdrawal’ and ‘access’ are -1.564 and -0.788, indicating that a 1 standard 
deviation change in these variables will result in a -1.564 and -0.788 standard 
deviation change in Y. This finding regarding ‘access’ is commensurate with 
previous findings of moderate marginal effects. Hence, it is necessary to overcome 
the limited harvesting time. That means the BFD should only be able to exercise a 
strict harvest time control, and provide policy directives that can lessen harvesting 
pressure and violation of harvesting time. Currently, because of significant livelihood 
demands and other associated factors such as illegal harvesting opportunities and 
indebtedness to Mohajan/Aratdar/Dadondar, FDCs have become unable to complete 
their harvesting within the prescribed time period. However, this issue can be 
partially addressed by creating a community level institution, granting unbiased 
harvesting rights (WRD) and adopting plantation measures to overcome 
deforestation. Beta coefficients of these variables rank them as having second, third 
and fourth relative important variables.  
Although elasticity 1.472 of ‘benefit-sharing partnership’ previously indicated 
highest enhancement of conservation, its beta coefficient (0.913) indicated lesser 
relative importance here. This might be tantamount to community level institution 
building for conservationists and policy-makers. This means that a 1 standard 
deviation change in institutional capacity building will result in -1.355 standard 
deviation change in Y. Hence, it ultimately affects ‘benefit-sharing partnership’.  
210 
 
Table 6.18: Beta coefficients in sustainability model 
Variable Standard 
deviation 
Regression 
co-efficient 
Beta 
coefficient 
Rank relative 
importance 
Access right 0.296 -0.996 -0.788  11th 
Withdrawal right 
(WRD) 
0.494 1.007 1.330  3th  
Withdrawal right 
(WRT) 
0.476 -1.229 -1.564  1st  
Management right 0.473 -0.975 -1.233 5th  
Exclusion right 0.395 -1.008 -1.065 7th  
 
Benefit-sharing 
partnership 
0.260 1.314 0.913  10th  
Customary knowledge 0.436 -0.928 -1.082 6th  
Conflict resolution 0.392 0.883 0.925  9th  
Plantation 0.356 -1.335 -1.271 4th  
 
Institutional capacity 
building 
0.379 -1.337 -1.355  2nd  
Corruption and 
discrimination 
0.432 0.851 0.983 8th  
 
6.14 Conclusion  
In the SMF, the absence of a shared understanding about rules of access, 
inappropriate government regulations, along with a lack of effective enforcement and 
dispute resolution through community institutions, together fail to achieve sustained 
conservation. A successful conservation strategy would need a partnership between 
FDCs and the BFD. Defined property rights and local level community institutions 
are needed to secure long-term rights and benefits to protect the forest. It appears 
from previous research that the link between assured benefits and sustained 
conservation is very strong in Bangladesh (Salam et al. 2005).  
Results show that FDCs under the current property rights regime have less 
participation in and lower motivation for, the conservation of forest resources. The 
stricter the conservation practices implemented by the BFD, the less likelihood of 
community contribution to conservation. The conservation of resources can be 
achieved by the allocation of community roles, partnerships, trusts, and norms for 
sustained benefit by forming horizontal and vertical networks with FDCs. 
Communities desire clear and expanded property rights to engage in conservation 
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management, practices and policy formulation. Findings suggest that constructing 
effective strategies to promote sustainable mangrove conservation require these 
factors to be addressed. Consistent with S&O’s (1992) theory, results indicate the 
necessity for ownership and management changes to ensure FDCs’ participation in 
conservation practices. The time to sustainably manage the SMF is now.  
The forthcoming chapter elaborates the justification of an alternative property rights 
regime of co-management with its pros and cons to achieve forest sustainability.  
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Chapter 7 
Property Rights Regime of Co-management for the 
Sundarbans Mangrove Forest 
 
7.1 Introduction  
Following the investigation of the interaction between the existing property rights 
regime and the conservation of forest resources in the previous chapter, this chapter 
looks at the challenges of achieving sustainable management of the SMF. During the 
past two decades, mangrove-livelihood conflicts and uncertainty have emerged and 
continue to persist. These issues reflect substantial pragmatic shifts in pursuing and 
understanding alternative livelihood strategies to lessen anthropogenic pressure for 
mangrove forest sustainability.  
This study explores an alternative property rights regime of co-management in the 
SMF. This indicates the possibility of a common property regime to be applied in a 
co-management structure specific to the SMF. By using theories of property rights 
and co-management, this chapter envisions the prospects of a ‘co-management-
alternative livelihood mix’ strategy as an alternative approach to achieving 
sustainability of the SMF. This study applies FGD and survey methods in appraising 
an alternative property rights regime of co-management. Attention is given to 
potential barriers and remedies to systematically direct conceptual, technical, ethical 
and practical dimensions for co-management. While co-management as an 
alternative property rights regime is clearly not a universal answer, experiences and 
knowledge from natural resource management suggest a ‘co-management-alternative 
livelihood mix’ as a positive nexus of supply and demand-side interventions. If 
insightfully applied, this could achieve sustainable management of the SMF.  
The chapter is divided into seven sections. Section 7.2 outlines the objectives and 
research methodology. Section 7.3 describes the data collection procedure and FGD 
methods applied. Section 7.4 provides the background of the FGD method and data. 
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Details of descriptive statistics for survey data regarding conservation and harvesting 
practices, FDCs’ co-management perceptions and demand-side interventions are 
presented in Section 7.5. Results and discussions of the study are presented in 
Section 7.6. In Section 7.7 conclusions are drawn.  
7.2 Objectives of the Chapter and Research Methodology Used 
The evaluation of alternative management scenarios in the study area is expected to 
result in policy options for designing and implementing a common property rights 
regime. Thereby, the objectives of this chapter are to investigate the following 
research questions:  
 
i. Is an alternative property rights regime of co-management able to 
achieve forest sustainability? 
ii. What are the barriers to the implementation of co-management?   
iii. How can these barriers be overcome to achieve sustainability?  
 
The long historical conflict between the FDCs and the FD over management regimes 
has been ignored in policy discussions. Thus, the above research questions are 
designed to address the existing conflict between the FDCs and the BFD. Focus 
groups are inherently social phenomena through which the complex and dynamic 
social context of groups can importantly be understood (Hollander 2004). According 
to Stewart et al. (2007), the FGD method is best suited for such conflictual research 
contexts and problems. This method is shaped by multiple contexts usually ignored 
by researchers using quantitative methods.  
It is worth noting that methodological literature on other quantitative and qualitative 
methods has considerably emphasised more attention to the social context of 
interaction than the focus group literature. Hollander (2004) identified that “in 
practice many researchers do not seem to attend to these issues” (p. 605). To this 
extent, this study relevantly applied content analysis and survey research methods in 
the previous two chapters. There is a criticism that FGDs are artificially formed from 
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a researcher’s objective to have ‘contrived’ speech, whereas survey interviews 
capture more ‘natural’ speech (Hollander 2004). In this research situation, the 
researcher used both methods to extract instances of property rights regimes 
interaction. According to critiques, thus, ‘naturally occurring’ speech would be 
subject to the same interactional and contextual constraints as the ‘contrived’ speech 
that occurs in the FGDs. However, the criticism is expected to be overcome through 
the triangulation of findings between both sets of research in the case of policy 
intervention. Consequently, the findings of these research questions were anticipated 
widely and to be applicable to comprehend the FGD results and their linkage with 
survey results. This would enhance the understanding of the everyday interaction of 
the FDCs and the BFD in explaining the crucial role of the property rights regime 
context in achieving sustainable management of the SMF. 
7.3 Focus Group Interviews 
As a research method, FGD is considered to be an instrument for in-depth qualitative 
information from a selected group of individuals on a particular topic to learn their 
opinions, views, attitudes and experiences (Balana et al. 2010). It needs organised 
discussions and facilitation by an experienced moderator with a small number of 
carefully selected people. Puchta and Potter (2004) found that questionnaires 
constrained participants’ responses. That is why the researcher of this study applied 
FGDs from a strong sense that while questionnaires fail to take larger views of the 
FDCs, the FGDs could allow participants to give their views in their own ways and 
in their own words. This can be understood from the definition of a FGD which is “a 
series of audio-recorded group discussions held with differently composed groups of 
individuals and facilitated by a researcher, where the aim is to provide data (via the 
capture of intra-group interaction) on group beliefs and group norms in respect of a 
particular topic or set of issues” (Bloor & Wood 2006, p. 88). FGD is used to collect 
selected information and data by using preselected questions and thematic issues. 
This allows the researcher to act as a facilitator or moderator. The role of a facilitator 
is substantial in conducting a FGD. The facilitator precedes the discussion by 
question and answer to generate a common and general discussion within the group 
on the selected issues under a specified topic (Bloor & Wood 2006). The facilitator 
achieves this by adopting different techniques, for example, in a self-effacing way by 
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asking the questions in sequence. The group members may be asked to perform 
special tasks by identifying the importance of a particular issue by ranking 
importance or correctness. This is sometimes very important when a series of reasons 
are given by the group members. Then they can be asked to rank the importance 
through intra-group discussions about which one carries the most importance. The 
underpinning reasons are also found out from this process of FGDs.  
Composition of the FGD is very important. Heterogeneity among the groups very 
often sees contrasts within the group (Bloor & Wood 2006). Consequently, 
homogeneity is very important, and achieved by grouping people of the same social 
status and socio-economic conditions. Homogeneity among the closest peers, friends, 
relatives or neighbourhood is convenient to promote group interaction. Thereby, such 
interaction with the pre-existing relationships enhanced desired data and information 
collection from these two groups. Otherwise, the process would become very slow 
and troublesome to this researcher. Thus, this study wisely kept FDCs in one group 
and participants from the BFD and NGOs in other groups (Figure 7.1). FDCs have 
regular interaction with the BFD officials in resource harvesting.  
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Figure 7.1: Conducting FGDs 
(a) FGD with the FDCs (b) FGD with the BFD 
  
 
(c) FGD with IPAC  
 
 
However, many critics do not support this as a bar to the focus group members to be 
known with one another (Kitzinger 1994). To them, focus group formation needs to 
consider the pre-existing purpose-constructed issues related to the sensitivity of the 
discussion topics (Morgan & Krueger 1993). Otherwise, pre-existing friendship 
groups become uncomfortable about over-disclosing relevant information in the heat 
of the discussion. This study considered the issues by developing a semi-structured 
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questionnaire with 11 main discussion topics (Appendix 13) and dividing the 
abovementioned three groups based on pre-existing relationships.  
Focus group formation needs consideration of size. Smaller groups are found more 
conducive to the research objectives and manageable to moderators, transcribers and 
researchers (Kerr et al. 1998). It gives in-depth exploratory investigation of issues in 
comparison with larger groups. However, the researcher experienced typical primary 
problems with small groups regarding participant recruitment. Moreover, the 
member(s) of a small group may vitiate the discussion with the possibility of the 
non-arrival of some of the participants (Bloor & Wood 2006). This often needs 
researchers to compensate by having measures in place for recruiting participants. 
Thus, many researchers suggest the focus group be between 6 and 8 individuals to 
operate in a manageable way (Bloor et al. 2001). However, such group size needs to 
avoid the vulnerability of disruption by non-attendance.  
Apart from the size of the focus group, other important issues are the selection of 
venue and offsetting the time of the participants. In the case of venue, the prime 
considerations are to select an interview place that is convenient and comfortable. 
For instance, the researcher of this study selected the FGD venues at nearby locations 
for the FDCs and at the office rooms for the BFD and NGOs.   
For academic social science research, the role of audio-recordings is very important. 
For particular research, usually more than half a dozen of such recordings are 
conducted. The success of FGD largely depends on the transcripts of such recordings 
needed to maintain the ordering of data. In this regard, one particular FGD usually 
generates more than 100 pages of transcript (Bloor & Wood 2006). Thus, this 
researcher remained aware of the absolute minimum consistent with covering the 
range of study population with the number of focus groups to be conducted for this 
research. 
FGD is not only restricted to the stand-alone method to explore data and information 
for group norms, beliefs, and attitudes; rather, it is now considered to be valuable as 
an ancillary method (Bloor & Wood 2006). Following such consideration, this study 
used this method for piloting the articulation of FGDs. In this study, the researcher 
collected data on group norms, behaviours; and day-to-day language used by the 
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FDCs, the BFD staff and other NGO people. Through this procedure, the researcher 
formulated and planned his next phase of the final FGD research.  
In this era of technology, researchers use ‘virtual’ focus groups where the facilitators 
operate from a pre-determined email distribution list (Bloor & Wood 2006). This 
eliminates the risk of participants’ non-attendance and transcription costs. It takes 
more time, usually a period of weeks or months, which need the facilitator to set a 
deadline. However, such virtual focus groups are popularly used in a study 
population where the respondents have internet facilities and easy access. In this 
regard, it can further be mentioned that such technique of data collection is used only 
for conventional focus groups (Bloor & Wood 2006). For the SMF, this is simply 
impossible as the FDCs are extremely poor people; and do not have such facilities. 
Likewise, it was not possible for the Ministry, NGOs or BFD officials as most of 
them also have no internet connection. 
7.4 Data and Focus Group Discussion Method 
The following sections describe the application of the FGD method.  
It is very important to understand that intrapersonal influences affect group outcomes 
and have consequences for individual behaviours (Stewart & Shamdasani 1990). Past 
research indicates that individuals in FGD behave differently to when participants 
remain alone (Shaw 1981). Considering the group characteristics, individual 
behaviours were considered to influence group behaviours and reaction. To minimise 
the effect of such influences, personal characteristics of group individuals such as 
physical, personality and demographic characteristics were considered carefully. The 
following characteristics were considerably combined to influence group behaviours.  
Age 
In accordance with the social rules and norms, the level of internalisation increases 
with increasing age and then decreases (Stewart et al. 2007). Consequently, FGD for 
this research consisted of adult members to bring variation in perceptions. A careful 
mixture of various age groups among the adult group was considered. However, it 
was not necessary for the focus groups conducted with the BFD staff and NGO 
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participants. The participants of these focus groups had variations in age because of 
their different official rankings.  
Sex 
The role of sex in resource harvesting is different for male and female FDC 
members. As female FDC members are not granted permits by the BFD, it was 
expected that in the group dynamics they would behave differently. Besides, it is 
found that women are more prone to conformity and better able to explain emotions 
than men. Men are usually more aggressive with both verbal and nonverbal 
dominance: exchange of body language including eye contact, aggressiveness and 
emotional expressions (Frieze 1980). Moreover, in Bangladesh, usually women are 
found to be very shy to talk in front of men. All of these issues were considered by 
the moderator of this study to bring equal and acceptable interactions in the groups. 
Hollander (2004) and Stewart et al. (2007) experienced these situations where female 
participants felt unsettled because of the composition and context of male-dominated 
mixed-sex groups. Consequently, women participants were not included in the 
FGDs. Rather, other aspects were ensured from the experience of initial pilot stage 
focus groups. These are: the same level of intelligence, knowledge to facilitate the 
same level of interaction and same socio-economic backgrounds.   
It should also be mentioned that no females were employed at the Bojbaja Office of 
the BFD or the IPAC office. Further, no female officer was found at the Khulna 
Forest Circle Office and Divisional Forest Offices. Hence, only male participants 
were recruited.    
Dress 
Clothing style was also very important as it has impressions and effects on 
interaction (Gibbins 1969). This is an important determinant of impressions when 
information is scant. Initial impressions shape the future direction of discussions 
(Frieze 1980). This study addressed this issue. The moderator dressed —formal and 
official dress was worn at the time of conducting FGDs with the BFD staff, casual 
dress was used for FGD with NGO workers and informal and local dress for the 
FDCs.  
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Language 
Bengali is the only language used throughout the country. This language is also the 
country’s official language. This language was used in the FGDs for easy 
understanding, conversations and expressions of emotions and opinions of the 
participants. However, when necessary, colloquialism was used with FDC members.     
7.4.1 Conducting Focus Group Discussions 
A semi-structured interview guide was developed to keep the discussions focused 
and well-centred (see Appendix 13). There were two sections of the interview guide. 
The first section was about overall management of the SMF by the BFD and the 
second section was about co-management and its applicability to the SMF. The first 
section asked about various issues, including decision-making and implementation 
processes. Questions relating to the degradation of the SMF and various 
interventions for its sustainability were also asked. The second section asked 
questions related to the appropriateness of co-management to achieve sustainability 
of the forest and consideration of various issues such as: defined property rights, 
power relationship, equity, local institutions and community involvement in 
management and policy formulation. Questions regarding the adequacy of 
government initiatives for co-management, implementation barriers and potential 
remedies were also asked. The discussion ended with an open-ended question.  
Views and perceptions were elicited from five selected focus groups. In addition, two 
FGDs were conducted as a pre-test. Participants were purposively drawn from the 
aforementioned six villages. The number of participants in each FGD ranged from 4 
to 12 persons following the recommendation of Tang and Davis (1995). This range 
was expected to produce information regarding management of a local forest unit.  
Three stakeholder groups were carefully selected for discussions from the BFD, 
relevant NGOs and FDCs. FDCs were included as local forest users. Lower and 
higher level foresters and NGO workers were included as practitioners and experts. 
Two FGDs were conducted for FDCs and two for the BFD. Only one FGD was 
conducted for the relevant NGOs. Selection of the group ensured balance in terms of 
representation, professional backgrounds, knowledge and experience regarding the 
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administrative, technical and historical perspectives of the SMF. Local knowledge, 
livelihood patterns, resource harvesting techniques, specific role in conservation and 
experience in local leadership were considered for participation in FDCs’ team 
membership (Balana et al. 2010). FGDs with FDCs consisted of ordinary resource 
harvesters (community members), a community leader (selected member of the 
Union Parishad) and a local religious leader as participants. For FGDs with the BFD, 
senior experienced Forest Guards, Boatmen, Officers-in-charge of forest camps at 
lower level; the Conservator of Forest (Head of Khulna Divisional Forest Circle 
Office), Divisional Forest Officers, Deputy Conservator of Forests and Range 
Officers at higher and middle level foresters were selected. Forest experts working at 
Khulna District and Koyra sub-district were selected for the FGD with NGOs 
considering their extensive fieldwork and past work experience in community 
livelihood and SMF management. The researcher of this study acted as both 
moderator and facilitator of the discussions.  
Group discussions provided adequate information for understanding the prevailing 
environmental and local socio-economic conditions of the forest and communities 
respectively. Information coming from FDCs and the BFD helped frame the existing 
conflicts between them over forest management and resource harvesting. Using this 
information, an alternative property rights regime of co-management was outlined 
and discussed to ensure sustainability of the forest.  
During the five months of recurrent FGDs, a change in the attitude of participants 
was observed. Initially, participants were shy and hesitant to talk. During the first 
two FGDs, only a few people talked. After building a personal bond and rapport with 
all, the willingness of participants to talk gradually improved. An increasing open-
mindedness among the participants was noticed during the second round of FGDs, 
when there was more willingness to display individual initiative by contributing to 
discussions, arguments and criticisms. Each FGD lasted from 70 to 100 minutes.   
As mentioned in Section 5.6, all FDC attendees were given a gift voucher to offset 
their opportunity costs.  
The tape-recorded FGDs were transcribed and coded. Key words were used in 
coding the FGD interviews.         
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7.4.2 Validity and Reliability 
The study achieved validity and reliability of FGDs to generalise the findings. The 
interview guide was validated through pre-testing. Face validity was conducted to 
have a cursory review of the items by a local expert working with FDCs. Translation 
validity was ensured to make the interview guide more understandable to the 
participants. Reliability was ensured through triangulation of the responses of FDCs 
and the BFD with the third eye views of NGOs. The conjunction of FGDs and survey 
methods is expected to improve overall verification and triangulation for reliability 
(Scott 2011). 
7.5 Descriptive Statistics 
To answer the above research questions and to analyse the FGD results, it was 
necessary to present information regarding FDC perceptions towards overall state 
and alternative property rights regimes. It was, therefore, necessary to gather 
information on FDCs, their livelihoods, resource harvesting patterns and predicted 
co-management. In this regard, necessary information was presented to substantiate 
FGD results and discussions. The following sections elaborate FDC knowledge, 
attitudes, expectations and opinions to cover areas of conservation problems and 
state of the SMF. The responses are analysed mainly with frequencies, contingency 
tables and χ2 goodness-of-fit to provide insights with respect to the SMF. The 
distributions of variable-wise values of interest are given below. SPSS/PASW 
version 19 and R version 2.13.0 have been used.  
7.5.1 General Features of Conservation and Harvesting Practices 
Before collecting information regarding conservation and harvesting practices, it is 
necessary to know the nature of FDCs and their livelihoods. It was found that FDCs 
were from five different communities (Table 7.1). The majority of community people 
are fishers. The table shows that respondents identified themselves as belonging to 
more than one group. Because of illegal harvesting opportunities and to earn 
subsistence level incomes, they harvest more resources. For instance, fishers obtain 
permits for fish and crab harvesting, however, they harvest wood and wood products 
illegally.   
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Table 7.1: Structure of FDCs 
Community % of 
responses 
Count % of total 
count 
Munda 8.6 50 12.2 
Bawalis 18.8 110 26.8 
Mawali 7.5 44 10.7 
Gol leaves collector 3.4 20 4.9 
Fisher 61.6 360 87.6 
Total 100.0 584 142.1 
Source: Household survey 
Respondents were asked about the importance of the SMF for their livelihoods. They 
were also asked to provide their views about the overall management of the SMF in 
terms of its development, conservation and distribution of resources (Tables 7.2 and 
7.3). Most of the respondents (86.4 per cent) opined that the importance of the forest 
was ‘high’ and ‘very high’ to them. In contrast, a majority of FDCs (42.5 per cent) 
considered that the present management status under top-down forest bureaucratic 
management was barely acceptable. Responding to the question, respondents (48.1 
per cent) expressed concern about the status of the tree density of the forest. 
Consequently, almost all respondents (99 per cent) advocated the necessity of 
protecting the SMF.   
Table 7.2: Importance of the SMF for FDCs’ livelihoods 
Scale Frequency % of responses 
Very high 192 46.6 
High 164 39.8 
Medium 53 12.9 
Low 2 0.5 
Very low 1 0.2 
Total 412 100.0 
Source: Household Survey 
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Table 7.3: FDC views regarding overall management 
Scale Frequency % of responses 
Very good 42 10.2 
Good 168 40.8 
Barely acceptable 175 42.5 
Poor 22 5.3 
Very poor 5 1.2 
Total 412 100.0 
Source: Household Survey  
Among the respondents, 50 per cent go to the forest twice a month for resource 
harvesting (Figure 7.2a). However, during the spring tide, fish and crab harvesters 
(77 per cent) stay 2-15 days for colossal harvesting (Figure 7.2b). Twelve per cent of 
the respondents stay for a longer time in the forest—up to 16 to 30 days at a time. It 
should be noted that permits are given for 30 to 45 days to the harvesters to collect 
Gol leaves, honey and beeswax. So, in the main, these harvesters stay 16 to 30 days.  
Figure 7.2: Visits to and days in the SMF in one month 
Figure 7.2 (a): Visits made                 Figure 7.2 (b): Days stayed 
     
Source: Household Survey 
FDCs harvest five major resources. It was found that almost all respondents were 
engaged in harvesting more than one resource (Table 7.4). They take permits for fish 
and crab harvesting round the year and for Gol leaves, honey and beeswax for three 
months. The table shows that they harvest other resources illegally because of the 
imposition of a ban on wood and wood-related resource harvesting since Aila. An 
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insignificant number of FDCs harvest fodder because of limited grazing land 
damaged by two cyclones. 
Table 7.4: Resources derived from the SMF 
Resource Responses Per cent 
Fish and crab 399 35.3 
Honey 208 18.4 
Gol leaves 197 17.4 
Wood and firewood 320 28.3 
Fodder 6 0.5 
Total 1130 100.0 
Source: Household Survey 
There is no distance limit of harvesting sites from respondents’ homes. They go as 
far away as 20 to 70 kms. Figure 7.3 shows that more than 71 per cent of the 
respondents collect resources from remote locations. Respondents noted that their 
harvesting site selection was based on resource availability. Although there are 
restrictions on harvesting from particular creeks, canals, rivers and buffer zones, in 
most cases they disobey such regulatory instructions with the cooperation of corrupt 
BFD staff.  
Figure: 7.3: Distance of harvesting sites from home 
            
Source: Household Survey 
In this regard, almost 99 per cent of the respondents opined that they could not 
harvest resources without harassment or hazards. The main harassment and hazards 
are (i) forest and police department officials, (ii) forest pirates, (iii) tiger attacks, (iv) 
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Aratdars/Mahajans/middlemen and (v) political/social elites. These were identified 
through FG and personal discussions and presented in Table 7.5. 
Table 7.5: Perceptions of resource harvesting harassments or hazards  
Scale Forester and 
Police 
Forest pirates Tiger attack Aratdar/Mahajan
/ Middlemen 
Political/ 
Social elite 
Freq
uenc
y 
% of 
respo
nses 
Frequ
ency 
% of 
respo
nses 
Frequ
ency 
% of 
respo
nses 
Freque
ncy 
% of 
respons
es 
Frequ
ency 
% of 
respo
nses 
Very high 89 21.6 142 34.5 175 42.5 0 0.0 7 1.7 
High 77 18.7 146 35.4 175 42.5 1 0.2 15 3.6 
Medium 230 55.8 105 25.5 53 12.9 10 2.4 14 3.4 
Low 14 3.4 17 4.1 8 1.9 189 45.9 155 37.6 
Very low 2 0.5 2 0.5 1 0.2 181 43.9 187 45.4 
No 
response 
      31 7.5 34 8.3 
Total 412 100.0 412 100.0 412 100.0 412 100.0 412 100.0 
Source: Household Survey     
The above table shows that tiger attacks and forest pirates are the two principal 
hazards, whereas most respondents perceived foresters and police as a medium level 
hazard in harvesting resources. Human-tiger conflict in the SMF has become a 
serious problem after Aila, with 72 yearly human killings in 2009-2010 (Kajal 2010). 
The BFD does not provide any protective role for harvesters. Although a proposal to 
provide financial compensation to the FDCs has been sent to the MOF recently, no 
decision has yet been taken. FDCs have long been facing piracy in the SMF (Figure 
7.4). Pirates regularly kidnap harvesters for extortion. In the case of failure to pay 
amounts fixed by pirates, they mercilessly torture or kill kidnapped FDC members. It 
is commonly known that these pirates are backed by political elites and the BFD. 
According to one FDC, “there is no excuse other than paying extortion if we are 
kidnapped by them”. In addition, at the time of these personal interviews, a FDC 
member informed the researcher that he was kidnapped for three days until a fixed 
extortion rate was paid by family members. During this time, he was made to row the 
pirates’ boat continuously and not allowed to sleep. Whenever he fell asleep, pirates 
beat him mercilessly. Hence, these two were identified as very high hazards.  
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Figure 7.4: Exchange of firing between rapid actions battalions and pirates in 
the SMF  
 
Source: The Daily Star, accessed on 17/3/2012, 
http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/index.php 
However, because foresters and police can be easily managed by paying certain 
bribes, again fixed by them, they were identified as medium hazards. Respondents 
perceived interventions of Atartars/Mahajans and political or social elites as ‘low’ or 
‘very low’ hazards. The reason was the availability of prompt financial help from 
them, albeit with high interest. In lieu of that, these local lenders use them as bonded 
labourers perpetually. 
A question was asked whether the BFD consults FDCs regarding certain activities. 
Five options were given: tree plantation, resource harvesting, monitoring of planting, 
reduction of tree density, and development of the SMF. Unfortunately, most of the 
respondents did not tick the options. According to them, the BFD never consults 
them regarding any of the activities. They opined that they were hired by the BFD to 
sell their labour during plantation time only.  
Respondents were found to be living since their birth in these respective villages. 
They were involved with NGOs in borrowing money. The main lending NGOs in the 
study area are BRAC, ASA, PRADIPON and RUPANTOR, of which the latter two 
are Khulna based. Their involvement was only for 2 to 5 years on average.  
7.5.2 Ex-ante Perceptions Regarding Co-management 
To overcome the above backdrops of conservation and harvesting practices of the 
BFD and police personnel, respondents were asked ‘who should manage the SMF’. 
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Surprisingly, almost all of them (93.2 per cent) suggested joint forest management by 
the BFD and FDCs (Table 7.6). This means that they advocated a common property 
regime for the forest. 
Table 7.6: Proposed managers of the SMF 
Manager Frequency % of 
responses 
BFD 4 1.0 
BFD and FDCs 384 93.2 
Private ownership 22 5.3 
None 2 0.5 
Total 412 100.0 
Source: Household Survey 
Respondents were willing to be involved in and contribute to the proposed co-
management framework. Almost all the respondents expressed their willingness to be 
involved in the proposed co-management of the SMF. In this regard, they provided 
their choices of proposed mechanisms for and their involvement in the framework set 
out in Tables 7.7 and 7.8. The majority of the respondents (41.1 per cent) desired to 
be involved in the co-management through developing their own institutions. It was 
found that 50 per cent of respondents wished to contribute to all activities mentioned 
in Table 7.8.  
Table 7.7: Proposed involvement in the co-management 
Involvement % of 
responses 
Through management process 17.1 
By developing community 
institutions 
41.1 
In benefit-sharing structure 14.5 
By selling cheapest labour 27.3 
Total 100.0 
Source: Household Survey 
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Table 7.8: Contributions to co-management 
Contribution Frequency % of 
responses 
Labour 95 23.1 
Monitoring 45 10.9 
Management 25 6.1 
Awareness building 62 15.0 
All (from 1-4) 185 44.9 
Total 412 100.0 
Source: Household Survey 
7.5.3 Information for Demand-side Interventions 
Respondents opined that their involvement needed to extend to the development of 
demand-side policies to lessen increasing pressure on the SMF. They assumed 
demand-side incentives for income generation substitutes would lessen the pressure 
on harvesting and enhance resource conservation of the SMF. Therefore, socio-
economic and demographic statistics presented in the previous chapter are not 
adequate to address demand-side interventions as core issues of the thesis. It is 
necessary to present more information to consider demand-side interventions in the 
proposed co-management policy options.  
The sample of 412 has a total of 2,060 family members. Of these, 62 per cent are 
adult members (over 18 years old) and 38 per cent are non-adult members (below 18 
years old). Adult members range from 1 to 10 persons per household and non-adult 
members range from 0 to 6 persons per household. The majority of the respondents, 
consisting of 200 or 48.5 per cent and 138 or 33.5 per cent respectively, have an 
equal number of 2 adult and 2 non-adult family members. That means that 82 per 
cent of the households have 4 dependent family members. On the other hand, of 412 
sampled households, 339 households have only one earner (Figure 7.5). Only a few, 
consisting of 73 households, have more than one earner.   
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Figure 7.5: Earning family members (in per cent) 
   
Source: Household Survey 
Although 111 households, consisting of 27 per cent, have 1 to 5 children, they were 
not all attending school. The ages of these children were between 6 and 18 years. It 
was found that the majority of the children (63.27 per cent) went to primary school 
only. Of the remainder, 32.12 per cent go to secondary school and 4.62 per cent go to 
college (grades 11 and 12). It is interesting to note that there is a huge dropout after 
primary education (i.e. after grade 5). This indicates a high dropout rate.     
Respondents were asked about how much time they spend in a year on income 
generation (see Table 7.9). The table shows the prevalence of disguised 
unemployment. Fishers and Bawalis harvest almost all year round, but Mawalis 
harvest seasonally. The findings have two implications. There is an existence of 
overlapping harvesting by the fishers. On the other hand, a few Gol leaves collectors 
also harvest Gol leaves out of season illegally. However, it can be noted that there 
are no daily fixed hours for resource harvesting during harvest time. Respondents 
spend as many hours as possible harvesting. 
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Table 7.9: Time spent by fishers, Bawalis and Mawalis 
Mont
hs 
Fish and crab 
Harvesting 
Wood and 
firewood  
 
Month
s 
Honey and 
beeswax 
 
Gol leaves 
 
Freque
ncy 
Percent Freque
ncy 
Percent Freque
ncy 
Percent Freque
ncy 
Perce
nt 
0-5 84 20.3 379 92.0 0 241 58.5 232 56.3 
1 129 31.3 71 17.2 
6-9 200 48.5 27 6.6 2 40 9.7 46 11.2 
10-12 128 31.1 6 1.5 3 2 0.5 59 14.3 
4-7   4 0.9 
Total 412 100.0 412 100.0 Total 412 100.0 412 100.0 
Source: Household Survey 
In spite of prohibitions, 92 per cent FDC involvement in wood and firewood 
harvesting indicates a clear failure of the harvesting-ban rule. As a conservation 
practice, this has been in vogue since Aila. The finding indicates a failure in 
executing this conservation practice. Harvesting rates of honey, beeswax and Gol 
leaves are almost equal (58.5 and 56.3 per cent). This is because permits for 
harvesting these resources are issued for the same time period.        
Figure 7.6 presents the average monthly income from the SMF for resource 
harvesting, processing, labour engagement, etc. More than half the respondents earn 
between Tk. 2001 to Tk. 4000. Surprisingly, this percentage is almost the same for 
those respondents who earn the same amount from all sources presented in Table 6.1. 
That means more than 50 per cent of the FDCs have no income sources other than 
harvesting resources from the forest.   
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Figure 7.6: Monthly income from the SMF 
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Source: Household Survey 
Following the above monthly income from the SMF, it is necessary to compare the 
income range of respondents’ earnings from sources other than the SMF. Figure 7.7 
presents income ranges earned from agriculture, service, and small local business. It 
was found that 96 per cent of respondents earn within the range of Tk. 0-2000. 
Surprisingly, 60 per cent of them do not have any alternative sources of income, 
whereas 15 per cent earn only Tk1000.       
Figure 7.7: Monthly income other than the SMF 
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Source: Household Survey 
For comparison with the monthly income from all sources, it is also necessary to 
identify the monthly expenditures of the respondents. Figures 7.8 (a) and (b) show 
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that there is a gap in upward income and expenditure ranges. More than 50 per cent 
of respondents earn a subsistence income from their livelihoods. It was very 
surprising that 52.4 per cent of the FDCs earn the same amount of Tk. 2001-4000 for 
‘income from the SMF’ (Figure 7.6) and ‘income from all sources’ (Figure 7.8a). 
However, other gaps indicate that respondents have to borrow money from lending 
institutions or other sources to maintain their livelihoods during financial hardship.   
Figure 7.8: Comparison between average monthly income from all sources and 
expenditure 
Figure 7.8 (a): Monthly income                    Figure 7.8 (b): Monthly expenditure  
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Source: Household Survey  
As two devastating cyclones caused huge damage to the forest and reduced 
livelihood incomes, it is necessary to distinguish income sources and ranges before 
Aila. Figure 7.9 and Table 7.10 present income ranges and sources before Aila. 
Income before Aila was found much higher. 
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Figure 7.9 Average monthly incomes before Aila 
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Source: Household Survey 
It was evident that there were several income generation options before cyclonic 
damage for economic activities (Table 7.10). Unfortunately, FDCs lost their previous 
income generation options because of the intrusion of salt water to their homesteads 
and arable lands. They lost their fish farming, agricultural, vegetable gardening, 
selling labour, poultry farming, small business, goat and sheep rearing and other 
income generating opportunities. Shrimp farming was the most profitable in these 
localities. Because of high export demand, shrimp was called ‘white gold’. After 
Aila, 89.1 per cent of FDCs lost their job opportunities from agriculture and shrimp 
farming.  
Table 7.10: Sources of income before Aila 
Sources Frequency Per cent 
Agriculture 61 14.8 
Fish farming 164 39.8 
Livestock 12 2.9 
Day labourer 142 34.5 
No income 24 5.8 
Missing responses 9 2.2 
 412 100.0 
Source: Household Survey 
Changing income levels from different sources indicate a disparity in prevalence of 
elite dominance. This can be seen from the average income generation displayed in 
Table 7.11. The following disparity analysis shows a huge income differentiation, 
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except income derived from sources other than the SMF. This indicates scanty 
income opportunities in the SIZ. The most alarming disparity lies in income 
generation from the SMF. This is due to elite domination and illegal liaison with the 
BFD by a particular group of respondents to access more resource harvesting. 
However, before Aila, the scenario was the same because of elite ownership of 
agricultural lands and fish farms where a portion of the respondents used to sell their 
labour. The analysis shows that there were no problems in maintaining their family 
because of alternative livelihood options. After Aila, harvesting resources from the 
forest became the only source of income. This has exerted huge pressure on the 
forest.       
Table 7.11: Income disparity analysis 
Income Minimum Maximum Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Monthly income from all 
sources 
1000 15000 4723.85 2155.35 
Monthly income from the 
SMF 
1000 19200 4203.82 2354.12 
Monthly income from other 
than the SMF 
0 5000 560.32 837.20 
Monthly family expenditure 1500 13000 5056.19 2406.22 
Monthly income before Aila 2000 20000 5426.22 2186.72 
Source: Household Survey 
With respect to more expenditure than income, respondents were asked to describe 
barriers to acquiring jobs other than forest resource harvesting (Figure 7.10). Most of 
them described a lack of other job opportunities as a major problem. However, a 
significant portion described a lack of financial assistance and literary knowledge as 
being similarly responsible for their entering into income generation activities.  
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Figure: 7.10: Barriers to getting jobs 
 
Source: Household Survey  
Because of higher expenditure and lack of job opportunities, respondents have 
significant financial constraints. There is no designated government organisation 
from which FDCs can take loans. Furthermore, they have no community level 
institutions to help them during financial crises. However, the government had been 
providing 20 kg rice as relief rations to each household since Aila in June 2009. 
Unfortunately, the government stopped this ration after just 18 months in December 
2010 without rebuilding lost livelihood opportunities. The government also provided 
Tk 20,000 to each household to build a makeshift house in response to Aila. When 
asked from where they get financial help in the case of hardship, this assistance was 
identified by 19.2 per cent of respondents as coming from government sources 
(Figure 7.11). However, the majority of them noted that they borrowed money from 
NGOs and local middlemen known as Dadandars or Mahajans with very high 
interest. The majority of the FDCs borrow money locally, known as Dadon, from 
these middlemen. These lenders entrap borrowers who pay a significant portion of 
their income as weekly or monthly interest. The severity of taking loans from the 
latter is not foreseen by them, and borrowers become bonded labourers. Borrowers 
must sell their harvested resources to them as a condition of repayment. Lenders 
calculate lower prices for the resources which borrowers are not allowed to sell in the 
markets. This repayment process continues perpetually.  
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Figure 7.11: Sources of financial help in case of difficulties 
               
Source: Household Survey 
7.6 Results and Discussions 
In this section, FGD results and discussions are presented in detail. The results were 
analysed from two perspectives: similarities and differences. The findings have been 
organised into three categories: (1) recognising an alternative property rights regime 
for sustainable forest management, (2) barriers to the implementation of co-
management and (3) potential remedies. Among these categories, demand-side 
interventions or alternative livelihoods options were identified as the main theme for 
FDCs’ livelihood security. All the findings are presented as a reflection of 
participants’ livelihood nestedness with the forest, experiences, perceptions, and 
attitudes. The findings therefore focus on a process of change, rather than on specific 
data regarding social and forest management conditions (Ljunggren et al. 2010). An 
analysis of the coding process and content analysis is summarised in Table 7.12 as an 
example.  
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Table 7.12: Coding process and content analysis example 
Main theme Category Code 
Strategy for alternative 
livelihoods option for 
sustainable management of 
the SMF through reducing 
high anthropogenic pressure 
Recognising an alternative 
property rights regime of 
co-management 
 
 
 
Barriers to co-management 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Remedies for co-
management 
Livelihoods security 
Anthropogenic pressure 
Property rights 
Skills 
Influence 
 
Communication mechanisms 
Understanding 
Awareness 
Respect 
Working together/non-kin 
bond 
Community institutions 
 
Bottom up approaches  
Transparency 
Building trust in the 
community 
Friendship 
Status/reputation 
Mutual interests 
Training 
 
Next, the results of the content analysis are presented. Then the policy implications 
are discussed.    
7.6.1 Recognising Alternative Property Rights Regime 
Respondents perceived the following issues regarding an alternative property rights 
regime. 
7.6.1.1 Planning Diversification 
Participants from all focus groups assessed the existing central conservation policy 
guidance for “keeping intact of biodiversity of the forest, water, fish and wildlife-
based SMF through integrated resource management in order to ensure their 
diversified usage” according to the Declaration No. 9 of the NFP 1994 (revised) 
(GOB 1994). Participants, except for BFD staff, perceived a failure to translate this 
policy guidance into local planning and practice. FDCs viewed the existing 
management system as over-restrictive and limiting their involvement.  
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Participants were divided into two blocks. From the experience of the FDCs, 
conservation policy is solely focused on the in situ management of the SMF that fails 
to build the nexus of diversified usage with livelihood diversification activities. On 
the other hand, the BFD sought to keep intact the biodiversity through strict controls 
without integrated resource management and partnership building with the FDCs. 
These findings illuminate vital differences between the BFD and others with respect 
to the scope, definition and appropriateness of addressing population pressure 
through planning diversification for community livelihood development. FGDs 
revealed that any change from traditional dependency on and use of the SMF to 
enhance ‘development activity’ would encourage community livelihood 
diversification. These views are illustrated in the following statements:  
“When our children starve, we have no other option other than entering the 
forest legally or illegally”. (FDC, focus group 3) 
“If we follow the current policy system focusing on the conservation only, 
there is no focus on livelihood issues for FDCs”. (Forester, focus group 2) 
“We always implement the conservation policy to regulate harvesting. 
However, this policy supports the British-enacted Forest Act and encourages 
stealing too. There is no diversification to maintain incomes of the FDCs as a 
legitimate activity from other alternative sources”. (Forester, focus group 2)  
“We feel an urgent call to overcome the policy hurdles that narrow livelihood 
diversification. However, we think that livelihoods diversification needs to be 
defined from the FDC perspective to focus on and translate into policy 
interventions. Perspectives and focus need adherence to the actual and 
appropriate alternative livelihoods measures in this backward rural area”. 
(NGO representative, focus group 5) 
However, similar to planners in other countries (Scott 2011), the BFD is inclined to 
favour and pursue a stricter definition of conservation which proscribes diversified 
forest resource use activities. The BFD could promote alternative livelihood 
opportunities—rather, they apply traditional top-down restrictive planning 
procedures as supportive of conservation policy. The inability and unwillingness of 
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these planners to accept the local people’s interests in resource management and 
livelihood diversification are identified as being at the heart of the conflict in natural 
resource management (Scott 2011). Basically, participants of the focus groups saw in 
the BFD an inability and unwillingness to create a climate of innovation and 
creativity in discussing possibilities for FDC livelihood diversification. This is 
despite the clear connection between wider community livelihood development and 
conservation activities within the NFP of 1994 (GOB 1994).    
7.6.1.2 Community Perceptions of Mangrove Conservation 
Significantly, FDCs perceive conservation in its entirety rather than comprising 
different elements and features. It is imperative to conceptualise a holistic 
conservation practice approach. FDC participants felt conservation policy and 
management strategies lacked the foresight to be able to achieve long-term 
sustainability. FDCs expressed dissatisfaction with the BFD for hiding actual data 
and information to reveal the current status of forest resources. This, they argued, 
reinforced the failure of past development interventions.  These views are supported 
by the following statements from respondents:  
“Presently, foresters apply a set of rules in an orthodox fashion which fail to 
foresee the bigger picture of sustainable ecology of the forest”. (Community 
leader, focus group 1) 
“They [foresters] never share any information with us. They always perceive 
that the Bada [the SMF] is rich with resources. But, if you enter the Bada, 
you can see huge degradation”. (FDC, focus group 3) 
“True, several years ago we could not see even the sunshine due to tree 
density. Now, you can play football in some places. Well; it is the forester 
who acts as facilitator to the illegal fellers instead of being protector of the 
SMF”. (FDCs, focus groups 1 and 3) 
Surprisingly, foresters denied the views of FDCs and presented their success stories 
for conservation, including:  
“Well; we took lot of initiatives to stop overharvesting and illegal felling. As 
per our observations, the quantity of trees [tree density] has increased by 2 
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per cent. Look, this is definitely a very positive sign”. (Forester, focus group 
4)  
These discourses uncovered a divide in the interpretation of conservation that has 
previously escaped significant attention. FDCs made negative assessments in a 
straightforward way. This negativity was reinforced by older community members 
who had experienced rapid degradation of the SMF. Their antipathy towards the 
present resource status of the SMF was evident. They expressed the view that from 
the periphery of adjacent villages and from nearby canals and rivers that are 
accessible to visitors, little degradation has occurred. The BFD hoodwink visitors by 
maintaining a minimum quality of forest health at the periphery. In the FDCs’ 
opinion, huge deforestation starts from one or two kilometres inside the forest.  
There is a common view among foresters that FDCs are ignorant of such matters. 
Not surprisingly, all focus groups provided very strong support for conservation of 
the SMF. In this regard, the discourse was interesting and showed polarised views 
between FDCs who see the forest as the only means for their livelihood and foresters 
who see the FDCs as a threat to the forest.  
7.6.1.3 Alternative Livelihoods Options  
During the FGDs, participants were asked whether the existing interventions to 
increase community livelihood security were adequate and, if not, what else could be 
done. Almost all participants agreed that current interventions do not look into 
developing any alternative livelihood possibilities. NGOs provide credit or financial 
loans to create alternative livelihood opportunities. Most NGO initiatives fail due to 
the absence of monitoring and skills training. The adverse impact of such loans 
increases income pressure on FDCs and causes overharvesting as a means to 
generate more income for repayment of these loans and interest. The following 
statements support this view:  
“I think livelihood diversification needs to be treated from a much broader 
dimension of various potential livelihood options such as: fish farming, 
transport, poultry, livestock, horticulture, small grocery, local business, salt-
tolerant agriculture, aquaculture fish farming”. (FDC and NGO 
representatives, focus groups 1, 3 and 5)  
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“Well: it is true; lack of diversified usage of resources encourages illegal 
harvesting from the forest as the sole source of income to maintain their 
families. I suggest that the Government needs to reduce FDC livelihoods 
pressure on the forest”. (NGO representative, focus group 5)    
The FGD results reveal two important patterns based on the participants’ perceptions 
of resource availability. A significant portion of the FDC participants have no land 
for cultivation. Their lands were lost due to the cyclonic damage to the embankment, 
as well as river erosion and intrusion of saline water. A small group of FDC 
participants consisting mainly of social and community leaders have a little 
cultivable land. The demographic structure of FDC households limits the amount of 
investment capital available for alternative livelihood activities. In discussions, 
participants highlighted that non-forest activities are more lucrative than forest-
related activities such as agriculture, small business, fish farming, poultry and 
horticulture. FDCs mentioned that capital constraints limit a household’s potential 
investment in profitable non-farm income generating activities. 
Social and community leaders are less likely to pursue forest activities. Although 
crop cultivation was found to be a dominant livelihood option to overcome poverty, 
it is not achievable due to a lack of capital and available cultivable lands. Eighty per 
cent of the households do not own their own agricultural lands in Koyra Upazila 
(Unnayan-Onneshan 2009). Before Aila and Sidr, only 34.15 per cent of the 
population were employed in Koyra (BBS 2007a). Of these employed people, 22.14 
per cent were working in agriculture and the rest were in business and other 
employment. This argument is consistent with similar findings in other developing 
countries. For instance, Barrett et al. (2005) in their case studies in Côte d’ Ivoire, 
Kenya and Rwanda, and Babulo et al. (2008) in their case study in Tigray in 
Northern Ethiopia found that in adverse agri-ecological zones, crop production was 
unlikely to meet basic household consumption needs. Consequently, further policy 
directives to develop appropriate alternative livelihoods options are necessary. From 
the participants’ opinions and personal discussions with the FDCs, the BFD and 
NGO officials, the researcher came to experience that adoption of coastal region-
specific livelihood options for the study area would be more cost effective. The main 
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suggested options are: less capital intensive local industry and farming, and creation 
of a revolving fund for non-farm income and other opportunities.    
7.6.1.4 Imperatives of Alternative Property Rights 
Although the NFP of 1994 advocated a common property rights regime, this has not 
yet been implemented by the BFD. FGDs tried to assess how imperative is the 
introduction of FDCs into the planning and policy practices in the SMF.  
The results reveal significant differences between the FDCs and foresters and 
planners regarding definitions, scope, appropriateness of livelihood security and 
dependence on the forest. This dramatically illuminated the gulf in understanding 
and beliefs between the two parties. FDC participants viewed livelihood security 
through co-management as a way to achieve sustainability. They suggested changes 
to traditional resource usage like harvesting; monitoring and plantation to promote 
sustainability.  
“I feel livelihood security is something that should be forest sustainability-
related. This issue is completely ignored in the present management structure 
of the BFD”. (FDC, focus group 1)        
However, foresters favoured and pursued much stricter control over the SMF and 
were unwilling to discuss alternative livelihood activities for the FDCs. FDC 
participants consistently raised suspicions and expressed scepticism of BFD 
motivations. In contrast, foresters highlighted how achieving these alternative 
livelihoods might be impossible. Comments show the polarised perceptions:  
“They [foresters] are all the same; protect, protect, protect; well, we, the poor 
people are fully dependent on Bada and our houses need protection. When 
there is no money, then we go to the forest”. (FDC, focus group 3) 
Attitudes towards conservation were prompted by foresters in a similar exchange.  
“Shame on all FDCs who pursue deforestation through illegal harvesting. 
Look, their incomes are very good”.  
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“No, I do not feel like that they are FDCs, are they? They take the permits 
and enter the forest with access rights. You see, they use materials collected 
illegally to build their houses and cook meals”.  
“Yes, we agree, they might need a local resource-based industry to sustain the 
population”.  
“In fact, I believe, we don’t need an idyllic FDCs dependent on the SMF 
only. Yes, there should be a balance; if there is no opportunity for them to 
work there, they should look for alternatives”.  
“We must agree to adopt alternative livelihoods measures to stop illegal 
harvesting”.   
“No way is this community to be involved in the management. This would be 
simply catastrophic”.  
(Foresters, focus groups 2 and 4)  
The benefit of the FGDs lays mainly in uncovering the very strong and increasing 
multifaceted perceptions of participants to mangrove management and conservation 
issues. Community perceptions of exclusion were evident and expressed in subtle 
ways in the FGDs. This demonstrated the importance of forest professionals, 
academicians and researchers to examine policy options for managing the SMF in 
more holistic and functional ways. 
Participants made positive assessments of the SMF as a valuable community 
livelihood and wildlife resource. These views were uncontroversial and 
straightforward. Participants felt an urgent need to enhance conservation. FDCs 
expressed their desire for involvement in the management and policy making of the 
SMF. Implementation of declarations 1 and 9 of the NFP 1994 to promote 
partnerships would achieve this goal.  
7.6.2 Barriers to Co-management 
Co-management strategies are seen as important tools for sustained conservation. 
However, there is a feeling that they have not lived up to their potential (Darlow et 
246 
 
al. 2008). At the community level FGDs participants discussed how socio-
demographic and forest management related factors act as barriers to co-
management. They perceived socio-demographic factors such as severe poverty, low 
educational levels, unwillingness of the BFD to cooperate, negligence of customary 
rights, lack of political commitment and absence of community level institutions as 
barriers to implementing co-management. The survey captured community 
perceptions towards co-management issues, which are presented in Figure 7.12.  
It was found that the unwillingness of the BFD and absence of political commitment 
to be the most (27%) and least (40%) notable hurdles respectively in achieving co-
management. This result is similar to the core concept of neo-classical economist 
North (1990) regarding institutional theory, and S&O’s theory (1992) of property 
rights.  
Figure 7.12: Barriers to co-management (n = 412) 
 
For reliability purposes, it was necessary to assess these differences of opinion in the 
scale by measuring whether the observed values could reasonably come from a 
known distribution. Thus, it was necessary to compare observed values with 
expected values by employing χ2 goodness-of-fit according to the model of equal 
responses (Table 7.13).  
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Table 7.13: Measure of observed and expected counts for co-management 
barrier 
Barrier χ2  df P-value 
BFD’s unwillingness 99.748 5 0.000 
Lack of community 
awareness 
130.359 5 0.000 
Overlooking customary 
rights 
89.204 5 0.000 
Lack of political 
commitment 
207.369 5 0.000 
Lack of community 
institutions 
20.379 5 0.000 
 
The critical value of χ2 is 11.070 for five degrees of freedom at a 5 per cent level of 
significance. The obtained values of χ2 were greater than the critical values for co-
management barrier responses. Consequently, the obtained p-value (<0.0001) for χ2 
test justified the rejection of the null hypotheses. Hence, there were differences 
among very high to very low observed and expected responses. The estimated 
proportion of the population indicated that the BFD’s unwillingness and absence of 
community level institutions were at 51 per cent. This also indicated that the 
distribution of barriers responses was skewed towards a ‘very high’ value. As the test 
demonstrated that this sample proportion was not due to a chance variation, these 
barriers need to be addressed in policy directives.    
In this research, the BFD is treated as the institution and FDCs as the motivated 
actors as per the conceptual framework outlined in Figure 3.3 in Chapter Three. The 
findings support the hypothesis as existing institutional settings of the BFD fail to 
meet the needs and desires of the motivated actors. There is also a highly significant 
association between unwillingness of foresters for partnering with FDCs and forest 
cover decrease {χ2 (df = 16, n = 412) = 39.145, p = 0.003}. The current conservation 
practices provide only regulated access and withdrawal rights. These limited rights 
have failed to reduce the demand on resources facing continuous degradation. 
Consequently, FDC satisfaction was investigated based on the present institutional 
structure by understanding their perceptions towards current property rights and 
forest conservation. It is found that they are highly dissatisfied with the BFD and 
identified it as the number one barrier to achieving co-management.  
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Participants identified political commitment to co-management as the lowest ranked 
barrier. This was for two reasons. First, FDCs are so marginalised and disadvantaged 
that they cannot be heard in the absence of community level institutions. This results 
in a failure by the FDC to understand the role of political leadership in potentially 
changing policy direction. Second, FDCs realise that the BFD is the key policy 
stakeholder. Political leaders engage with policy stakeholders; and the BFD drafts 
policy and legislation at their behest.   
7.6.3 Achieving Co-management 
Participants identified the allocation of property rights, political willingness, 
commitment from the BFD, formation of institutions and capacity building at the 
community level as preconditions for co-management being successfully 
implemented.   
Results in Figure 7.13 reveal pragmatic and exciting findings. FDC capacity building 
is the number one option selected by participants as a means of achieving co-
management for conservation {χ2 (df = 16, n = 412) = 27.333, p = 0.038}. However, 
allocation of property rights was found to be the least. This means that the allocation 
of property rights would not contribute significantly to sustained conservation unless 
community capacity is also enhanced to manage the forest properly. Thereby, 
participants identified the development of FDC institutions as the second most 
needed remedy for co-management. Such institutions are very important for the 
application of rules and regulations with respect to property rights in overcoming tree 
density reduction {χ2 (df = 16, n = 412) = 24.172, p = 0.086}. In Nepal, it is found 
that power-based vertical relations in society and upward enforcement of rules enable 
elites to capture resources with impunity (Adhikari & Goldey 2010). Several other 
studies have found that elite capture of resources at community level collective 
resource management is common (Esman & Uphoff 1984; Malla et al. 2003).  Thus, 
it is expected that the development of local level institutions might encourage FDCs 
to be motivated actors. These institutions would form social capital to tackle elite 
dominance.   
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Figure 7.13: Achieving co-management (n = 412) 
 
Participants did not rate political willingness and commitment of the BFD (only 12% 
and 10% respectively) as important factors in achieving co-management. In FGDs, 
the participants were then asked why they were inclined more towards capacity 
building (50%) and the creation of local level institutions (22%) and less towards the 
outright allocation to them of property rights (7%). Basically, by identifying FDCs’ 
capacity building, the participants were suggesting more pressure for demand-side 
policy interventions than supply-side interventions. Creation of community level 
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depending on political willingness and the BFD’s commitment to co-management. 
FDCs perceived these supply-side interventions would not be enough unless 
alternative livelihood measures were also adopted. 
To assess these differences, it was also necessary to compare the observed and 
expected frequencies by employing χ2 goodness-of-fit (Table 7.14). The critical 
value of χ2 is 9.488 for four degrees of freedom at a 5 per cent level of significance. 
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it could be concluded that the difference between the frequencies of respondents was 
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among population proportions. Hence, 72 per cent observed differences data for 
‘very high’ frequencies of community capacity and institutions were sufficiently 
statistically significant to identify them as a remedy for forest degradation and 
deforestation.        
Table 7.14: Measure of observed and expected counts for co-management 
remedy 
Remedy χ2 df P-value 
Rights allocation 80.112 4 0.000 
Political willingness 35.087 4 0.000 
BFD’s commitment 119.699 4 0.000 
Community institution 43.364 4 0.000 
Community capacity 
building 
239.189 4 0.000 
 
Participants revealed the necessity for demand-side interventions for farm and non-
farm livelihood opportunities to reduce their forest dependence. They notably 
suggested further development of forest resource-based industries. Currently, the 
main harvested non-wood products are fish, crabs, honey and Keora fruits. FDCs sell 
these products just after harvesting to middlemen in two local village markets. There 
is no local processing industry to add value to their harvested products. Further, the 
only way to transport these harvested products to the Khulna district is via the water 
ways. All the perishable harvested resources of FDCs are impeded by the unreliable 
and irregular nature of water transport. In this instance, then, participants noted that 
they could not even afford to buy their daily meals. This situation forces them to 
borrow money from the local village lenders who exploit their labours perpetually. 
If, however, these products were processed locally and marketed through FDC 
institutions, there is a huge potential for non-farm income generation and 
employment opportunities. They also suggested that another promising alternative 
livelihood option is poultry farming. The demand for poultry is exponentially 
increasing due to the expansion of the urban population in the various districts and 
cities, and poultry could be a vital alternative cash income-generating activity. This 
view is supported by Babulo et al. (2008) with identification of poultry as a vibrant 
alternative livelihood option for the FDCs in northern Ethiopia.  Likewise, there is a 
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good opportunity to develop a pickle industry for Keora fruits that could have a huge 
demand. 
To make co-management successful, demand-side interventions as are equally 
important as the supply-side interventions of property rights allocation, community 
level institution formation and community capacity building. Implementation of 
these initiatives largely depends on political commitment.   
7.7. Conclusion 
Because of the complexities involved in deconstructing top-down bureaucratic 
management problems, a range of qualitative and quantitative research techniques 
and approaches is required. The argument here is that such techniques will provide 
better results and a clearer picture to inform pragmatic policy for resource 
conservation (Burgess 1999). FGDs were used in this study to extract the views of 
the two conflicting groups: FDCs and foresters. 
The analyses of the discourses and participants’ perceptions reveal the necessity of 
implementing an effective strategy for sustainable management of the SMF. This 
requires the development of a partnership between the BFD and the FDCs by 
adopting a common property rights regime and initiating demand-side interventions. 
This partnership needs the allocation of an appropriate level of defined and secured 
property rights to FDCs. The existing missing link between conservation and 
livelihood security needs to be addressed through both supply- and demand-side 
interventions. Existing theories mainly support supply-side interventions by bringing 
FDCs into a co-management regime in terms of resource extraction, use and policy-
making. The results also support adoption of demand-side interventions through 
alternative livelihoods measures, allowing FDCs to lessen pressure on the SMF.  
Existing policy fails in two main areas. First, the absence of a real management 
partnership inhibits the sustainable usage of resources. These potential benefits may 
not be achieved unless measures for the creation of FDC capacity-building through 
community level institutions are adopted. Thus, this study gives an urgent call to 
policy-makers and the BFD to adopt a strategy that incorporate FDCs and their 
expectations into conservation practices of the SMF. Second, alternative livelihood 
measures are necessary to address the economic pressure from FDCs on the SMF. 
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Therefore, urgent policy measures are suggested incorporating a ‘co-management-
alternative livelihoods mix’ in line with the results of this study.       
Based on the findings of this chapter, as well as results and discussions of the 
previous chapters, the next chapter summarises the arguments of the research and 
makes recommendations for future policy implications.  
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Chapter 8 
Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 
8.1 Introduction  
It remains in this chapter to take a final step to synthesise and to draw together the 
thesis. The aim of this concluding chapter is to summarise the knowledge gained and 
the understanding that can be derived from analysing an alternative property rights 
regime to achieve sustainability in the SMF. In doing so, it is necessary to go back to 
the aims and objectives of the research. This commenced with an understanding of 
the existing state property rights regime through an investigation as to the viability of 
an alternative property rights regime of co-management. The research was driven by 
five closely related research questions on property rights and co-management.  
In Chapter One of the thesis, a fundamental distinction was made between the 
existing property rights regime and the conservation of forest resources. Critical 
discussions of the study area were presented in Chapter Two. Following these aims 
and objectives, the research critically reviewed relevant theories and concepts of 
property rights and the co-management literature. This review established the 
conceptual framework described in Chapter Three. Then, in Chapter Five, the 
research outlined the methodologies to be used to answer the research questions and 
form parts of Chapters Four and Seven.  
The triangulation of the survey and FGDs results is expected to provide robustness 
and authentication of the overall findings of the study. Results and discussions of 
analyses were presented in Chapters Four, Six and Seven.  
This chapter comprises five sections. Section 8.2 summarises the major findings of 
the thesis. Section 8.3 pinpoints implications of rights embeddedness for collective 
management in theory, methods and policy and practice in the SMF. Section 8.4 
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identifies avenues for future research. The thesis concludes with final comments in 
Section 8.5.  
8.2 Summary of the Major Findings    
The major findings of the thesis relate to the five research questions. Firstly, the 
findings of research question 1 regarding the adequacy of the existing property rights 
regime are presented in a ‘state property regime’ thematic analysis. Secondly, FDC 
perceptions regarding the existing property rights regime and the conservation of 
forest resources are summarised to answer research question 2 in ‘common property 
regime’. Then, prevailing conflicts between the BFD and FDCs are explored to 
pinpoint whether an alternative property rights regime would be able to achieve 
sustainability in the SMF as per research questions 3, 4 and 5. These colliding 
discourses are concluded in the ‘demand-side interventions’ discussion.  
8.2.1 State Property Rights Regime 
The research drew on several streams of empirical literature to examine the role of 
property rights in achieving sustained conservation of the SMF. This was done to 
address research question 1. The research critically evaluated various property rights 
regimes and forest policies for four distinctive historical time periods. During these 
periods, FDCs were not given any role in managing the forest. Due to its status as an 
economic, cultural and religious frontier zone, the forest has been facing 
deforestation and degradation over the longer term. The Colonial Government 
focused more on revenue generation and other development strategies that were 
based on forest products and lands. This undermined sustainable conservation and 
the livelihood security of its dependent communities.  
Top-down management has failed to achieve forest conservation. Forest management 
can be improved through co-management. In many developing countries, the 
emergence of co-management came as an alternative response to the perceived 
degradation of forests under state property rights regimes. This is because of the 
adoption of effective protective systems by the users. Because of the long historical 
dominance and coercive management by the BFD, collective action is unlikely to be 
initiated by local FDCs. The BFD should impose new arrangements of co-
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management to resolve social tensions that prevail between themselves and 
dependent communities.  
A specific co-management structure designed for the SMF can help reverse 
degradation and help regeneration of its degraded areas. The top-down state 
mechanism of the BFD has not improved the forest condition. The dominance of 
forest officials is a major reason for current and previous state-managed conservation 
practices resulting in forest degradation. This degradation was caused by the politics 
of the previous FDs and current BFD, where FDCs are deprived of information and 
authority over the management of the SMF. The conservation interests of the BFD 
were not often shared by the FDCs.  
Although existing access and withdrawal rights are assumed to provide economic 
gains to the FDCs, benefits are scant as their livelihood security is sublimated to 
BFD objectives. The state property regime does not support the livelihoods of the 
poor and dependent FDCs. The underlying cause for this is the bias of BFD 
management toward illegal interests.  
Present state forest management does not allow social, cultural and economic 
benefits from a community participation process to occur. This shrinks the flow of 
overall direct benefits to FDCs and has created frustration among them. State 
interventions do not motivate communities to act collectively. The research found 
that FDCs wish to be motivated actors and to take part in collective management. 
The study finds that the existing state regime does not allow this to occur and has 
proved inadequate in achieving sustainability.    
8.2.2 Common Property Regime 
While community involvement in forest management is established in policy, it is 
not implemented in practice. Present conservation systems of the top-down 
bureaucratic framework in the SMF contain serious flaws. FDCs’ proposal for 
common property rights could be effective. The BFD has failed to halt forest 
degradation. This failure results from ignorance of local communities’ needs and the 
top-down nature of the management system.  
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The failure of the BFD to recognise the marginal socio-economic situation of FDCs 
institutionalises biases and encourages harvesting pressure. These are the pitfalls of 
bureaucratic, authoritative management control. Again, the danger of such 
management is it mainly serves external interests in particular the interests of 
community elites aligned with those interests. Consequently, the success of the 
institutions depends on the interrelationships between communities and the BFD by 
transferring power into a common property rights regime. Hence, interventions are 
needed which can be guided by the directions, magnitude and relative importance of 
the factors examined here.  
8.2.3 Demand-side Interventions  
The combination of both qualitative and quantitative methods provides a vivid 
picture to policy-makers. In response to research question 3, FDCs perceived existing 
conservation practices as maximising the self-interests of the BFD. FGDs captured 
the conflict between the BFD and the FDCs regarding de jure and de facto 
conservation practices. FGDs provided a different window on social interaction and 
substantiated the individually focused or survey method results. In Chapter Seven, 
the results of the FGDs indicated endemic existing conflict between FDCs and the 
BFD. A dearth of demand-side incentives underlies the persistence of such conflict, 
and results in the failure of environmental and economic trade-offs. In existing 
permit systems for supply-side interventions, the BFD has encouraged classic ‘rent 
seeking behaviour’ comparable to the private sector, and made it difficult to 
withstand the excess demand pressures on resources.  
FGDs assessed the efficacy and relevance of state regimes for conservation policy 
and FDC livelihood security initiatives. The assessment considered key research 
question 3 as to whether an alternative property rights regime of co-management 
could achieve forest sustainability. These issues were investigated through research 
questions 4 and 5. FGDs assessed existing supply-side interventions, an exclusion 
approach, conservation policy impacts and an understanding of demand-side 
intervention policy issues. Hence, this provided a window into existing conservation 
insights and critically examined the relative strengths, weaknesses and policy options 
for a more inclusive approach.   
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The research establishes the imperative of an alternative property rights regime of 
co-management to hope to achieve sustainability in the SMF. However, one of the 
main lessons of this research is that unless demand-side incentives aimed at reducing 
deforestation and degradation are accompanied by co-management supply-side 
control measures, they are unlikely to be effective as a means of mangrove 
conservation. Survey and FGDs results presented FDCs’ income losses after Sidr and 
Aila and the increased pressure on resource harvesting. A majority of the FDCs have 
lost their income generation opportunities from agriculture, fish farming, selling 
labours and other sources. Existing supply-side incentives do not provide any 
opportunity to the FDCs to obtain financial assistance to offset difficulties. 
Traditional marketing systems and infrastructure again deprive harvesters of correct 
prices for harvested resources. Poor FDCs access financial help from NGOs and the 
village Mahajons, Aratdars and Dadandars who are local elites. They remain 
indebted to these money lenders, particularly to the latter who, in turn, use them as 
bonded labourers for long periods of time. Hence, these lenders bound them to sell 
their harvested resources at lower prices fixed arbitrarily at the lenders’ sole 
discretion. FDCs, thus, engage in overharvesting to maintain their family and to 
satisfy the demands of lenders.  
Furthermore, since these two cyclones, FDCs have been living on the WAPDA 
embankment that borders the SMF. In the absence of alternative livelihood 
generation opportunities, they put further pressure on the forest. Unless policy 
interventions are adopted for alternative livelihoods, conservation measures—even 
with an inclusive approach and strong control—will likely remain ineffective in 
sustainably managing the forest.        
This research also examined demand-side policies that can develop substitutes in 
income generation for the FDCs. It also investigated this as a means of addressing 
anthropogenic pressure on the forest. Findings of this demand-side policy focus on 
the development of a demand for alternative income generation outside the SMF 
ecosystem. These demands will substitute for the renewable resources of the SMF. 
Hence, the results suggest that these policy directives should reduce demands of the 
resources of the SMF. Based on participants’ opinions, adoption of the following 
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demand-side interventions for alternative livelihood creation in the SIZ is suggested. 
Proposed interventions need to: 
 Establish fish and fruit processing industries in adjacent markets and centres. 
 Establish alternative livelihood opportunities such as: poultry, Keora pickle 
industry, fish industry, goat and sheep rearing farms. 
 Adopt innovative income generation avenues appropriate for the climatic 
conditions of the SIZ such as hanging vegetable gardening due to SLR, salt-
tolerant agricultural and other cultivations.  
 Create non-farm income generation and employment opportunities through 
marketing and supply chain management. 
 Produce aqua-cultured fish in tanks or artificial ponds or farms to reduce the 
pressure on wild mangrove fish stocks. 
 Promote reforestation in deforested and degraded barren mangrove lands to 
provide high levels of ecological services.   
 Provide skill training to the FDCs. 
 Create a revolving fund to provide financial support to FDCs in case of 
emergency and to remove the bonded labour system. 
8.3 Implications of the Research 
This research has implications for theory, methods, policy and practice. There are 
very few studies on the SMF. Most importantly, quantitative studies with 
econometric analysis are absent. No study has previously investigated the role of 
property rights in the long-term management of this forest. Existing studies have 
narrowly focused on the socio-economic aspects of conservation. Few studies have 
examined the interests of FDCs using a property rights regime perspective. No study 
has focused on FDC involvement in a co-management structure and examined issues 
of demand-side interventions through the creation of alternative livelihood options. 
The following sections present implications of the research.  
8.3.1 Implications for the Theoretical Framework 
The application of common property rights regimes in collective management is area 
and region-specific. Community participation is embedded in changing social, 
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economic, cultural, political and ecological factors. Application of property rights as 
suggested by S&O (1992) is too mechanistic and fails to capture the socio-economic 
and cultural embeddedness of anthropogenic pressure. Appropriate community 
property rights support decision-making and cooperative relations to conserve 
resources sustainably only when there are interdependences among property rights, 
conservation and livelihood security. This research has demonstrated that collective 
management is embedded with social, economic, cultural and political factors 
relevant to community livelihood security. Without understanding the livelihood 
complexities of FDCs, co-management will be difficult to implement. S&O’s 
framework suggests allocation of appropriate level property rights to FDCs for 
sustained common-pool resource management. The study treated this as supply-side 
interventions. The findings of this study extend the framework with a suggestion of 
focusing alternative livelihoods as demand-side interventions to achieve 
sustainability in common-pool resource management.   
8.3.2 Implications for the Methodology 
The research applied three methods to investigate the potential of using alternative 
property rights regime in the SMF. The research also identified and quantified 
determinants of participation of FDCs in mangrove conservation practices.  
For the first time, content analysis used property rights as an explicative variable to 
establish the argument of FDCs’ role in achieving conservation of the SMF. 
Qualitative content analysis of various historical ‘factors’ and ‘actors’ examined 
showed that existing traditional management patterns need to be amended to adapt to 
a changing contemporary socio-spatial context with necessary rights regime 
modifications. 
This cross sectional survey provided a reliable and rich data source. This thesis has 
made credible findings in comparison with other studies that focused on qualitative 
and scientific aspects of forest management. Most of these studies have relied on 
limited data information. This might not easily be replicated. Thus, the possibility 
remains for suggesting policy implications of doubtful worth.  
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In the absence of baseline information, the assessment of tree density growth for 
specific time periods is complicated. The research conducted a subjective assessment 
of tree density improvement.  
Many previous studies could not produce convincing econometric results. Compared 
with previous studies, this research provides practical mangrove conservation 
explanations.  
The findings of the FGDs ensured triangulation of survey results. As participative 
tools, focus group results provide remarkable potential for environmental 
policy-making. 
Finally, this research is the first study that undertakes a rigorous assessment of the 
effects of conservation policy on the SMF. In this regard, it gives valuable insights 
into the sustainability of this forest under current and alternative property rights 
regimes.   
8.3.3 Implications for Policy and Practice  
The findings of the thesis clearly contradict the belief that protected areas conserve 
mangrove forests. It is true that the legal designation of protection may shape a basic 
institutional infrastructure to support conservation. Empirical findings of this 
research outline the huge degradation rate in the SMF. These findings support the 
empirical findings of IFRI studies that demonstrate that protected areas do not have a 
higher level of vegetation density than forests not legally designated as protected 
areas (Hayes & Ostrom 2005). Consequently, the negative trend of forest cover 
change in the SMF shows that protected area conservation policies do not ensure 
mangrove conservation.  
Forest conservation policies depend on a range of factors. Notably, they include local 
recognition of the validity of the protected area policy, biophysical features, financial 
and human resource supports, as well as appropriate mechanisms to resolve conflicts 
(Hayes & Ostrom 2005). All of these factors are absent in case of conservation 
policies in the SMF. Forest conservation largely depends on the viability of local 
level institutions. Therefore, the most notable findings of this study are the failure of 
the BFD offices to recognise and comprehend the significance of FDCs’ potential 
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rule-making, monitoring and enforcement role in conservation. These activities are 
significantly and positively correlated with abundant mangrove vegetation density. A 
broader institutional framework is necessary to provide protected area policies where 
FDCs can assist in formulating and achieving conservation policies. Overall, the 
study found a lower level of vegetation density, due mainly to the lack of FDCs’ rule 
making, monitoring and enforcement rights.  
A community awareness building mechanism needs to be developed to provide the 
capacity to communities to enforce forest management rules. A system of 
community rights and conservation policies to link the BFD and FDC conservation 
efforts will bring greater protection outcomes in the SMF.       
In doing so, policy makers should not assume co-management to be the only means 
of forest improvement. Rather, the distinction must be made between livelihoods and 
conservation. Forest produce surplus may not be able to generate income to offset 
anthropogenic pressure. Such policy intervention may not be ideal for biodiversity 
conservation. The development of communities’ administrative and economic status 
should be central to achieving co-management.  
8.4 Future Research  
The thesis has addressed the implications of planning common property rights 
regime for sustainable management of the SMF. Suggestions for further research into 
various aspects of sustainable mangrove forest management and related key areas are 
outlined as follows.    
Mangrove management must be considered separately from other forest management 
regimes, because of the interrelationships of forests and people. This requires an 
understanding of mangrove vegetation, dependent communities and relevant bodies 
of governance.  
It is necessary to investigate the rationality and role of alternative livelihood 
interventions to promote conservation in general. To draw comparisons, other types 
of participatory research on natural resource systems need to be conducted. This 
should focus on the future articulation of mechanisms for positive discrimination 
toward marginalised and disadvantaged dependent communities. Future research 
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needs also to look into policy insights pertaining to the emergent framework of 
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) 
mechanisms. REDD+ may be blended with the legal framework of CBD to ensure 
the involvement of indigenous peoples at national and local levels in resource policy, 
management and conservation strategies of the SMF.   
The geographical scope of the research is limited to a mangrove forest in a coastal 
area of Bangladesh. There is the possibility to undertake similar kinds of research in 
other types of terrestrial forests in other parts of the country, and in other developing 
countries as well. There is a pressing need to apply property rights analysis in these 
contexts. Assessment also needs to evaluate the performance of other regulatory 
frameworks and instruments.         
8.5 Final Comments  
As a newly-established and poor country, two forest policies were adopted by the 
Bangladeshi Government at a time when the experimental and research knowledge of 
forests and their ecosystems was scarce. Thus, based on imperfect and insufficient 
knowledge of ecosystems, socio-economic structures and their interrelationships, 
policies and property rights were imperfect and incomplete and have not achieved 
sustainability of the forest. These policies did not take into account the needs of the 
huge forest communities whose livelihood concerns were relegated to non-wood 
forest products.  
This research has presented the underlying pitfalls associated with top-down 
bureaucratic management processes. The outcomes of the thesis include suggestions 
regarding initiating co-management interventions in policy and practice. While co-
management is found to be significant in attaining management justice, it also has a 
vital role in conservation, but must be accompanied with alternative livelihood 
options for the fully-dependent marginalised and disadvantaged FDCs. Any 
imposition of co-management and a standardised mechanism to mangrove 
management from the top down will not result in FDC participation. An appropriate 
mechanism needs to be implemented to rein in the coercive, exploitative and 
authoritative role of the BFD.  
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In very recent times (2011), the MOEF has assigned IPAC to initiate co-management 
activities in the SIZ. IPAC has formed only two co-management committees in 
Mongla and Sarankola sub-districts. The researcher attended co-management 
meetings and conducted focus group and personal discussions with all concerned. It 
has been found that the MOEF is attempting to implement ‘benefit-sharing’ instead 
of ‘co-management’. More than 50 per cent of the members of the co-management 
committee are from the BFD and other government bodies. Most importantly, the 
chair of the committee is the local Union Parishad Chairman—who is a political 
person. Selection of FDC members is highly biased, with elite dominance. IPAC is 
responsible for implementing the decisions, whereas the BFD remains in charge with 
its supervisory role. The committee has not yet involved FDCs in management and 
policy-making. It is, thus, expected that the findings of this research should be of 
great help in future co-management framework implementation.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: List of offices visited for data and information collection 
 
Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics 
Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS) 
Upazila Statistics Office, Koyra 
 
Bangladesh Forest Department 
Bojbaja Forest Office, Bajbaja, Koyra 
Bangladesh Forest Department (BFD) 
Bangladesh Forest Industries Development Corporation (BFIDC) 
Bangladesh Forest Research Institute (BFRI) 
Chandpai Range Office, Chandpai, Mongla  
Divisional Forest Office, Khulna Wildlife Management and Nature Conservation 
Division, Khulna 
Sundarban Forest Office (SFO), Khulna 
Sundarban West Forest Division, Khulna 
Wild Management and Nature Conservation Division, Khulna 
 
Election Commission of Bangladesh 
Upazila Election Office, Koyra 
 
International Organisations 
International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN), 
Bangladesh 
 
Local Government Organisations 
Dakshin Bedkashi Union Office, Dakshin Bedkashi, Koyra 
Uttar Bedkashi Union Office, Uttar Bedkashi, Koyra  
 
Ministries/Divisions 
Economic Relations Division (ERD), Ministry of Finance 
Ministry of Environment and Forests (MOEF) 
Ministry of Primary and Mass Education (MOPE) 
 
Non-Government Organisations 
Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) 
Integrated Protected Area Co-management (IPAC) 
Prodipan – a leading local NGO in Khulna, Bangladesh 
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Rupantor - a leading local NGO in Khulna, Bangladesh 
 
Non-Government Research Organisations 
Divisional Office of Unnayan Onneshan, Khulna 
Unnayan Onneshan, Dhaka Office 
 
Other Government Organisation 
Space Research and Remote Sensing Organisation (SPARSO) 
 
Planning Commission of Bangladesh 
Agriculture, Water Resources, and Physical Infrastructure Division  
General Economics Division (GED) 
 
Universities 
University of Dhaka, Department of Statistics, Biostatistics & Informatics 
University of Jahangirnagar, Department of Statistics 
 
Upazila Level Government Offices 
Office of the Upazila Nirbahi Officer, Koyra 
Upazila Local Government and Engineering Office, Koyra 
Upazila Fisheries Office, Koyra 
Upazila Primary Education Office, Koyra 
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Appendix 2: Personal consultations/discussions with relevant persons1 
 
Designation of the person  Name of the 
organisation 
Secretary (Highest bureaucratic position of the 
Government, and next to Minister) 
Deputy Chief (Planning) 
Deputy Secretary (Administration) 
Senior Assistant Secretary (Forest Section) 
Senior Assistant Chief (Forest Section 1) 
Senior Assistant Chiefs (Forest Planning) 
Assistant Chief (Forest Planning) 
Administrative Officer (Forest Section 1) 
MOEF 
Additional Chief Conservator of Forests (Planning) 
Conservator of Forests (Administration & Finance)   
Conservator of Forests (Wildlife) 
Assistant Chief Conservator of Forests   
Accounts Officer 
Head Assistant (Administration)  
BFD 
Conservator of Forests (Khulna Circle) & Project Director 
Deputy Conservator of Forests (Khulna Circle) 
Divisional Forest Officer (Sundarban West Forest 
Division) 
Divisional Forest Officer (Sundarban East Forest 
Division) 
Divisional Forest Officer (Wildlife Management and 
Nature Conservation Division, Khulna) 
Range Officer (Chandpai Range, Mongla) 
Officer-in-Charge (Bojbaja Forest Camp) 
Station Officer (Chandpai Range, Mongla) 
Forest Guards, Boatmen, and Cook (Bojbaja Forest Camp) 
SFO and BFD (Khulna 
Forest Circle Office) 
Divisional Head (Mangrove Silviculture Division) 
Scientific Officer 
BFRI 
Cluster Director, Sundarban Cluster, Khulna 
PMA Research Associate Sundarbans Cluster, Khulna 
Communication and Outreach Facilitator, Sundarban 
Cluster 
Site Facilitator, Chandpai Site 
IPAC 
Joint Chief (Forest Wing) PC 
Joint Chief (Europe Wing) ERD 
Senior Assistant Chief GED 
                                                          
1 This list does not include community households, local leaders, Mahajans/Aratdars/Dadondars, 
political and social elites and many other key informers.  
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Upazila Nirbahi Officer 
Upazila Engineer 
Upazila Statistics Officer 
Upazila Election Officer 
Upazila Primary Education Officer 
Koyra Upazila 
Parishad 
Professor of Statistics  University of 
Jahangirnagar 
Lecturer of Statistics, Biostatistics & Informatics University of Dhaka 
Project Coordinator Unnayan Onneshan 
Coordinator  
Project Coordinator    
Pradipon 
Chief Executive Rupantor 
Manager, Koyra BRAC 
Principal  Kopatakka Degree 
College, Koyra 
Lawyer, Forest Court Koyra 
Local Journalists Koyra 
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Appendix 3: Determination of sample size  
 
Sample surveys frequently encounter the problem of estimating population 
proportions or percentages such as: proportion (1705 forest community households) 
of total households (2299) engaged in resource harvesting from the SMF. Thus, p is 
assumed to be a proportion having a given attribute of being forest community 
households, and q is the proportion not having this attribute such that p+q = 1. In that 
case, assuming 2299 households to be the sufficiently large population, the formula 
for estimating the sample size is:  
𝑛0 =
𝑧2𝑝𝑞
𝑑2
     ...............................................................................  (i) 
where,  n0 = desired sample size 
z  = standard normal deviate usually set at 1.96, and it corresponds to 
the confidence level at 95%.  
p = assumed proportion of the target population with particular 
characteristic to be estimated.  
d = desired degree of accuracy in the estimated proportion. 
Employing the above formula (i) for this study, z = 1.96, d = 0.05 and p = 0.74 (1705 
forest community households are 74% of total households). Thus, within 5 per cent 
points of p, the estimation of the true proportion in the population will be within p = 
0.74 ± 0.05. Consequently, 
𝑛0 =
𝑧2𝑝𝑞
𝑑2
   = 
(1.96)2(.74)(.26)
(.05)2
 = 296 
However, guessing that p is not known or even not easy to assume for this study, 
“the safest procedure to take p as 0.50 which maximises the expected variance and 
therefore indicates a sample size (n) that is sure to be large enough” (Islam 2009, p. 
118). This can be applied in assuming the population size (N) as small. If N is small, 
assumed formula to be used is as the following form:   
 𝑛 =
𝑁𝑧2𝑝𝑞
𝑁𝑑2+ 𝑧2𝑝𝑞
     ...............................................................................  (ii) 
Thus, according to Islam (2009), this formula (ii) can also be expressed as  
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 𝑛 =  
𝑁𝑛0
𝑁+𝑛0  
          ......................................................................(iii) 
In practice, n0 is first calculated. In case of negligible n0/N, n0 is regarded to be the 
satisfactory approximation to n (Islam 2009).  
Taking p to be 0.50, in case of its difficulty to assume the event is:   
 𝑛0 =  
(1.96)2(.5)(.5) 
(.05)2
 = 384 
Supposing N = 1705 to be the small population, previous estimates of n is revised as 
follows: 
  𝑛 =  
𝑁𝑛0
𝑁+𝑛0  
 = 
1705 × 384
1705 + 384
 = 313 
Considering the above three scenarios for determination of n in estimating population 
proportion by using statistical formulas for this study, selection of n as 412 is more 
than satisfactory.  
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Appendix 4: Contact form  
 
(English translation from Bengali) 
 
 (Fill the code with same number for this contact form and interview schedule 
provided the respondent agrees to participate in the survey.) 
 
CONTACT FORM 
 
I am Anjan Kumer Dev Roy, a PhD student, in the School of Accounting, Economics 
and Finance, Faculty of Business and Law, University of Southern Queensland, 
Australia, conducting a survey for the research project about ‘An investigation into 
the adequacy of existing and alternative property rights regimes to achieve 
sustainable management of the Sundarbans Mangrove Forest in Bangladesh’. I would 
like to invite you to take part in this survey. I would remain grateful if you help me in 
this regard.  
 
For this survey, your household has been selected as sample using random sampling 
technique. I would like to interview the head of the household. I guarantee to keep 
the information given by the respondents confidential. I also assure that this research 
does not bear any relationship with the government policies. The interview will take 
about 35 minutes.  
 
Q.1 Please tell me whether your head of the household agree to take part in the 
interview? 
1   [    ] Yes   2  [    ] No  (Skip to Q.5) 
 
Q.2 Could you please tell me the nick names of the mentally and physically fit 
household members aged over 18 years? 
(From the oldest to the youngest) 
No Nick name No  Nick name 
1  5  
2  6  
3  7  
4  8  
 
Q.3 Number visits to the household to conduct the interview. (This is for the 
interview only) 
 
No of visit Date and time Comment Contact address 
First    
Second   
Third   
 
Q.4 Being the head of the household, you have been identified purposively to be 
interviewed in this survey. Do you agree to take part in the interview now? 
1   [    ] Yes   2  [    ] No   
Code No: 
312 
 
  
Q.5 Could you please tell me the reason why you did not agree to take part in the 
interview? 
1  [ ] Lack of time 
2  [ ] No financial incentive 
3  [ ] No confidence regarding the result of the survey 
4  [ ] Scared to speak  
5  [ ] The respondent is absent 
6  [ ] Others (Specify)   
 
Q.6 Could you please tell me your age?   .................... years 
 
Q.7 Could you please tell me your occupation?  ..................................... 
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Appendix 5: Response rate  
 
(i) Total houses visited 430 
(ii) Nobody found after three visits 3 
(iv) Fail to interview after three visits 15 
(v) Replacement sampling 18 
(iii) Interview completed 
          First visit:     321 
          Second visit: 79 
          Third visit:    12       
 
(vi) Total survey completed 412 
(vii) Response rate (412/430)×100 95.81% 
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Appendix 6: Full version of interview schedule 
 (Confidential) 
(English translation from Bengali) 
 
 
 
 
 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
Greeting. I am now going to ask you some questions regarding the overall 
management of the Sundarbans mangrove forest and the way you prefer its 
management. The prime purpose of this survey is to investigate whether an 
alternative property rights regime can enhance forest sustainability in the SMF.   
 
It is highly expected that you will respond the questions with utmost honesty and 
truthfulness at best of your knowledge. There is no right or wrong answer. Your 
opinions, knowledge, attitudes and expectations will be highly valued and counted in 
understanding some pressing issues of prevailing management systems and how this 
forest can better be managed to provide benefits to the forest-dependent 
communities.  
 
You are expected to respond every question with the best possible answer(s) and 
knowledge reflecting your opinion(s). Please follow the instructions before 
responding any particular question whether it is single or multiple. Your responses 
will be completely confidential and will not be used for any other purposes other 
than this PhD research at the University of Southern Queensland, Australia. 
 
Section-A (Attitude and Perception) 
 
1. Which community do you belong to?     
1 [   ] Munda   2 [   ] Bawali   3 [   ] Mawali  4 [   ] Gol leaves collector  5 [   ] Fisher 
 
2. What do you think about the importance of the Sundarbans for your livelihood? 
1 [  ] Very high    2  [  ] High    3  [  ] Medium      4  [   ] Low       5 [   ] Very low 
 
3. What is your view about the overall management of the Sundarbans that means its 
development, conservation, distribution of resources, etc? 
1 [  ] Very good   2 [  ] Good   3 [   ] Barely acceptable   4 [  ] Poor   5 [   ] Very poor       
 
4. Do you think that there have been any changes of tree density of the Sundarbans 
over the years?                                                        [Please tick (√) where appropriate] 
Year Yes  No 
Name of the Respondent: ………………………… 
Date: ………………….  Place of interview: ………………… 
Time: ……………………..to ………………….. 
Sub-district: ……………………….Union: ……………….. 
Ward: …………   Village:  ………………  Mohalla: …………….. 
Code No: 
315 
 
(over the last) Increase Decrease Percentage (%) 
5       
15      
30     
 
a. If decreased, could you please rank five reasons? 
1  [ ] Present management system 2  [ ] Environmental degradation 
3  [ ] Too much population pressure  4  [ ] Corruption  
5  [ ] Others (Specify)  ………….      
  
b. Do you think that there is a need to protect the Sundarbans?  1 [   ] Yes    2 [   ] No 
 
5. How are you concerned about the status of this forest in terms of tree density? 
1  [  ] Very high    2  [  ] High      3  [  ] Medium        4  [   ] Low         5 [   ] Very low 
 
Section-B (Management and Harvesting) 
 
6. Please provide information of resource harvesting from the Sundarbans over ONE 
month. 
 
Times Day Benefit Harvesting 
Visited the 
Sundarbans 
Put 
tick 
(√) 
Average days 
stayed in one 
visit 
Put 
tick 
(√) 
Benefits/ 
resources 
derived 
Put 
tick 
(√) 
Harvesting sites 
distance from 
home (km) 
Put 
tick 
(√) 
Daily  0 (none)  Fish & crabs  <1   
5-8 times  1   Honey  1-5  
3-4 times  2-7   Gol leaves  6-10  
Twice  8-15   Wood & 
fuelwood 
 11-20  
Once  16-30   Fodder  21-30  
Others 
(Specify) … 
…………… 
 Others 
(Specify) ….. 
…………….. 
 Others 
(Specify) …. 
……………. 
 Others (Specify) 
….................. 
…………….. 
 
 
7. How do you harvest resources from the Sundarbans? 
1  [    ] With Permits   2   [    ] Illegally    3   [    ] Others (Specify)  ..……………….. 
 
8. Could you please rank your views regarding the following issues of the 
Sundarbans? 
1=Strongly agree    2=Agree     3=Undecided     4=Disagree     5=Strongly disagree  
Issue Rank 
Present management is conducive to the increase of tree 
density in last 10 years 
1 2 3 4 5 
Forest communities who are willing to harvest forest 
resources are allowed to do so 
     
Communities can harvest with permits as per their      
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demands  
Harvesting time as per permits is always completed      
Forest communities are able to make decisions about 
internal use patterns and transform harvested resources 
by making improvements 
     
Forest Communities are able to make decisions about 
which community member can use the forest 
     
Forest Department consults forest communities 
regarding harvesting and distribution 
     
Communities are satisfied with various species 
plantation 
     
Present management conflicts with community interests      
Discrimination or corruption prevails in giving permits      
Your involvement in various community-based 
organisations is satisfactory 
     
Communities intend to be involved in the management      
 
Are there any comments you would like to make regarding above issues?    
......................…………………………………………………………………………
………………….…………………………………………………………………….  
 
9. Are you able to harvest without any harassments/hazards from the Sundarbans?   
1   [    ] Yes      2  [    ] No 
 
i. If ‘no’, could you please rank the sources of harassments/hazards (from 1-5)? 
1  [     ] Forest Department and Police   2  [     ] Forest pirates  
3  [     ] Tiger attacks    4  [     ] Aratdars/Mahajons/Middlemen  
5  [     ] Political/social elites   6  [     ] Others(Specify) ......................... 
…………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
ii. For which of the following activities Forest Department consult you? 
1  [ ] Tree plantation    2  [ ] Resource harvesting 
3  [ ] Monitoring of planting  4  [ ] Reduction of tree density 
5  [ ] Development of the Sundarbans 6  [ ] Others (Specify)  ……….. 
 
10. Please name your community-based organisation.   ............................................  
a. Year(s) of involvement: ……………..year(s)     …………………month(s) 
 
Section-C (Rights, Barriers and Remedies) 
 
11. How long have you been living here?  
1  [     ] Since birth     2  [     ] Last 10-20 yrs      3 [      ] 1-10 yrs       4  [     ] <1 yr 
 
a. Where did you come from (for 2-4)? ……………… b. Why? ..............................  
 
12. Who should manage the Sundarbans? 
1  [ ] Forest Department 2  [ ] Forest Department and communities 
3  [ ] Private owners 4  [ ] None        5  [   ] Others (Specify) ………… 
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Please give me the answers of few questions regarding co-management. 
 
13. Forests are conserved through ‘co-management’ in many countries of the world. 
In this co-management system:  
i. Do you like to be involved in the co-management for the Sundarbans?  
1   [   ] Yes             2 [   ] No 
ii. How would you like to be involved in the co-management for the Sundarbans? 
(More options are allowed) 
1  [  ] Through management process     2  [   ] By developing community institutions 
3  [  ] In benefit-sharing structure     4  [   ] By selling cheapest labour  
5  [  ] Others (Specify) ……………………… 
 
iii. What do you like to contribute to the co-management? 
1  [  ] Labour                 2  [  ] Monitoring             3  [  ] Management         
4  [  ] Awareness building         5  [  ] All from 1-4    
 
14. Which rights should communities be allowed for co-management? 
1  [ ] To harvest specific products  
2  [ ] To regulate harvesting patterns and improvement of harvested resources  
3  [ ] To make decision regarding the access and transfer of access rights to others  
4  [ ] Rights from 1-2   5  [ ] All the above rights from 1-3 
6  [ ] Others (Specify)  …………………………………………………………......  
 
15. Could you please rank the barriers to the implementation of co-management? 
1   [  ] Forest Department’s unwillingness   2   [ ] Lack of community awareness 
3   [  ] Forest Department neglects customary knowledge   
4   [  ] Lack of political commitment     5   [ ] Lack of community institutions 
6   [  ] Others (Specify) …………… 
 
Could you please explain the reason of your first barrier identification? 
      
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
      
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
16. Could you please rank your suggestions to overcome barriers of co-management? 
1   [ ] Property rights allocation       2   [   ] Political willingness 
3   [ ] Forest Department’s commitment   4   [   ] Community capacity building 
5   [ ] Creating community level institutions   
6   [ ] Others (Specify) …………………… 
 
Could you please explain the reason of your first overcome option identification?  
      
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
      
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Section-D (Socio-demography) 
 
17. Record sex of the respondent (without asking)    1   [ ] Male   2  [ ] Female 
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18. What is your highest level of education?    ............... years 
 
19. What is your age?     ................... years 
 
20. Including you, how many adult and minor members live in this household? 
1   [ ] Number of adults (>18 years)     2   [ ] Number of minors (≤18 years) 
 
21. Are you the only earner of your family?     1   [     ] Yes          2   [    ] No 
 
i. If ‘no’, please mention the number of earning members?  …………. persons 
ii. What is the number of primary school completion literate family member(s)? ... …. 
persons 
iii. What is the number of 6-18 years old children going for education?  
Goes ............ persons,   do/does not go ............... persons 
iv. Please provide the number of children attending which level(s) of education:  
Primary: …………. Secondary: ………….. College/University: …………. 
 
22. (a) What is the average monthly income of you and all your family members 
earning from all sources including harvesting from the sundarbans, wages, salaries, 
agriculture, livestock, etc.?    .................... Tk. 
 
(b) Please provide the following information regarding your occupation(s) and 
income(s)? 
 
Name of the 
occupation 
Type of occupation Time engaged Monthly 
income Months 
per year 
Hours 
per day Primary Secondary 
1 Fish & crab 
harvesting 
     
Wood & firewood 
Harvesting  
     
Honey harvesting       
Gol leaves 
harvesting  
     
2 Agriculture      
3 Fish farming      
4 Livestock       
5 Selling labour      
6 Transportation      
7 Others (Specify)  
……………… 
     
 
i. Yearly income from the Sundarbans (resource harvesting, processing, labour, etc.): 
………… Tk. 
      ii. Yearly income from other than resource harvesting from the Sundarbans 
(agriculture, service, etc.): …………. Tk. 
      iii. Yearly expenditure of your family: ……………… Tk. 
      iv. From where do you get financial help in case of difficulties/hardships? 
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1  [  ] Relatives  2  [  ] Friends/neighbours  3  [  ] Dadandars/Mahajans   4  [  ] NGOs 
5  [  ] Banks   6  [  ] Government help     7 [  ] Others (Specify)   ………. 
 
v. What are the major barriers of getting jobs except forest resource harvesting in this 
region? 
1  [ ] Lack of other job opportunities 2  [ ] Lack of technical knowhow 
3  [ ] Lack of education    4  [ ] Lack of finance 
5  [ ] Collateral with Dadandars/Mohajans 6  [  ] Others (Specify)   ……. 
 
vi. (a) What was your monthly income before Aila? ..................... Tk. 
 (b) What were then sources of income other than resource harvesting from the  
 Sundarbans? 
1 [  ] Agriculture        2 [  ] Fish farming     3 [  ] Livestock   
4 [  ] Day labourer       5 [  ] Others (Specify) ................... 
 
23. How would you describe your marital status? 
1   [   ] Never married            2  [   ] Married         3   [    ] Widowed  
4   [   ] Divorced/separated        5  [   ] Unwilling to disclose 
 
24. Type of dwelling (Record, if possible) 
1  [    ] Gol leaves/straw/wood 2  [   ] Chala/mud   3 [   ] Tin/wood built    
4  [    ] Brick built   5  [   ] Others (Specify)   ………………. 
 
25. Can I/researcher communicate with you for any further information?  
1 [   ] Yes        2 [   ] No 
If yes, please provide your contact details (including cell phone no): 
.…………………………………………………………………………………………      
 
26. Would you like to contact the researcher to enquire about the research?  
1 [    ] Yes          2 [    ] No    
(If yes, please provide the contact address of the researcher)  
 
27. Are there any comments you would like to make regarding the overall 
management of the Sundarbans? ……………………………………………………. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
(Please say): Thank you for your cooperation 
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Appendix 7: Full version of re-interview schedule 
 (Confidential) 
(English translation from Bengali) 
 
 
 
 
My name is Anjan Kumer Dev Roy. At present, I am doing my PhD at the University 
of Southern Queensland in Australia. One of my research associates collected survey 
data on management issues of Bada (Sundarbans) on ............ I am very grateful to 
you for your participation in the survey. I would like to ask you few questions to 
assess whether the research associate did his/her job perfectly as well as to examine 
the consistencies of your information provided at the time of the interview. I would 
take about five minutes time to complete this job. I would be grateful to you if you 
could cooperate me.  
Whether or not you are willing to participate in the interview? 
1 Yes  [ Start interviewing] 
2 No   [ Stop and go to other participant] 
 
Q. 1 Record respondent’s sex (do not ask) 
1  [     ] Male                2  [  ] Female   
 
Q. 2 What is your highest level of education?    ............... years  
 
Q.3 Who should manage the Sundarbans? 
1  [ ] Forest Department  2  [ ] Forest Department and communities 
3  [ ] Private owners  4  [ ] None  
5  [ ] Others (Specify) ……………. 
   
Q.4 Which rights should communities be allowed for co-management? 
1  [ ] To harvest specific products  
2  [ ] To regulate harvesting patterns and improvement of harvested resources  
3  [ ] To make decision regarding the access and transfer of access rights to others  
4  [ ] Rights from 1-2   5  [ ] All the above rights from 1-3 
6  [ ] Others (Specify)  …………………………………………………………...... 
 
  
Code No: 
Date: ………………….   
Sub-district: …………………Union: ……………….. 
Ward: …………...   Village:  ……………….....   
Mohalla: ……………........... 
321 
 
Q.5 Could you please rank the barriers to the implementation of co-management? 
1   [ ] Forest Department’s unwillingness    2   [ ] Lack of community awareness 
3   [ ] Forest Department neglects customary knowledge   
4   [ ] Lack of political commitment      5   [ ] Lack of community institutions 
6   [ ] Others (Specify) …………… 
 
Q.6 What is the average monthly income of you and all your family members 
earning from all sources including harvesting from the sundarbans, wages, salaries, 
agriculture, livestock, etc.?    .................... Tk. 
 
Q.7 From where do you get financial help in case of difficulties/hardships? 
1  [  ] Relatives  2 [  ] Friends/neighbours    3 [  ] Dadandars/Mahajans 4  [  ] NGOs 
5  [  ] Banks   6  [   ] Government help      7 [  ] Others (Specify)   ………..... 
 
Q.8 Would you like to contact the researcher to enquire about the research?  
1 [   ] Yes       2 [   ] No     
 
 
(Thank you very much for your cooperation) 
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Appendix 8: Comparison between UN guidelines and applied household survey 
design procedures 
 
UN guideline Applied survey measure 
No Survey planning and execution 
1 Clearly spelled survey objectives Described at the outset of 
conducting survey 
2 Direct observation (for small sample 
sizes and populations) 
UN guidelines followed 
(hereafter followed) 
3 Recruitment of qualified interviewers Followed 
4 Training of interviewers  Followed 
5 Personal interview Followed 
6 Pre-testing of questionnaire Followed 
7 Avoidance of ‘loaded’ questions Followed 
8 Question sequence Followed in 4 sections. 
9 Question construction with ‘yes’, ‘no’ 
and ‘other’ options 
Followed 
10 Question wording Followed 
11 Cross-tabulations Followed 
12 Data analysis plan Followed 
13 Arrange meetings with local opinion 
leaders 
Followed 
14 Legal provision for conducting the 
survey 
Followed (Formal written 
permission taken from the 
MOEF) 
15 Field supervision (Supervisor : 
Interviewers = 1 : 4 or 1: 5) 
Ratio 1 : 8 was followed 
(Researcher supervised 8 
interviewers).  
16 Follow-up of non-respondents Followed 
Sampling strategies 
17 Probability sampling in stages such as: 
suggested probability of selecting a 
household is 1/50 (10/100 multiplied by 
1/5) 
Followed (the probability was 
very high such as 1/11 (6/13 
multiplied by 412/1705) 
18 Calculating probability of household 
selection such as 1 in 5 households 
(1/5=0.2). 
Followed (412 in 1705 
households that means 412/1705 
= 0.24).  
19 Defined target population Followed. 
20 Sample size determination (5% or 10% 
of the population). 
Followed (24% of the population) 
21 Rule of stratification Followed in five stages (district-
Upazila-union-village-household) 
22 Target population definition and 
coverage 
Followed 
23 Handle non-responses with 3-5 call-
backs 
Followed (3 call-backs) 
24 Reducing non-response bias Followed 
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25 Minimise non-response to 10-15% Followed non-response rate at 4% 
(18 out of 430)  
26 Random sampling with replacement Followed 
Sampling frame 
27 Relationship between sampling frame 
and target population 
Followed 
Reducing sampling errors 
28 Assessing biases through comparison 
with more reliable sources 
Followed 
29 Consistency checks Followed 
30 Sample verification Followed 
31 Post-survey/re-interview checks Followed 
Data processing  
32 Data preparation in the field Followed 
33 Coding Followed 
34 Editing and checking of data Followed 
35 Handling missing data Followed 
  Source: UN (2005) 
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Appendix 9: Correlation matrix for socio-demographic attributes 
 
Variable Constant Sex Marital 
status 
Dwellin
g   
Age Educat
ion   
Income House
hold 
size 
Constant 1.000 -0.549 -0.561 -0.121 -0.173 -0.331 -0.227 -0.253 
Sex        -0.549 1.000 -0.152 0.096 0.166 0.151 0.012 0.053 
Marital 
status 
-0.561 -0.152 1.000 -0.155 -0.314 0.062 0.018 0.044 
Dwelling   -0.121 0.096 -0.155 1.000 0.062 -0.069 -0.117 -0.020 
Age       -0.173 0.166 -0.314 0.062 1.000 0.244 0.105 -0.226 
Education     -0.331 0.151 0.062 -0.069 0.244 1.000 -0.122 0.042 
Income    -0.227 0.012 0.018 -0.117 0.105 -0.122 1.000 -0.174 
Household 
size     
-0.253 0.053 0.044 -0.020 -0.226 0.042 -0.174 1.000 
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Appendix 10: Tolerance and VIF for socio-demographic attributes 
 
Collinearity Statistics 
Variable Tolerance VIF 
Sex  
 
0.928 1.078 
Marital status 
 
0.910 1.099 
Types of dwelling 
 
0.957 1.045 
Age 
 
0.861 1.161 
Education 
 
0.856 1.169 
Income 
 
0.916 1.092 
Household size 0.904 1.106 
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Appendix 11: Correlation matrix for sustainability model variables 
Variable Constant Access 
right 
Withdra
wal right 
(WRD) 
Withd
rawal 
right 
(WRT) 
Mana
gemen
t right 
Exclus
ion 
right 
Benefi
t-
sharin
g 
partne
rship 
Custo
mary 
knowl
edge 
Confli
ct 
resolut
ion 
Planta
tion 
Institutio
nal 
capacity 
building 
Corrupti
on and 
discrimi
nation 
Constant 1.000 -0.346 -0.230 -0.230 -0.076 0.090 -0.332 -0.104 -0.190 -0.540 -0.595 -0.095 
Access right    -0.346 1.000 0.074 0.149 -0.019 0.105 0.089 0.033 0.103 0.136 0.161 -0.033 
Withdrawal 
right (WRD)    
-0.230 0.074 1.000 -0.215 -0.177 -0.224 0.304 0.029 0.121 -0.088 0.110 0.021 
Withdrawal 
right (WRT) 
-0.230 0.149 -0.215 1.000 0.229 -0.115 0.014 0.074 -0.006 0.012 0.040 0.080 
Management 
right    
-0.076 -0.019 -0.177 0.229 1.000 -0.099 -0.071 -0.353 -0.078 0.000 0.085 -0.190 
Exclusion 
right 
0.090 0.105 -0.224 -0.115 -0.099 1.000 -0.197 0.118 0.048 0.018 -0.125 -0.078 
Benefit-
sharing 
partnership  
-0.332 0.089 0.304 0.014 -0.071 -0.197 1.000 -0.064 0.063 -0.209 0.022 -0.027 
Customary 
knowledge 
-0.104 0.033 0.029 0.074 -0.353 0.118 -0.064 1.000 -0.023 0.089 0.030 -0.106 
Conflict 
resolution 
-0.190 0.103 0.121 -0.006 -0.078 0.048 0.063 -0.023 1.000 -0.026 -0.031 -0.289 
Plantation -0.540 0.136 -0.088 0.012 0.000 0.018 -0.209 0.089 -0.026 1.000 0.001 0.029 
Institutional 
capacity 
building  
-0.595 0.161 0.110 0.040 0.085 -0.125 0.022 0.030 -0.031 0.001 1.000 -0.010 
Corruption 
and 
discriminatio
n 
-0.095 -0.033 0.021 0.080 -0.190 -0.078 -0.027 -0.106 -0.289 0.029 -0.010 1.000 
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Appendix 12: Tolerance and VIF for sustainability model variables 
 
Collinearity Statistics 
Variable Tolerance VIF 
Access right 0.946 1.057 
Withdrawal right (WRD) 0.888 1.126 
Withdrawal right (WRT) 0.867 1.154 
Management right 0.772 1.295 
Exclusion right 0.878 1.139 
Benefit-sharing 
partnership 
0.922 1.084 
Customary knowledge 0.834 1.198 
Conflict resolution 0.852 1.174 
Plantation 0.913 1.096 
Institutional capacity 
building 
0.939 1.065 
Corruption and 
discrimination 
0.802 1.246 
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Appendix 13: Interview guide for focus group discussions 
 (Confidential) 
Interviewer’s name:     ……………………………………………… 
Name of interviewees (optional):   …………………………………………….... 
Official/current address:  ……………………………………………… 
Date, time and location:  ……………………………………………… 
Briefing research objectives and confidentiality: 
 
Interview Guide:  
Section A: Overall Management of the Sundarbans 
1. What did you think about the forest conservation in Bangladesh? 
2. What are the issues relating to the conservation of the Sundarbans? 
The significance of the Sundarbans at local and national level 
3. Decision making and implementation processes at different levels 
The role of the MOEF, BFD and forest-dependent communities 
4. Do you feel that the Sundarbans is being degraded? If so, how? 
5. What are the interventions for the sustainability of the Sundarbans? 
a. Interventions for the development of the Sundarbans  
b. Interventions for the community livelihood security. 
c. Are these interventions enough? If not, what else can be done? 
d. Does the BFD consult communities regarding interventions? 
Section B: Co-management for Sustainability of the Sundarbans 
(Explanation of ‘Co-management’ by the Moderator) 
6. Is the co-management able to achieve sustainability in the Sundarbans?  
7. What issues of co-management need to be considered? (e.g. defined property 
rights, power relationship, equity, local institution, community involvement 
in management and policy formulation) 
8. Has Government taken any steps to implement co-management in the 
Sundarbans? 
Are the steps adequate?  If not, why? 
9. What are the barriers to the implementation of co-management? 
10. How can these barriers be overcome to achieve sustainability in the 
management of the Sundarbans? 
11. Is there anything else about the sustainable management of the Sundarbans 
that you would like to share that we have not yet touched upon? 
(Thank you for your cooperation) 
